



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AN
ESSAY
ON
THE THEORY OF MONEY
AND
PRINCIPLES OF COMMERCE.

BY JOHN WHEATLEY.

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1819 May 22
PREFACE.

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P R E F A C E.

IN adverting to the reasoning of the Sixth Chapter, it is necessary to observe that our Currency is now at a fixed amount, for as the annual supply of gold and silver from the mines of the world does not materially exceed the annual waste, Gold may be said to be at a fixed amount; and as Paper cannot be reduced in value below the precious metals, Paper is at a fixed amount, though, should the Paper of other countries be augmented, the Paper of this country may certainly be augmented in the same proportion. Our Currency will, therefore, progressively increase, in a slight degree; but it may be said to be sufficiently fixed in amount for all practical purposes.

Though it was perfectly right to come to a fixed amount of Currency and fixed Prices, or to a settled state of Currency and settled Prices, yet nothing could be more unjust than to come to them by a hasty return to Cash payments and reducing our Prices, instead of fixing our Currency at the amount at which it was in 1812 and 1813, and keeping Prices the same.

The only difference, therefore, between the plan which Government has adopted, and the plan which is recommended in this work, is, that Government has fixed our Currency at its existing

amount to the ruin of half the Nation ; and the plan proposed in this inquiry is, that it should be fixed at what it was in 1812 and 1813, not only to avert all ruin, but to raise the Country to the highest state of prosperity to which, under our present erroneous Commercial System, it can be raised.

The existing Distress entirely arises from the inability of the Farmer to procure Income enough, in consequence of the Reduction of Prices, to pay his Rent and Taxes and support himself in comfort ; and from the inability of the Manufacturer and Merchant Importer to pay Interest for Money borrowed and maintain themselves as they formerly did. If they could procure enough for these objects no distress would be known ; and as nothing can give them enough but the same state of Prices as prevailed in 1812 and 1813, and as nothing can give the same state of Prices but the same amount of Currency, if the distress is to be removed, the same amount of Currency must be re-issued as was then issued. But it is greatly to be feared that Ministers will suffer the Distress to go on rather than incur the disgrace of acknowledging their error, and retracting their measures.

The impolicy of setting limits to the Population, Industry, and Wealth of our towns, by forbidding the Import of Foreign Corn, and the injury which this Restriction does to the Farmer as well as to the Manufacturer, are sufficiently explained in the Fifth Chapter of this work ; but it may be presumed that there is not a Farmer in the Kingdom who would not rather have Wheat at 120 shillings, with our ports open, than at only 60 shillings with our ports shut : and with the existing amount of our Currency and an average harvest wheat can never be above 60 shillings. This price

if Rents are to continue as they are, is far from a remunerating one; and if Rents are to be altered, it will be impossible for Land-owners to pay the interest of mortgages and other incumbrances on their estates at the same time retaining for themselves what is fairly their due.

It is thought, by some, that altering the Standard of Money will be as good a measure as increasing the Currency; but if the Standard be altered, the change will be permanent, but if the Currency be increased, and the increase be limited to a fixed sum, the Pound Note will in a few years again be brought to par, and the existing standard be maintained. The one measure will effect a temporary good by means of a permanent evil, and the other will effect a temporary good without any evil at all, but on the contrary be an act of retributive justice to the Farmer and Manufacturer, during the time that the Pound Note is raising itself to par. Nor will this increase of Currency cause any suffering among the poorer classes, as the Wages of Labour will of course be raised in the same degree in which Prices are advanced.

By fixing our Currency at the average amount at which it was in 1812 and 1813, the Country will possess, in the course of a few years, the same proportion of Gold to Paper which it possesses at present, and may possess any greater proportion; and as it may come to this proportion with Prices that will support Contracts, instead of with Prices that break them, why we are to continue to struggle with difficulty,—why the Landed Interest is to suffer in all its branches from a diminution of Income by the alteration of Contracts,—and why an inadequate Revenue is to be raised, and raised with discontent, when all our difficulties may be removed,

—when the Landed Interest may be maintained in the Income they possessed in 1812 and 1813, and when an adequate Revenue may be raised without any discontent at all, and this without placing the Fundholders in a worse situation than they were in in 1812 and 1813, I am at a loss to conceive: unless it be to save the credit of Ministers, if indeed their credit can be said to be saved by persevering in what is wrong, instead of adopting what is right. The illiberal and degrading system of Economy and Retrenchment which is now pursued, and which forces us to act with so much ingratitude to our Public Servants, and particularly to our General Officers, is as ineffectual as it is unnecessary, and, from the apparent but factitious exhaustion it exhibits, is extremely injurious to us in our foreign relations.

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ESSAY, &c.

CHAPTER I.

HAVING shewn in the preceding Volume what appears to me to be the true Theory of Money, I shall now endeavour to explain the Principles of Commerce; but before I make any inquiry into their nature, it will be necessary to point out the real causes of national wealth, for the purpose of laying down the system, by which universal prosperity may be diffused, and the poverty that has hitherto been inflicted on the world be made to disappear.

The Wealth of a nation depends on the amount of its agricultural and manufactured produce, and the number of people among whom that produce is shared. The gross produce of every country is divided into as many shares as there are persons. Unless every person, however poor, obtained his daily portion, he could not subsist; but the wealth of a country is determined by the greater or less magnitude of the shares. Where population is small, and produce comparatively great, the produce will be divided into large shares, and the nation will be rich;

CHAPTER where population is great, and produce comparatively small, the produce will be divided into small shares, and the nation will be poor : its wealth or poverty being according to the greatness or smallness of the shares, or to the proportion which produce bears to population.

It is impossible to form a correct estimate of the wealth of a nation without considering the gross amount of its produce with reference to the number of its people ; as a nation with a small produce may be comparatively much richer than a nation with a large one, and have not only a larger relative, but a larger actual, surplus at the command of its government. Let the gross produce of a country be what it may, if its population at the same time is also so great, that its produce is divided into shares that give nothing but the necessaries of life to each individual, it will be comparatively poorer than that country whose gross produce is less, but which, from a less relative population, has its produce divided into shares that give not only the necessaries, but the comforts, of life to each individual ; and it will be comparatively poorer still, than that whose gross produce is still less, but which, from a still less relative population, has its produce divided into shares that give the luxuries of life to many, as well as the comforts and necessaries of life to all. A country, therefore, with a small produce, and small population, whose shares are sufficient to give the comforts and luxuries of life, as well as its necessaries, will be comparatively much richer than a country with a large produce, and a large population whose shares are only sufficient to give its necessaries : and as the surplus of a nation consists of that proportion of its produce, which

is converted into comforts and luxuries, it is obvious that CHAPTER
that country, whose produce is small, but whose smallness
of population enables its produce to afford comforts and
luxuries, furnishes to its government not only compara-
tively, but positively, ampler means of revenue than that
whose produce is great, but whose greatness of population
allows its produce to afford nothing but necessities which
cannot be given up without famine. A nation only then
begins to be rich when its produce has so far got the start
of its population as to be divided into shares that yield
something for the conveniences of life beyond mere sub-
sistence ; and it becomes richer and richer in proportion
only as its produce becomes greater and greater, compared
to its population, and enlarges the shares of each individ-
ual. Gross produce, therefore, can only be considered
a criterion of wealth, when taken together with popula-
tion : as it is the number of people who divide the produce,
and not the amount to which it extends,—the magnitude,
not the quantity, of the shares, that makes the produce
comparatively great or small, and the country possessing
it rich or poor.

The number and magnitude of the shares into which
the agricultural produce of a country is divided, depends
for the most part on the law of inheritance. The num-
ber and magnitude of the shares into which the manufac-
tured produce of a country is divided, depends on the
greater or less application of machinery.

Where the law of primogeniture prevails, the land will

CHAPTER I.
principally be divided into large estates, and if those estates are divided into large farms, and no encouragement is given to the increase of labourers, beyond what the wages of labour rear, population will be small, and the upper classes belonging to the land will be rich, and the lower above want, or all will be in the same relative prosperity ; because the produce will be great, compared to the number of people who are to share it. But if the estates are divided into small farms, each farm giving rise to a distinct family, population will be great, and the upper classes only will be rich, and the lower poor ; because the produce will be small compared to the number of people who are to share it. But where equal laws of inheritance prevail, and the whole of the land is divided into small possessions, population will be still greater, and the upper and lower classes will all be poor ; because the produce will be still less, compared to the number of people who are to share it. All principles that lead to the raising of produce by the labour of a few, or to the division of property into large shares, are conducive to wealth ; and all that lead to the raising of produce by the labour of many, or to the division of property into small shares, are conducive to poverty.

The manufacturing population of a country will be rich or poor, according to the degree in which machinery is substituted for manual labour ; as the application of machinery contributes more than any other cause to increase the proportion of produce to population, or divide property into large shares. If any given number of people

can raise ten times more produce by the aid of mechanical power than without it, it is obvious that they will be ten times richer, as their shares of property will be ten times larger: and those nations that save the greatest number of hands by its application, or, in other words, raise the largest produce with the fewest hands, will necessarily be the wealthiest; because the produce to be shared, or the money to be divided, amongst a given number, will be greatest. Give to a nation of ten millions of people, the machinery of a loom in manufacture, and of a plough in husbandry, and to a nation of a hundred millions nothing more than the knitting-needle and the spade, the ten millions will raise as much produce as the hundred millions, and will therefore possess ten times as large a share of property, or divide among themselves ten times as large an income.

Machinery has been thought detrimental by some, because it throws out of employment all those whose manual labour before raised the produce which it serves to make. But though the discarded hands will suffer, unless their labour find a beneficial diversion, or unless the state provide for them, by a well regulated system of colonization, as it should do, all the rest of the community are benefitted by the substitution; because they buy the manufactured article at a cheaper rate. The manufacturer who uses the machinery has not only a larger share of property himself, but enables all others to have a larger share; for as he can afford to give a greater quantity of his own produce for a less quantity of their's than before, all have so

CHAPTER much more of their own for other exchanges, or so much ^{I.} more to sell. He therefore not only increases his own income, but indirectly increases that of all others ; and in proportion as those who follow other trades are capable of displacing manual labour by machinery, they will be more or less capable of adding to the aggregate stock of produce, and increasing the general shares of property. By degrees a large produce and large income are thus raised and shared by the same number of hands that before raised and shared a small produce and small income : and a nation becomes rich in the same proportion in which its produce becomes great, compared to the paucity of people who divide it.

But though the partition of the land into large estates and large farms, and the application of machinery in manufactures, form the best foundation for national wealth, because they necessarily lead to a large produce, and small comparative population ; yet no country has legislated on these principles to a sufficient extent to create the state of society that ought to result from them. All have more or less adopted laws and customs that have encouraged population beyond what the produce that was raised required, and by the dividing of property into too many shares, have entailed misery instead of happiness on the mass of mankind.

When a nation increases in produce in a greater degree than it increases in population it becomes richer, because its shares of property become larger : when a nation in-

creases in population in a greater degree than it increases **CHAPTER**
in produce it becomes poorer, because the shares of pro- **I.**
perty become smaller. Every nation, therefore, should
endeavour to increase its produce and reduce its popula-
tion, till further reduction, by diminishing the powers of
labour, would cause produce to be diminished in a greater
degree than population ; but as long as produce could be
kept to the same amount, while population was diminish-
ing, the country would be so much richer, according as
the shares of property became so much larger. But in-
stead of embracing this policy, all nations have, more or
less, established laws to increase population in a greater
degree than produce, and have therefore caused poverty
to prevail instead of wealth.

The population of every country is divided into a cer-
tain number of classes that are possessed of different pro-
portions of the national produce, or different degrees of
wealth, according to their rank. The natural result of
things in the formation of society seems to have dictated
nearly the same classification in all countries ; but from
the failure of laws to confine the population of each class
within its just limits, the national produce is in no country
so impartially shared among the classes as to maintain
them all in the same relative prosperity. In every instance
where the population of a class exceeds the number which
the produce that is raised for its maintenance can duly
support, the shares become so divided, that its deteriora-
tion immediately ensues. The necessary laws should
therefore be made to prevent this limit from being ever

CHAPTER passed. In no country are the classes so nearly confined to their proper number as in this, which is partly owing to our laws, and partly to established custom.

The productive classes of this country consist of eight; four belonging to the land, and four to manufactures and trade.

The four classes belonging to the land are the nobility, country gentlemen, tenants, and labourers. The nobility are limited in number by the crown; but they are maintained in the same property, or in the same shares of the national produce, from generation to generation, by the law of primogeniture. There is no power to limit the number of country gentlemen, but they are necessarily restricted in number, and maintained in the same property, or same shares of the national produce, from generation to generation, by the same law; and experience has shewn, through a long course of years, that their descendants, and the descendants of the nobility, are not more than enough to supply the liberal professions of the army, the navy, the church, and the law, and keep up the line of succession. Had their descendants exceeded this proportion, and reduced the shares, by division, to too low a value, examples would have occurred of their being, in some instances, so distressed in circumstances as to follow professions inconsistent with their rank, which has rarely happened. In the case of the nobility, indeed, the limitation of the title to the eldest son, and on his decease without male issue, to the remaining sons of the created peer and their male

descendants has not been found sufficient to continue the **CHAPTER**
 line of succession, as the number of extinct peerages suffi- **I**
 ciently shews ; but if further inheritors were admitted, the
 constitutional prerogative of the crown, in the creation of
 peers, would be too much encroached upon. But in the
 class of country gentlemen, as the succession to the eldest
 son, or in the male line, is in all unentailed estates merely
 optional, it often happens, in default of male issue, that
 the estate is bequeathed, or descends, to a daughter, whose
 marriage supplies the deficiency, and causes the property
 to be equally transmitted to posterity unimpaired. But if
 equal laws of inheritance were to prevail, and the estates
 were to be divided into equal shares, according to the num-
 ber of children, the two classes of the nobility and country
 gentlemen would be totally extinct in three generations.
 Each successive division, as it occurred, would give rise
 to a poorer and poorer family, till the shares would dwindle
 to so small a property, that their descendants would be
 brought to seek subsistence in the lower walks of life,
 and poverty instead of wealth would pervade the upper
 and middle classes.

As the number of tenants cannot be greater than the
 number of farms, the class of tenants is confined to its just
 proportion, and maintained in its fair share of the national
 produce, by the division of estates into large farms, which
 places the tenantry of England on a higher footing than
 that of any other country. The occupation of three or
 four hundred acres by one tenant, instead of the occupation
 of them by thirty or forty poor families, enables the English

CHAPTER farmer to rear his family in ease and competency, and leave
I. a sufficiency behind him to support his children in the same
way of life in which he was brought up himself. But if
equal laws of succession were established, instead of the
law of primogeniture, and the farms were split into small
divisions, this class, in a few years, would also be extinct,
with that of the nobility and country gentlemen ; and
want, misery, bad cultivation, and low rents, would take
place of respectability, comfort, a high state of cultivation,
and high rents.

By this result of the law of primogeniture, which has
led to the partition of the land into large estates and large
farms, and caused property to continue of the same mag-
nitude through a long succession of ages, the three classes,
of the nobility, country gentlemen, and tenants, have been
confined within their proper limits, and maintained in
their just shares of the national produce. And had the
class of labourers been limited to the number which the
wages of labour could rear, and maintained in their fair
share of the national produce, nothing would have been
wanting to the creation of as perfect a state of society, and
as just a partition of the wealth of a nation, as human laws
are capable of forming.

The four classes belonging to manufactures and trade,
are master-manufacturers and labourers, merchants and
tradesmen.

As far as the home trade is concerned, the number of

the master manufacturers depends on the amount of the agricultural surplus, as they cannot exceed the proportion which this surplus is calculated to support : but the same law of primogeniture that leads to large estates and large farms, and therefore limits the population of the country, increases the population of the towns, because it provides more food for the supply of the towns, or leaves a larger surplus to be exchanged for manufactured produce ; and as the extent of the manufactured produce will be in proportion to the extent of the agricultural surplus, not only does the law of primogeniture make the landed interest richer, but it makes the manufacturing interest collectively richer also. But where foreign trade is freely permitted, and the agricultural surplus of other countries is allowed to be imported, the number of manufacturers will be increased according to the extent of this supply, but they never can exceed the proportion which the aggregate agricultural surplus is adequate to maintain. As this collective surplus is comparatively larger in this country than in any other, the master-manufacturers are relatively richer than those of any other country.

But the manufacturing labourers do not participate in the same relative superiority. They suffer from the same cause as the labourers in husbandry—the competition of a greater number of workmen than the wages of labour would have reared.

The number of merchants, independently of the transit trade, depends on the united amount of the agricultural

CHAPTER and manufactured surplus. Where the law of primogeniture prevails, which leads to a large agricultural surplus, and where machinery is most substituted for manual labour, which leads to the largest manufactured surplus, the mercantile body will be greatest in number and highest in capital ; because their consignments will be proportionally extensive. But where an equal law of inheritance obtains, which leads to a small agricultural surplus, and therefore to a small manufactured surplus, and where but little machinery is used, to a manufactured surplus still less, merchants will be few in number and low in capital, because their consignments will be proportionally small ; but where a transit trade is carried on for the interchange of the agricultural and manufactured surplus of foreign countries, they will be more numerous in proportion to the extent of this trade ; but their united numbers can never exceed what the home trade, the foreign trade, and carrying trade, can duly support.

The number of tradesmen will also depend on the amount of the agricultural and manufactured surplus, and never can exceed what the transaction of exchanges between the two bodies can properly maintain. But, for the same reason as the merchants, they will be more numerous and wealthy where a law of primogeniture takes place than under an equal law of inheritance.

From this review of the classification of this country, it is evident that all classes, with the exception of the labouring poor, are confined to their proper number, by law, by custom, or by the limitations which the state of trade

prescribes, and are therefore maintained in the wealth **CHAPTER** which their respective position in society requires. But ^{I.} wise and just as this partition of the national property is, it originated in the speculative principles or practical experience of no lawgiver, but rose out of the ruins of the feudal system, and grew to maturity by the gradual advancement of ages. One of the principal links in the chain of partition consists in the division of estates into large farms, for which there is no stipulation by law, but which has become the general custom of the country, from a consciousness of its beneficial tendency; notwithstanding that the opposite plan of small farms would be in more conformity with the prejudices of the public, and the views of our statesmen, which have always been to increase population to the utmost, instead of repressing it. Nor has the law of succession, which limits the estate to the eldest son, any operation, except in the case of an intestate, and yet such is the general feeling of the propriety of the law, that an instance very seldom occurs where an estate is bequeathed by will in any other manner. It was a consciousness of the practical good resulting from this law that induced the barons, in the reign of King John, to come to their celebrated resolution of “ *Nolumus leges Angliæ mutare;*” though the theory that the wealth of a nation depended on the division of its lands into large shares was as little understood then as it is now. But it is a singular fact, that in our constitution, which has in a great degree taken a republican form, so fundamental a tenet of the feudal system as the law of primogeniture should have remained; and that, in the governments of the continent,

CHAPTER which till lately took not only a monarchial, but despotic,

I.

character, the equalizing policy of the Roman law of inheritance should have been substituted in its stead. The resistance which our ancestors made to the supremacy of the church happily continued the law of primogeniture among us; but wherever the ascendancy of the papal power has maintained itself, the civil code of the Romans has been more or less partially introduced. An equal law of inheritance might have been established on the continent, with the double view of supporting church and state; as an equal division of property among all the children, though of republican origin, is more favourable to the views of monarchy than the accumulation of wealth, and consequently of power, in the heads of families: but it must be admitted, that an equal law of inheritance is much more consistent with the natural rights of mankind than the "insolent prerogative" of primogeniture. Nothing can appear more unreasonable, at first view, than to give to the eldest son what by the law of nature belongs to all the children alike; but when national poverty is the fixed and inevitable doom of the equal division of estates, from the small shares of property and numerous population it occasions, no doubt can be entertained of the superior wisdom of the distinction. Nor can it be said that the younger sons materially suffer by the partiality; for as the large produce and small population to which the law of primogeniture gives rise, not only prevents the liberal professions from being overstocked, but provides a considerable surplus to be laid out among them, they are sure to afford a competent subsistence to worth and talent. It

is seldom, therefore, that the younger sons of a wealthy **CHAPTER**
I.
country gentleman fail of eventually acquiring as good an income as they would have had, had the family been broken up by an equal division of the property. They certainly debar themselves from the privilege of marrying much more than they would do under an equal law of inheritance, as the possession or occupation of land, let it be ever so small, almost always leads to marriage. The expensive manner in which the younger sons of a good family are educated and supported sufficiently deters them from entering into this state, unless they have the prospect of bringing up their children in the same way ; and that the preventive check, so well explained by Mr. Malthus, operates with due force among this description of persons, the gains of the liberal and scientific professions fully attest. Under an equal law of inheritance these professions are so freely supplied, and the surplus that constitutes their gains is so small, that they are incapable of affording an adequate provision.

The law of primogeniture therefore is indispensably requisite to the due partition of the agricultural and manufactured produce of a country, among the various classes that compose its population, and under proper regulations will always maintain them in the respective prosperity which they ought to possess. But it will not of itself create this prosperity. It will not cause the prosperity of the tenantry where estates are not divided into large farms ; but the tenantry cannot be prosperous without it, because large farms cannot exist. Nor will it of

CHAPTER itself give rise to an effective body of home manufacturers,

I.

as foreign manufacturers may have such a superiority as to put in a better claim to the agricultural surplus, but an effective body of home manufacturers could not well be established and maintained without it, as a sufficient agricultural surplus could not easily be imported to make and continue them effective. Though, therefore, this law is a necessary incident to constitute the prosperity of every class; yet all, that it necessarily does, is to restrict the classes of the nobility and country gentlemen to their just proportion, to keep up the great families of a nation in constant succession to support its character and dignity, and provide a large agricultural surplus for the exigencies of the state and distribution among the other classes.

That the law of primogeniture will not of itself create the prosperity of the class of tenants and labourers, unassisted by the custom of dividing the estates into large farms, the wretched condition of the tenantry and the labouring poor of Ireland too strongly attests. By the prevalence of this law the nobility and country gentlemen are confined to their just number, and maintained in the same, or nearly the same, opulence as the nobility and country gentlemen of England; but from the division of estates into small farms, the tenants and labourers exceed their just number to such a degree, that they are far removed from the same relative prosperity with the upper classes. The soil of Ireland is, generally speaking, superior to that of England, and had the same policy been pursued, of restricting the lower classes to their just pro-

portion, as is pursued in England, by the division of CHAPTER ^{I.} estates into farms of the same magnitude, there is no doubt that the prosperity of Ireland would have been equal, if not superior, to that of England. But as long as the present system prevails, of cutting up the estates into small parcels, and letting four or five hundred acres to forty or fifty tenants, instead of one, there is no possibility of raising her to the same relative opulence ; because there is no possibility of limiting the number of tenants and labourers to the same relative proportion, and giving to each the same share of the national produce. Their numbers are so great compared to the produce, that their shares are too small to afford any thing beyond the bare necessities of subsistence. In order to place Ireland on a level with England, her nobility and country gentlemen should totally reverse the system on which they now act, in the management of their property, and adopt the requisite means to confine their tenants and labourers to their just number, by converting their small farms into large ones. Where the small farm system prevails, poverty must inevitably result ; because the population of the lower classes must always be too great, and the shares of produce too small.

If 500 acres were divided into fifty farms, instead of being occupied as one, the land must produce fifty times as much under their cultivation, to make each of them as rich as the one. If it produced no more in their hands than in the hands of the single tenant, it is obvious that they must be fifty times poorer ; and if it produced less,

CHAPTER as it certainly would, they must be more than fifty times
 I. poorer. With such a system of division there would be no possibility of raising the fifty tenants to the same degree of wealth with the single tenant, as there would be no possibility of giving them the same share of produce. Their poverty must be utterly without remedy, and without end.

Where this system is practised the rent too must necessarily be lower ; for as more hands will be employed in raising the produce than the land requires, and therefore employed to a loss, the fifty tenants will collectively be at more expence in working the soil than the single tenant. Under any system of economy and privation, the support of the fifty tenants, with their fifty families, will greatly exceed the price of labour paid by the single tenant, and in proportion to this excess, a diminution must take place in the amount of the rents. The share of property that gives the comforts of life, as well as its necessaries, can always afford a higher rent than that which gives its necessaries only, as a deduction may be made from the one, but never from the other. But not only will the tenants be poorer and the rent lower under a small farm system than a large one, but from the total want of capital and stock, the cultivation will be worse, and the gross produce consequently less. It is impossible that any means can be devised to establish and extend the empire of poverty more effectually over the lower classes of mankind than the multiplication of small shares of property, by the division of estates into small farms.

The number of tenantry in every country is necessarily ^{CHAPTER} proportionate to the number of farms. Population is ^{I.} ever ready to augment itself, where a house, a cottage, or a cabin, can be had to give protection to a family. The difference between the agricultural systems of England and Ireland fully illustrates with what force the principle breaks loose under any relaxation of the restrictive power, and passes from a nearer to a further limit. The large farms of England impose a boundary that cannot be transgressed; and, as long as they remain, the tenantry will be restricted to their just number: but if the boundary were enlarged by the division of estates into small farms, the tenantry would immediately become co-extensive, and would continue to increase as long as the division was persisted in, till misery and famine checked their progress.

To such a degree is the multiplication of small farms carried in Ireland, that the tenants and labourers can scarcely be said to form two distinct classes. Every tenant is a labourer, and every labourer a tenant, both of them principally living on the produce that is raised by their own hands. The order of tenantry as it exists in England, in competency and independence, with a suitable establishment of hired labourers for the cultivation of their farms, can hardly be said to exist in any part of Ireland. Without large farms no separation of the classes can take place. Small allotments necessarily blend them together, and invariably cause them to run to excess of population, and excess of poverty. Where the tenantry are confined to their just proportion, by the division of estates into large

CHAPTER farms, the labourers will, for the most part, be confined to
 I. ~~the~~ their just proportion too. Labourers are much less disposed to marry when they earn their subsistence by wages than when they earn it by the produce they raise from their own ground. Nor, indeed, can poor habitations be so easily had under a large farm system as a small one.— To establish, therefore, the prosperity of both classes, by the limitation of both to their just proportion, it is absolutely necessary that the classes should be distinct; and to cause their separation, by the union of small farms into large ones, should be the great object which the Irish nobility and country gentlemen should endeavour to realise.

As the division of estates into small farms is the sole cause of the inferiority of the tenantry and labouring poor of Ireland to the tenantry and labouring poor of England, a transition to large farms is consequently the only thing required to place them on the same footing. There is no possibility, however, of making this transition without an extensive system of Colonization; but colonization must be conducted on very different principles from those on which it is now carried on to produce the requisite result.

All the emigration that has hitherto taken place has had no effect to lessen the poor of the united kingdom a single individual, because no means have been taken to correct the system by which the poor are reproduced, and the removal of one pair has only made room for another,

to restore the sum of poverty to the same amount; what- **CHAPTER**
 ever, therefore, may have been the benefit to the parent **I**
 state, in a commercial point of view, from the settlements
 she has made, as far as regards the diminution of the poor,
 colonization has been utterly unavailing, as the number of
 poor is at this moment as great, if not greater, than ever it
 was; and let emigration proceed in a ten-fold ratio to its
 present rate, the number will still continue as great, unless
 the cause that leads to their reproduction be removed.

Nor can any measure be fraught with more inhumanity than that of sending settlers to a foreign station without any adequate and pre-arranged plan for their support, and leaving them the instant they are landed to their own exertions to find what means of living they can. In order to make colonization answer the great ends of which it is capable, the mother country should not only receive an instantaneous benefit by being relieved of so many poor, but should have that benefit confirmed to her for ever, by such precautionary measures as will prevent her from ever having the same number of poor again: the settlers should be provided with the means of obtaining a better subsistence in the station to which they are sent than they could obtain at home: and each country should look, as the colony advanced in prosperity, to a lasting and increasing reciprocation of advantages arising from the freedom of trade.

To accomplish these objects the most effectual measures should be taken to prevent the districts and towns that are cleared of their poor from reproducing them to the

CHAPTER same amount, by uniting the small farms into large ones,
I. and destroying the habitations that give birth to the poor,
wherever placed, whether in the country or the towns. And that the settlers may be competently provided for at their place of destination, their emigration should be conducted in the nature of a military expedition. They should be embodied into regiments before their departure, and kept together in encampments at the stations where they settle. Engineers, with a suitable train of surveyors, drainers, and practical husbandmen, should be previously appointed, and despatched to the settlement to report upon the best spots for fixing the encampments; and magazines should be formed at proper places of the stores that are necessary to support and forward the establishment. The lands, when cleared, should be divided among the officers and men in due proportion, and all support from the mother country withdrawn after five years.

It is a fortunate circumstance that we not only possess colonial territories of sufficient magnitude to give effect to this plan, to whatever extent it may be requisite to carry it, but of such fertility and excellence of position in point of climate, as almost to make it a matter of difficulty to select the best.

The three principal stations where our settlements are founded, are Canada, the Cape of Good Hope, and New Holland. Though all of them are well adapted for the reception of colonies, and well calculated to make ample returns for the expence and labour of cultivation, yet

Canada, from its proximity and healthiness, presents **CHAPTER**
greater advantages than the other two. The position of **I.**
Canada will allow a British settler to live in the same
latitude in which he lived at home, as the whole of North
America, between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, from
latitude forty-five to the North-west Sea, belongs to Great
Britain. The temperature of this district, between forty-five
and fifty-five, is nearly the same as that of England, but some-
what hotter in summer and somewhat colder in winter, and
admits the cultivation of Indian corn and vines in addition
to our agricultural produce. The excessive heat of cli-
mate necessary to the production of sugar, cotton, and
coffee, deducts too much from the enjoyments of life to be
eligible for residence. The south-west district of Canada,
therefore, as described in the interesting narrative of Sir
Alexander Mackenzie, who explored it with such enter-
prising boldness, offers altogether a greater union of advan-
tages than any other situation on the Globe, with the ex-
ception of Chili. A navigation for canoes, save at the
portage points where the canoes are unloaded and carried,
extends the whole of the way from the Atlantic to the Pa-
cific Ocean, from the mouths of the river St. Lawrence to
the mouths of the Columbia. Game and fish are to be had
in abundance through the whole district; and corn and
wine, and flocks and herds, may be raised and reared to
any extent as the country becomes cleared.

Nothing is wanting to advance this settlement to pro-
sperity and wealth, but a chain of encampments between
these rivers for the purpose of opening an easy line of com-

CHAPTER I.
munication, and forming so many protecting points for the safety of the settlers, and general security of the colony. The portage places seem to be pointed out by nature as the fittest spots for fixing the encampments. By steam boats and fleets of canoes our settlers may be conveyed to any stations that the engineers may decide upon. A commander-in-chief, with a full and able staff, should be appointed over the whole line, to see that the communication is free and open, that the encampments are properly placed, and that the settlers who surround them are duly protected. When the links of this great chain are once united, and personal safety secured, settlers of every description, and from all parts, will be sufficiently ready to flock round the encampments. Many will repair to them with the view of bettering their condition, many to explore a new and interesting tract of country, and many to enjoy the vicissitudes of the chace, so attractive to young and ardent minds. There can be no doubt, upon this communication being formed and maintained, that the colony will advance with rapid steps from competence to opulence, and from opulence to refinement, and in a few short years will become sufficiently flourishing and powerful to make ample returns to the parent estate for the expences incurred, by an extensive and lucrative intercourse. It was by such encampments, and such a free line of communication, that the Romans advanced the countries they subdued to the same state of civilization with themselves. Almost all our cities had their origin in Roman encampments, nor is there any reason why the cities of Canada should not in the same manner, rise out of British encampments.

But it is not only for the benefit of Ireland, and the prosperity of Canada, that this extensive system of colonization should be carried into effect, but it is of the utmost importance to the labouring poor of England. There are no means of benefitting our poor but by giving them a larger share of produce, or more wages, than they are now possessed of; but it is impossible that they can have a larger share of produce without their number being diminished, or produce being increased. One of these effects must ensue to allow more to be divided among them. No plan, therefore, that does not conduce to one of these ends can have any tendency to improve their condition.

There has been a great increase of agricultural and manufactured produce in this country during these last fifty years; and, had not the number of our poor exceeded what the wages of labour would have reared, produce would have got a head of population to such a degree, or wages would have risen to such a degree, as to have allowed the poor as much as those who are interested for their welfare could have wished them to have. Not only, however, have our poor laws contributed to raise a greater number of poor than would otherwise have been raised, but the influx of the poor from Ireland, and the mountainous districts of Scotland and Wales, has made population keep pace with produce, as the increase proceeded, instead of keeping behind it, and prevented our own poor from deriving any advantage from it. It is obvious that if our produce increased sufficiently to place the labourers of England on a better footing than the labourers of Ireland, by an advance

CHAPTER of wages, the Irish labourers would come over to take ad-

I.

vantage of the advance, and, by preventing produce from being augmented in a greater degree than population, would prevent the improvement that would otherwise be made in the condition of our own poor. This has been particularly exemplified in Liverpool, Manchester, Bristol, and Glasgow, which have increased in opulence to a greater degree during these fifty years than any other towns; but great as the increase has been, the correspondent influx of the Irish, by making population keep pace with produce, has prevented the increase from being productive of any advantage to the English poor. The same competition that has kept wages from rising in the manufacturing labour of England, where there was any increase of produce, has also kept them from rising in agricultural labour, notwithstanding the great increase of agricultural produce during the same period. Thousands and thousands of Irish have regularly flocked to the English ports for the summer season, as the increase took place, and, by spreading over the country, have prevented the advance of wages that would otherwise have been made in favour of the English labourer. If it were possible, by any system of political economy, or any regulation of our poor laws, to raise the wages of labour in England to twenty shillings a week, while the wages of labour in Ireland were no more than ten, as there is no law to prevent the Irish from coming from Connaught to Kent, to take advantage of the difference, there is no possibility of raising the poor of England to any great degree of superiority above the poor of Ireland, or of keeping the wages of the two countries from coming nearly to the same level.

In the present state of things the poor's rate is, in reality, CHAPTER
raised for the relief of the poor of Ireland, instead of for I.
the relief of the poor of England ; for if what is given in
the summer to the Irish was distributed among the Eng-
lish, there would be no application, or but very little
application, for relief, by the English poor during the
winter. The poor's rate, therefore, is, in point of fact,
raised for the service of Ireland, and not for the service of
England ; for, if the Irish were excluded, no rate would
be necessary.

Fortunately, therefore, for Ireland, there is no possibility
of raising one part of the united kingdom to a state of
prosperity without the other. All must be advanced in
the same degree ; and while the labouring classes of Ire-
land are poor, let the increase of our produce be what it
may, the labouring classes of England must be poor also.

An injurious influx of poor has also taken place from
the mountainous districts of Scotland and Wales, where
the small-farm system also prevails to a greater degree than
it ought to do ; but as the population of these countries
has not proceeded to the same relative extent with the
population of Ireland, the competition has been less pre-
judicial. But these districts would be more prosperous in
themselves, and contribute more to the general prosperity
of the kingdom, if more attention were paid on the part
of their landed proprietors to a comparatively increased
produce and diminished population, by a conversion of
the small farms into large ones.

CHAPTER I. But in addition to this competition from Ireland, Scot-

land, and Wales, the English poor have themselves been augmented beyond what the wages of labour would have reared by the system of our poor laws. Noble and benign as the principle may appear, of considering the population of a country as the children of the State, and providing for them in poverty at the public expence, yet as all institutions that conduce to the increase of the poor beyond what the wages of labour would rear, deteriorate their condition, by raising more competition than would otherwise subsist, they have an evil, instead of a good, tendency. The support which is given to the supernumerary hands, leads to the poverty of the whole body, since not only does the surplus proportion fail of acquiring a competent subsistence, but those who were before employed are no longer able to earn their just gains. Partial benevolence is thus converted into general inhumanity, and the sum of human misery is increased by the very means that are taken to lessen it. Inasmuch, therefore, as our poor laws have a tendency to increase the number of our poor beyond what the wages of labour would rear, their principle is injurious; and as it must be admitted that they have this tendency, notwithstanding the counteracting power of the law of settlement, which, though a strong, is still an inadequate counterpoise, it would be inconsistent with reason not to condemn them. But there can be no question whatever that the improved state of our agriculture and manufactures would long since have reduced these laws to a dead letter, and extinguished the poor's rate, had not the advantages that would have resulted to the English poor from

the rapid increase of our produce been counteracted by **CHAPTER**
I.
the influx of the Irish poor as fast as the increase occurred. 

But nothing can be further from my intention than to recommend that any measure whatever should be taken to obstruct the influx of the Irish. They have as much right to enter into competition with an English labourer as a fellow-labourer of England has. Their poverty is not occasioned by their own misconduct, but arises from the custom so unhappily prevalent in Ireland, of dividing the estates into small farms instead of large ones. Had their nobility and country gentlemen conducted their estates in the same manner in which estates in England are conducted, there would have been no poor in either kingdom. But no public body can be fairly condemned for not acting on a system which has been too little illustrated to have it clearly made out, that national good must inevitably flow from it. If their nobility and country gentlemen will now do their duty, by lending their aid to raise their poor to the condition, to which they ought to be raised, past evil shall be forgot in the future good. But it is proper here to remark, that as the higher classes of Ireland are just as opulent as the higher classes of England, save the difference that arises from the bad management of their estates, there was no reason why they should have been exempted from the property tax, as they inherit as large estates by the law of primogeniture as the nobility and country gentlemen of England; and should the property tax be hereafter renewed, it should undoubtedly be made to extend to Ireland. The lower classes should of course be excepted in the same manner as they are in England.

CHAPTER I.

It is not only, therefore, for the peculiar interest of Ireland, but it is to the full as much for the interest of England, and the best interests of humanity, that the labouring classes of Ireland should be advanced to the same prosperity with the labouring classes of England. The existence of poverty, wherever it is found, is the fault of the government that allows it, as it is in the power of every one so to legislate as to prevent its existence. No system can be more consonant to wisdom, or more calculated to raise the sum of human happiness to a higher amount than the classification of the people of England; and had the same classification extended over the whole of the united kingdom,—had the class of tenants and labourers in Ireland been separated as they ought to have been by the division of estates into large farms, the just limitation of every class would have been realised over every part of the united kingdom, and no poor would have been known. An example would have been given to the world of such a perfect classification of the population of a country, and such a perfect distribution of its wealth, as utterly to preclude the existence of poverty.

Such a state of things may now be brought about, but it can never be brought about unless colonization is carried on to an extent greatly surpassing the present scale, and unless, let it be carried on to what extent it may, the lands that are cleared of the poor are converted into large farms, and the towns that are cleared of the poor have the habitations that produced them converted to some other purpose, as all emigration will be useless unless the reproduction of

the poor is prevented. In every instance, therefore, where **CHAPTER**
the poor may be induced to quit their home for a foreign
settlement, whether in England or in Ireland, a stipulation
should be made that the habitations they leave should not
be again tenanted ; and the utmost precaution should be
taken, in both countries, to prevent the further erection of
cottages on the sides of roads, the edges of commons,
and the outskirts of towns, for the further spread of
poverty. Nor can it answer any good end to send out a
few hundred persons every year, on a narrow and economical
principle, instead of many many thousands. It would
be taking a drop of water out of the sea to stop the rise of
the tide. From fifty to a hundred transports, therefore,
should be annually taken up—the proper season of the year
for sailing should be made known—particular ports should
be appointed in both kingdoms for the reception of the
emigrants—barracks should be provided for their accom-
modation before their departure—pay should be allowed
at the rate of sixpence a day for each individual, for five
years, and every facility should be afforded for the execu-
tion of the plan which its policy and importance de-
mand. The Italian poor principally live on Indian
corn, five pounds of which, or more than enough for the
daily support of life, may be had in good seasons for
a penny ; and as this corn may be raised with the same
facility in the southern districts of Canada as in Italy, it is
fair to presume that sixpence a day will be ample provision
for a settler ; but the expences can only be ascertained by
experiment.

CHAPTER I. Whatever may be the amount of the expences, it should be charged on the poor's rate, which should be made to extend to every part of the united kingdom, to give effect to the plan. In Scotland and Ireland the fund should be appropriated to the relief of the poor in no other way; but in England, where the poor are already entitled to parish relief, an option should be given to those who apply for aid, to join the emigrant associations or receive the rate at home as before. No law should be made to compel them to colonize, instead of remaining on the parish, as they should not be placed in what they may consider a worse situation; but when so much fairer a prospect is opened to them of bettering their condition than is presented to them at home, it is reasonable to infer that those who have sufficient health for the enterprise will be glad to accept the proffered good. When emigration has proceeded to a sufficient extent to raise Ireland to such a degree of prosperity as to prevent her poor from flocking over to this country, the charge will be no longer necessary, and the poor's rate will become extinct; and if the system is carried on with the spirit and energy that are requisite, the rate may cease to be collected in ten or twelve years, and the poor laws die a natural death.

Since, then, there are no means of expelling poverty from England without expelling poverty from Ireland, no plan that does not embrace, in its consequences, the decrease of the population of Ireland, can be productive of any good to the poor of England. Conspicuous, therefore, as are Mr. Scarlett's talents, and enlightened as are his views, his

Bill can be of no benefit to the English poor. The estab- **CHAPTER**
 lishment of a maximum, should all thoughts of bettering **I.**
 the condition of the poor be given up, may relieve those
 who are to pay the poor's rate, but can be no relief to
 those who are to receive it. But as the extinction of the
 rate is preferable to its limitation, it is better to pursue the
 system that will cause its extinction than that only which
 will cause its limitation. To colonize the poor of Ireland,
 and prevent their reproduction, is the only mode by which
 the condition of the poor can be made what it ought to be
 in both countries.

Though the wages of labour will be higher under this improvement of the state of the poor than they now are, yet as but little more will be required for English labour than is now required for Irish and English labour together, not only will the labourer be better off, but the master will be better off, by having less on the whole taken from him in consequence of his release from the poor's rate; and as produce will not only be raised altogether at less expence, but get a-head of population, all will be wealthier according as their shares of produce are made larger.

On the Lanark system it is only necessary to observe, that as its principle is large population and small shares of property, instead of small population and large shares of property, its extended execution would not only be productive of greater poverty than now exists, but, from the increased population that would ensue, would, in a very few years, lead to misery and famine.

CHAPTER I. Unless the plan which is here recommended be adopted, it will be impossible to allay the spirit of disaffection which now accompanies, and always will accompany, distress. Nothing that does not cause population to be diminished and produce increased, nothing that does not raise the wages of the poor, and give them the comforts of life, as well as its necessaries, can be of any avail. It is not an Extension of our Foreign Trade, or Catholic Emancipation, or a Reform of Parliament, or an Improved System of Education, or an Amendment of our Criminal Code, or the carrying of any of the great questions, about which the leading statesmen of the country now interest themselves, that will produce the good that is required. It is necessary in the first instance to relieve the country from the greatest of all evils, Poverty; and this can only be done by bringing about the limitation of the class of tenants, and the limitation of the class of labourers, according to the system which is here laid down. If this system is carried into effect, not only will the united kingdom be raised to a high degree of wealth and happiness, but Canada may be brought, in the lapse of a few years, to a state of rival prosperity.

CHAPTER II.

On the laws and customs that affect the state of Population in different countries.—Superiority of the Law of Primogeniture over an equal Law of Inheritance for promoting National Wealth.—Comparison between the wealth of France and England.—A Restrictive System of Population, with large estates and large farms, better than a Stimulative System of Population with small estates and small farms.—England more wealthy than France in consequence of the Restrictions on her Population.

IT is evident, from the foregoing chapter, that no nation CHAPTER
II. can attain to a due state of wealth, or such a state as will allow the comforts of life as well as its necessaries, to be given to the lower classes, and the luxuries of life as well as its comforts and necessaries, to be given to the upper, unless all classes are limited to their just proportion—to that proportion which permits the national produce to be divided into shares of sufficient magnitude for the purpose. No country can be said to be truly prosperous, whose produce is not sufficiently large, and whose population is not comparatively sufficiently small, to admit of such a distribution. But the relative amount of population and produce depends on the extent to which a restrictive or stimulative system of population is carried by the laws and customs that relate to the division of property.

CHAPTER II. Where these laws and customs are founded on the principle of making population conform to produce, the system will be restrictive, and the number of each class will be duly limited, because it cannot exceed the number of shares; but where the laws and customs are founded on the principle of making produce conform to population the system will be stimulative, and the number of each class will be unlimited, because the shares will be increased as the numbers increase, till misery and famine interpose their authority to prevent the increase from going further. Where a restrictive system of population is established, the shares will be large, and competent to their office; where a stimulative system is established, the shares will be small, and incompetent to their office. And in proportion as a nation approaches to, or recedes from, a due state of wealth, by adhering to, or departing from, the laws and customs that are requisite to confine each class to its just number, the shares will be more or less adequate to their object. If all the classes are duly restricted, and all consist of their just number, all the shares will be competent, and universal prosperity will prevail. Every country will be rich in proportion as it pursues a restrictive system, because its produce will be so far above population; and every country will be poor in proportion as it pursues a stimulative system, because its population will be so far above produce.

The laws of a country will tend to confine the classes to their just proportion or not, according as they give the estate of the parent to the eldest son, or to all the children alike; according as they lead to large or small estates, by

making the shares of property indivisible or divisible. And the customs of a country will tend to confine the classes to their just proportion or not, according as they lead to large or small farms; to an indivisible and limited number, or to a divisible and unlimited number. Where the laws and customs both co-operate in establishing large farms as well as large estates, and cause them to be maintained from generation to generation of the same size, the system of population will be altogether restrictive, because the number of which the classes are composed cannot exceed the number of estates and farms, and every class will be limited to its just proportion. Where the laws and customs co-operate in establishing small estates as well as small farms, and cause them to be divided from generation to generation, as the numbers, of which the classes are composed, augment, the system of population will be altogether stimulative, as the estates and farms will increase in the same degree with the numbers of the classes, and every class will exceed its just proportion. But where the laws and customs are at variance with each other—where there is a law that causes the estates to be large and indivisible, and a custom that causes the farms to be small and divisible; or where there is one law that creates large estates, and another that creates small ones, the systems of population will be partly restrictive and partly stimulative, as the class whose estates are indivisible will be limited, and the classes whose estates and farms are divisible will be unlimited, and the systems will preponderate on one side or the other, according as the laws and customs lean most to large estates and large farms, or small estates and small farms.

CHAPTER

II.

As the laws and customs of England both co-operate in establishing large farms as well as large estates, her system of population is wholly restrictive. As the laws of Ireland are the same as those of England, her system is restrictive, as far as the laws have force; but as her custom is at variance with her laws, and conduces to the division of farms as population increases, her system is half restrictive and half stimulative,—restrictive as to the upper classes, and stimulative as to the lower. In Austria, Prussia, Russia, and Spain, the laws are at variance with each other, and as there is one law that creates large estates and another that creates small ones—as there is a law of primogeniture for the chief nobility, and a law of equal inheritance for all the other classes—the systems of population are stimulative in a greater degree than restrictive by the operation of the laws; and as the custom of small farms universally prevails, their systems are entirely stimulative, with the exception of the first class of nobility. But in France there is no exception whatever to the stimulative system. No law of primogeniture exists; and as her laws and customs both co-operate in establishing small estates as well as small farms, every class is unlimited, and her system is wholly stimulative. As the two countries, therefore, of France and England pursue a system of population directly the reverse of each other, the one being altogether stimulative and the other altogether restrictive, a comparison between them will more fully exemplify the principles of national wealth than a comparison between any other two countries, as the two systems have occasioned a totally different order of things in the two kingdoms, the one having led, in consequence of an equal law of inherit-

ance, to small shares of property and poverty, and the other having led, in consequence of a law of primogeniture, to large shares of property and wealth.

The equal law of inheritance which now obtains in France is not materially different from that which prevailed before the revolution. It was originally taken from the pandects, and substituted for the law of primogeniture by the influence of the church. In consequence of this substitution most of the noble families were reduced to poverty by the successive division of their estates, long antecedent to the revolution. The law to distribute the property of the parent among all the children alike is so just and faultless in principle, that the ill consequences resulting from it were entirely overlooked, and, notwithstanding the daily destruction it was causing of the great families of the kingdom, no effort was made to arrest the progress of the evil by appealing to the old system. But excellent as this law was admitted to be in theory, it was felt to be so bad in practice that recourse was had to every possible expedient to evade its operation. Where a family was large, the second son was usually destined to the priesthood, and could therefore hold no lands ; the younger ones, if circumstances allowed, were portioned off in the life-time of the father, on condition that they would surrender their shares to the eldest ; and the unmarried daughters were, in most instances, consigned to convents, that their shares, save a very small portion, which was given to the convent for their support, might be forfeited. But though these expedients were in some degree successful to retard the degradation of a family, they were not of sufficient force to prevent its

CHAPTER final ruin ; and few of the great families, with the exception of those allied to the throne, retained any adequate share of the possessions that once constituted the splendour of their house when the revolution broke out.

It might be presumed that the agrarian system, which this division of property had already created, was carried to a sufficient extent by the operation of this equalizing law to meet the views of the most zealous republican ; but extended as the division was, the shares were not deemed sufficiently small to answer the purposes of the revolutionary leaders. To promote the partition of the land therefore still further, and bring down all families to the same common level of poverty, the confiscated property of the nobility and the church was parcelled out in the smallest possible allotments, though this was certainly done as much for the purpose of impeding the restoration of the estates to their former owners, by increasing the number of proprietors, as for encouraging the agrarian system. This policy caused the division of property, already forced to an injurious extent, to be pushed to a pernicious extreme ; and such is now the number of small proprietors, that scarce a family is to be found in all France that would in England be called a rich one. Some idea may be formed in this country of the small share of property which is held sufficient for the support of the higher classes, when a majorat of £1200 a year, which descends with the title to the eldest son, is thought a competent income to maintain the dignity of a French nobleman in the Chamber of Peers, and when in the Chamber of Deputies the average income of the members does not exceed £400.

The present law of inheritance allows the parent, where one child only is left, to dispose, by will, of half his property,—where two are left, of a third,—and where more than two are left, of a fourth ; but if the privileged share were in all instances bequeathed to the eldest son, it would simply retard, but not prevent, the final division of the estate.

CHAPTER
II.

The population of France consists of the same number of productive classes as the population of England ; the nobility, gentry, tenantry, and labourers, for the land, and the master-manufacturers, merchants, tradesmen, and labourers, for manufactures and trade.

The nobility of France under the feudal system, and as long as the law of primogeniture was in force, were the most opulent nobility in Europe ; but since the introduction of the Roman law of inheritance, they have become the poorest. They now consist of two orders, the Real and Titular.

The real nobility are those who are members of the Chamber of Peers, and are limited in number by the crown. The titular nobility are those who have hereditary titles without seats in the Chamber ; and as all the sons of a noble family are distinguished by a title, and by the law of equal inheritance possessed of the same, or nearly the same, property with the eldest, the number is necessarily unlimited, and amounted before the revolution by the division of estates to 50,000 families. Many of these have since had the good sense to drop the distinction ; and it would

CHAPTER be as well if all titles, except those that belonged to
 II. the members of the Chamber, were exploded.

If the law of primogeniture were re-established, the Peers of France might gradually recover their ancient dignity, and accumulate sufficient property to support their station with that degree of opulence which ought to attach to the peerage of a great nation. The average fortune they now possess is totally inadequate for the purpose, and, if an equal law of inheritance is to continue, it will always be inadequate, notwithstanding the limitation of their number, as the majorat, the only part of the property that descends unimpaired to the eldest son, is not only an insufficient income for a Peer, but an insufficient one for a member of the Chamber of Deputies.

Instead of fifty thousand families, the House of Lords of England consists of no more than 345, forming, from the constant preservation of their estates, the richest public body of which history furnishes an example. In the Roman senate the wealth of Crassus greatly surpassed that of the other senators, and amounted to about £3,000,000 of our money, and the value of money in those days was nearly the same as it is at present. But the estates of the Dukes of Devonshire, Bedford, Northumberland, and Rutland, may be estimated at a somewhat higher sum than £3,000,000, and those of Lords Lonsdale, Stafford, Hertford, Buckingham, Fitzwilliam, Darlington, Bridgewater, and Grosvenor, at a sum not much inferior; but whatever may be the precise difference between the fortunes of

these noblemen and that of Crassus, the average income **CHAPTER**
of the Peers of England greatly exceeds that of the Roman **II.**
senators in the proudest era of their greatness.

When, therefore, a comparison is to be made between the Peers of France and the Peers of England, it is impossible to draw a fair parallel, because they do not consist of the same description of persons, the Peers of England having great wealth, and the Peers of France having none at all, not even enough to support the poorest country gentleman of England in respectability. But that the purest principles of virtue, and the highest sentiments of honor, are perfectly compatible with the lowest state of poverty, all history furnishes abundance of instances, and the history of no country more than that of France; but an experienced lawgiver would certainly say that it would be more consistent with sound policy to place a public body in such a state of wealth as to be above corruption, than in such a state of poverty as to be constantly exposed to it, and that the public councils of a country would be more likely to be directed as its best interests dictated where the members had a great stake in it than where they had a small one. But be this as it may, all that it is necessary to shew here is, that the law of primogeniture has maintained a rich order of nobility in England, and that an equal law of inheritance has substituted instead a poor order of nobility in France, and that, if the constitutions of the two countries are to be similar, the law of primogeniture must be revived, and the Chamber of Peers must be composed of persons possessed of the same degree of wealth as the

CHAPTER House of Lords of England, or no real similitude can
II. exist.

The titular nobility of France may be blended, under the new constitution, with the common order of gentry, forming, together, a poor and numerous body of landed proprietors, and every year and every day becoming poorer and poorer, from the deaths that occur, and the divisions of property that follow. Since the introduction of the Roman law of inheritance, this class has had no limit, the number of shares having uniformly increased in the same proportion with the number of persons, and has only been restricted by the interposition of misery, in consequence of property becoming too small to be further divided into the means of living. From this class the members of the Chamber of Deputies are principally elected ; but it is obvious that the Chamber, thus composed, has as little affinity to our House of Commons as the Chamber of Peers to our House of Lords. There is as much difference between the wealth of the two elective bodies as between the wealth of the two hereditary bodies. Such, indeed, is the disparity, that any three of our wealthiest commoners, as Mr. Coke, Sir Watkin Williams Wynn, and Mr. Portman ; Sir Robert Peel, Mr. Beaumont, and Sir Charles Morgan ; Mr. Duncombe, Mr. Hughes, and Mr. Arkwright ; Mr. Watson Taylor, Mr. Rothschild, and Mr. Coutts, or the three Barings, could buy the whole Chamber. These fortunes are, however, marked exceptions, the average fortune of a member of the House of Commons being about £4000 a year, in-

stead of £400. But this difference is sufficient to shew CHAPTER
that the Chamber of Deputies is not composed of the same
class of persons as our House of Commons, and, while the
present law of inheritance remains, it never can be.

II.

But as the constitution of France, formed as it is, may be fully equal to discharge the duties of a good and wise government, notwithstanding the want of opulence among its members, it is not for the purpose of bringing its constitution to a perfect similitude with our own, that the law of primogeniture should be restored, but it should be restored as a preliminary step to that state of prosperity which gives to all classes their due share of wealth. At the present moment there is not a single class in France that possesses its due share, because there is not a single class restricted to its just proportion. In England every class is properly restricted, except the labouring poor, and they would be duly restricted if the Irish were excluded. In Ireland the nobility and country gentlemen are duly restricted, though the lower classes are unlimited: and in Russia, Austria, Prussia, and Spain, the first class of nobility is duly restricted, though all the other classes are unlimited; but in France every class is unlimited, and until her whole system is changed, and every class is duly restricted, prosperity will be unattainable.

The first measure, therefore, that should be taken to raise France to a due state of wealth, is to prevent the further increase, and further impoverishment, of the upper classes, by preventing the further division of

CHAPTER estates. While the division and subdivision of estates are

II.

permitted, there will be a constant progress from bad to worse, as the proprietors of the land must necessarily get poorer and poorer as their shares get smaller and smaller. But by the restoration of the ancient law, and giving the estate to the eldest son, no further reduction to poverty will be made, and the existing state of wealth, such as it is, will be maintained. This is all that law can, at the present instant, accomplish. No sudden and violent change for the better can be made. It is impossible to form such a system of re-action, by political regulations, as to bring back the upper classes to their just proportion, and restore them to a due state of wealth, by the hasty steps that they receded from it. Nothing can be more easy than to increase the population of a country and reduce it to poverty by the dividing of estates, and making the births exceed the deaths:—nothing so difficult as to decrease the population of a country, and restore it to wealth, by the reconnecting of estates, and making the deaths exceed the births. The reflux of the stream must be slow and gradual; but under a law of primogeniture, as fortunes are made and property is accumulated,—as intermarriages take place between elder sons and only daughters,—the estates will eventually become larger and larger, and the peers and country gentlemen of France may in time be raised to the same degree of opulence with the peers and country gentlemen of England: though many years must undoubtedly elapse before the small properties can be re-united, and such a state of prosperity be in view.

'Till the law of primogeniture is restored, and large **CHAPTER**
estates are formed, it is impossible that large farms can be
formed, as the division of estates, under the present law, is
always operating to their reduction: and such is now the
small size of farms, that the tenants and labourers of
France, like the tenants and labourers of Ireland, consti-
tute but one class. Every tenant is a labourer, and every
labourer a tenant. In France, indeed, a farm of three or
four hundred acres, cultivated by hired labour, is of less
frequent occurrence than in Ireland, because no large
estates exist to admit of farms of such an extent. To raise
Ireland to a due state of wealth, it is only necessary to en-
large the farms; to raise France to a due state of wealth,
it is necessary to enlarge the estates as well as the farms.

When large farms are formed, as the number of tenants
can only be commensurate with the number of farms, the
class of tenants will be entirely separated from the class of
labourers, and raised to a level with the tenantry of Eng-
land. Without this separation neither class can possess
the comforts of life, which they ought to have. But to
raise the labouring poor, on the enlargement of the farms,
to a due degree of prosperity, and enable them to earn
sufficient wages to realise the benevolent wish of Henry
the Fourth, that "every man should have a fowl in his pot
on a Sunday," it is necessary that competition should be
lessened by lessening their number. But as France is with-
out colonies, there is no other mode of diminishing the
number of her poor, but by entering into a treaty with
those States whose population is too thin to allow of their

CHAPTER settling. By a compact with Russia and Spain, any number of emigrants might be settled with advantage to all the contracting parties, in a climate fully equal to that of France, either on the shores of the Euxine and Caspian, or in the luxurious provinces of South America.

Should the alteration, which is here suggested, at any time take place in the law and custom of France, and large farms, as well as large estates, be made to prevail, the four classes belonging to the land will be restricted to their just proportion, and possessed of their due share of wealth ; but while the present law of inheritance remains, each class will exceed more and more its just proportion, the shares of property will become smaller and smaller, and poverty, with its attendant miseries, will be always increasing.

But it is not that poverty is confined under this law to the four productive classes belonging to the land only, it extends to the four productive classes belonging to manufactures and trade ; and in proportion as the whole productive body is poor, the funds that furnish the public revenue will be low, the army and navy will be badly paid, and the liberal and scientific professions will be incapable of earning an adequate subsistence.

As the amount of the manufactured surplus of a country, as far as it is confined to the home trade, cannot, in any great degree, exceed the amount of the agricultural surplus, for which it is exchanged, where the agricultural

surplus is small, the manufactured surplus will be small **CHAPTER**
 also : and as these united surplusses constitute the funds
 that supply the revenue, where they are deficient these
 funds will necessarily be deficient in the same proportion.
 The army and navy, and the liberal and scientific profes-
 sions, will be in an impoverished condition, not only on
 account of the inadequacy of the funds, but on account of
 excess of numbers ; for in the same proportion in which
 an equal law of inheritance causes the funds for their
 maintenance to be diminished, it causes the number of
 candidates to be increased. One effect cannot take place
 without the other, as there would be no poverty if there
 were no excess of numbers.

It is obvious, that the agricultural surplus of a country
 will be relatively great or small, according to the number
 of hands that are employed to raise it. If 500 acres are
 cultivated by a hundred families, the agricultural surplus
 which they yield will be much less than if they were culti-
 vated by one family ; as the support of the hundred fami-
 lies must be taken from the surplus in one instance, and
 the support of no more than one family be taken from
 it in the other. Where, therefore, the estates are small,
 and the farms are small, almost all that the land supplies
 will be consumed by those that raise it, and but little be
 left to exchange for manufactured produce, or but little
 be left for the support of manufacturers, and the supply of
 the towns. As far, therefore, as the manufacturing body
 of a country depends, for its maintenance, on the corn that
 is raised at home, it will be great or small according as the

CHAPTER agricultural surplus is great or small ; or, in other words,
 II. where there is a large agricultural population, there must necessarily be a small manufacturing one, and where there is a small agricultural population, there will be, or there may be, a large manufacturing one. But as the small estates and small farms of France give a large agricultural population and small agricultural surplus, they necessarily prevent the manufacturing body and manufactured surplus from being otherwise than small also.

But where the agricultural surplus and the manufactured surplus are both small, the merchants can have but small consignments, and the tradesmen but little to exchange. The mercantile and trading classes, therefore, will be equally distressed with the farmers and manufacturers, and the whole productive body of the country will participate in the same common lot of poverty.

Under this deficiency in the united surplusses of the productive classes, no adequate funds for the supply of the revenue can exist ; because the average income of the people will be too small to allow an excess above necessities out of which it can be paid. Unless there is a surplus income, convertible into luxuries and comforts, the revenue must be paid out of necessities only, and cannot be collected without causing distress ; because a sufficient residue cannot remain for the means of subsistence. The severity or lightness of the pressure of taxation does not depend upon how much is taken, but upon how much is left. Where the average income is sufficiently large to allow an

excess for luxuries and comforts, a revenue commensurate with this excess may be raised, because a competent residue will remain. But where the average income is so small as to allow no more than enough for the purchase of necessaries, no revenue can be collected, without embarrassment; because no competent residue can remain. If there are two nations, one of which is possessed of £50 a head, and the other of no more than £20, the nation possessed of £50 a head may be taxed £30 each, and yet have a residue equal to the average income of the other, though exempted from all taxation.

There is no other mode by which the pressure of taxation between any two countries can be fairly estimated, than by what is left. No inference can be drawn of an equality of burthen, from the payment of the same proportion of income, unless their income per head is the same, as a greater residue must be left in one instance than the other. A country possessed of £50 a head, can pay a tenth of its income much more easily than a country possessed of only £20 a head; as the one will have a residue of £45, and the other only a residue of £18. Nor can any estimate be formed of the comparative wealth of nations, from the amount of their revenues; for as there is no positive limit to the exactions of government, it is possible that a poor country may pay out of necessities, as much as a rich one out of luxuries and comforts. It is with the funds that furnish the revenue, and not with the revenue itself, that the comparison should be made. Where there is a large excess of income above necessities,

CHAPTER II. the funds will be large : where the excess is small the funds will be small. The extent of the excess is the true measure of their relative wealth.

In order, therefore, that the revenue may be large, and the residue large too, it is requisite that all classes should have a large income above necessities. In whatever class this surplus is wanting, the pressure of taxation must be felt with more or less severity. Where the farms are large, as well as the estates, and all classes are duly limited, and rich, as in England, all can contribute without distress, because all can pay out of luxuries and comforts, leaving necessities totally free. Where the estates are large, but the farms small, as in Ireland, the upper classes only can contribute without distress, because they only can pay out of luxuries and comforts. But where the estates are small as well as the farms, and all classes are unlimited and poor, as in France, none can contribute without distress, because none can pay out of luxuries and comforts without encroaching upon necessities. But as supplies must be raised, notwithstanding the distress to which they give rise, it may happen that the revenue of France, paid out of necessities, may be as large as the revenue of England, paid out of luxuries and comforts, though the funds of England might be capable of supplying six times as much, or though more might be left to the people of England if they paid six times as much.

In proportion, therefore, as the small-property system of France causes a less surplus income above necessities,

than the large-property system of England, it causes the CHAPTER
funds for furnishing a revenue to be so much less also. II.

The same cause that makes the funds for supplying a revenue too small makes population too great; for if the shares of property were larger, and competent to their office, the funds would be larger, and population be duly restricted. But as a law of equal inheritance causes the shares to be smaller and smaller, as population is greater and greater, produce becomes deficient in the same proportion in which the number of people becomes excessive, and poverty and population keep pace with each other. Competition, therefore, to fill the liberal professions is increased, according as the funds for their subsistence are diminished, and they become overstocked in the same degree in which they are badly paid. The army and navy, and the learned and scientific bodies, alike suffer from the co-operation of these depressive effects of the Roman law.

A French soldier is allowed three-pence halfpenny a day and a pound of bread. Out of the three-pence halfpenny one penny is reserved for linen, from which stockings are excluded, as an unnecessary appendage in a warm climate. Another penny is given for breakfast, and another for dinner. The odd halfpenny is received by the soldier, and is commonly laid out in tobacco. Sixteen mess together. Their breakfast and dinner are the same; half-a-pound of bread and a pipkin of soup, with vegetables and a piece of meat in it. A finer body of men than the French soldiery cannot exist; and this allowance serves

CHAPTER to shew how little will suffice, with good management, to

II. maintain the health and strength of the human body.
Marriage is not permitted. Notwithstanding the scantiness of this subsistence, and the penalty of celibacy, such is the general inferiority of condition among the lower classes of the people, from their redundant numbers, that they are, commonly speaking, eager to engage in the service, and none but men of good character are admitted.

The pay of a French officer is about one-third of the pay of an English officer ; and little as this may appear, it is, in most instances, all that is possessed. The professors of law and medicine, and of the arts and sciences, are not better off than the officers. A physician has half-a-crown a visit, and the various masters in the arts and sciences usually no more than ten-pence an hour for what they teach. Where the productive classes are poor, it is impossible that the unproductive ones can be rich. A large surplus is as essential for the maintenance of the professions in a due state of wealth as for the supply of the revenue.

In England, the same restrictive system of population that causes the funds for the support of the different professions, or unproductive classes, to be larger, causes the numbers that supply them to be fewer. As the sum, therefore, to be divided among them is greater, and the number who are to share it is less, their condition must of course be better. An English soldier has thirteen-pence a day. Three-pence halfpenny is reserved for linen ; he pays four-pence half-penny for three quarters of a pound of meat, and three half-

pence for a pound of bread. Should this portion of meat **CHAPTER**
and bread cost more, the overplus is paid by govern- **II.**
ment. The remaining three-pence halfpenny, as much as
the whole pay of a French soldier, he receives for himself.
On foreign service he is allowed eight-pence a day, with
bread and a pint of wine. An English officer has, gene-
rally speaking, a competent allowance from parents, or an
independent property, in addition to his pay. The mem-
bers of our inns of court, and the professors of medicine,
often acquire large fortunes; and those who distinguish
themselves in science or art seldom fail of being duly
remunerated. Where produce is great, and population
relatively small, all classes must necessarily be richer than
where produce is small and population relatively great.

In France, the titular noblemen and gentlemen are often compelled to stoop to professions totally inconsistent with their rank in life, which in England very rarely occurs. But had France retained her ancient law of primogeniture, which would have caused her estates to continue from generation to generation of the same magnitude, she would now have been greatly superior in wealth to England, instead of greatly inferior.

In order to shew the correctness of the foregoing argu-
ment by facts, it is necessary to give a statistical account
of the population and produce of the two countries.

France consists of 51,910,062 metrical arpents. A me-
trical arpent contains 110,412 English feet. An acre con-

CHAPTER tains no more than 43,560. A metrical arpent, therefore,
 II. is rather more than two English acres and a half, or
 51,910,062 metrical arpents are equal to 131,552,317
 English acres.

The population of France has been carried by some returns as high as 32,000,000. Some have made it no more than 28,000,000. The returns of 1815 made it 29,152,743; of which 25,334,837 inhabited the country, forming the agricultural class, and 3,817,906 inhabited the towns, forming the manufacturing class. But for the sake of round numbers, I will take the acreage at 130,000,000, and the population at 30,000,000, making the agricultural class consist of 25,000,000, and the manufacturing of 5,000,000.

The principal tax in France is a land-tax, in the nature of our parish rate, and is levied on the proprietors of land and houses according to a per centage on the real or estimated rent of the property they possess. When the amount of the revenue is fixed, the minister decides at his option what proportion each department is to pay; and the proper authorities, in the various subdivisions of the department, determine the sum which each proprietor is to give. But too much is left, not only to the partiality, but to the discretion and judgment of the minister, and those who act under him. The system is unsatisfactory to the party determining, and the party paying, the assessment. It is impossible for any man to possess himself of such a correct valuation of the net produce, or net income, of the different

departments, as to be capable of taxing all in the same **CHAPTER**
 proportion. The existence, or belief, of partiality has **II.**
 given rise to great complaints of the inequality of the bur-
 then ; and instances have certainly not been wanting, where
 particular districts have been favoured through the interest
 of powerful individuals who resided in them. But setting
 aside all partiality, the constant variation of seasons and
 circumstances makes any approximation to a just decision
 on the proportion, which each department should bear, im-
 practicable. A general per centage on the united property
 of the kingdom, without specifying the proportions of the
 departments, would be far preferable, if it could be duly
 collected, as it would not only prevent all inequality, but
 relieve the assessors from the odium that attends the exe-
 cution of their office, whether discharged with impartiality
 and disinterestedness or not. Of all the taxes which a go-
 vernment can impose, a general per centage on property is
 the fairest and wisest.

To give to government, however, the means of forming
 as just a decision as possible, great pains have been taken to
 come at a correct valuation of the net income of each de-
 partment. In 1791, the constituent assembly ordered a
 survey to be made of the whole kingdom. The successive
 troubles of the revolution prevented the completion of the
 work, but a third part of each department has, for the
 most part, been surveyed ; and in 1817, a report was
 drawn up by the head commissioner, Mr. Hennet, from
 the returns transmitted to his office. This report contains
 three different tables of the net income of each depart-

CHAPTER ment. The first is deduced from actual survey, by draw-

II.

ing an inference of what a whole department will yield, from the survey of a third part. The second is taken from the mean rent of an arpent; and the third is the estimate of special commissioners. According to the first table, the net income arising from the land and houses of France is £55,130,786; according to the second, £61,926,860; and according to the third, £67,750,000. The houses consist of 5,431,000, and the manufactures and mills of 127,000, the net rental of which is estimated at £13,865,000. If this sum is deducted from the highest calculation of £67,750,000, it will leave no more than £53,885,000, for the whole net rental of the land of France; a sum scarcely superior to the public revenue, and therefore greatly below the real amount.

These tables are founded on the supposition, that the average rent of an English acre in France is no more than eight shillings, which, on a calculation of four rents, would make the gross produce no more than £1. 12s. According to such an estimate the gross produce of the kingdom would be only £208,000,000, which divided among the agricultural body of 25,000,000, would give no more than £8. 6s. a head. But from the best private testimony, the average rent of an English Acre in France is about twenty shillings, and the gross produce £4. At this rate, the net rental of the land of France will be £130,000,000, and the gross income, or gross agricultural produce, £520,000,000, which divided among the agricultural body, will give £20. 16s. a head, instead of £8. 6s.*

* See the Tables in the Appendix.

By the official survey, the land of France is thus di- **CHAPTER**
vided :— **II.**

Total square surface . . .	51,910,062	} arpents.
Measured surface . . .	47,412,000	
Departments	85	
Arrondisements	368	
Cantons	2,669	
Communes	38,990	
Registered Properties . .	13,668,000	
Parcels	115,268,000	
Proprietors	12,791,000	

Property not built upon liable to taxation :—

	ARPENTS.	FRANCS.
Arable land	22,818,000	600,191,000
Woodland in under- wood	51,26,000	73,463,000
Woodland in timber	460,000	5,038,000
Pasture	3,525,000	45,320,000
Meadow	3,485,000	184,760,090
Vines	1,977,000	86,064,000
Chesnut orchards	406,000	4,410,000
Fruit orchards	359,000	26,787,000
Kitchen gardens	328,000	23,187,000
Ponds	213,000	3,706,000
Marshes	186,000	3,246,000
Hop and hemp grounds	60,000	3,311,000
Osier grounds	58,000	2,009,000
Olive orchards	43,000	2,977,000

CHAPTER
II.

	ARPENTS.	FRANCS.
Land otherwise cultivated	1,076,000	48,975,000
Waste Land	3,841,000	8,067,000
	<hr/>	<hr/>
	43,959,000	1,121,511,000
	<hr/>	<hr/>

Property not built upon, and not liable to taxation :—

	ARPENTS.
Forests belonging to the crown	1,486,000
Roads and streets	1,170,000
Rivers and lakes	465,000
Mountains	325,000
	<hr/>
	3,446,000
	<hr/>
	43,959,000
	<hr/>
	47,405,000
	<hr/>

Property in buildings, and liable to taxation :—

	FRANCS.
Houses	5,431,000
Mills	76,000
Manufactures	35,000
Divers buildings	16,000
	<hr/>
	5,358,000
	<hr/>
	332,775,000
	<hr/>

Property in buildings not liable to taxation :—

	ARPENTS.
Churches	56,000
Public buildings	22,000
	<hr/>
	7,000
	<hr/>
	47,405,000
	<hr/>
Measured surface	46,412,000
	<hr/>

The principal facts to which it is necessary to advert in **CHAPTER**
 this statistical survey are the 13,668,000 of registered pro- **II.**
 perties, the 12,791,000 of proprietors, and the 115,000,000
 of parcels of land.

The number of properties being 13,668,000, and the territory of France no more than 130,000,000 of acres, the average size of the properties cannot be more than ten acres each. But as many proprietors have more than one property, Mr. Hennet makes the number of properties exceed the number of proprietors by 877,000. Yet as there must necessarily be as many properties as there are proprietors, and as the number of proprietors are 12,791,000, the average quantity of land possessed by each will still be short of eleven acres.

But the number of proprietors must be greatly exaggerated. In a population of 30,000,000, the adults cannot well exceed 12,000,000. Unless, therefore, the property belonging to minors is very great, almost every adult, according to this census, must be a proprietor, which is evidently not the case.

But making every allowance for exaggeration, no document can afford more conclusive testimony to shew the powerful operation of the Roman law, in reducing a country from affluence to poverty, by the conversion of large properties into small ones, and rich proprietors into poor ones. Let a nation be ever so opulent, by a due restriction of its classes, in consequence of the limitation of

CHAPTER estates to the eldest son, and let a law of inheritance be
 II. made to divide the estates, in equal proportions, among all
 the children, the natural order of things must inevitably
 bring about such a partition, in successive generations, as
 to reverse the state of society, and make it poor instead
 of rich.

The 115,000,000 of parcels of land, which scarcely allow more than an acre for each parcel, shew the extent to which the small-farm system is carried by the minute divisions into which it is requisite to split a farm, to give the cultivator a succession of crops. Under a large-farm system, the divisions for the most part take a correspondent size, and broad masses of cultivation appear, instead of the strips and patches that mark the surface where small farms are prevalent. But minute as this subdivision is, it is not impossible, should the present law continue, that in the lapse of years, as deaths and intermarriages take place, the 115,000,000 of parcels may become 260,000,000, and contain no more than half an acre each, instead of an acre.

As the population of France consists of 30,000,000, 25,000,000 constituting the agricultural body, and only 5,000,000 the manufacturing class,—the manufacturing body is no more than a sixth of the whole: and as it may be assumed that all classes consume the same quantity of food per head, it is fair to infer, that the agricultural surplus amounts to no more than a sixth, and that no more than £86,000,000, or a sixth of the £520,000,000, gross produce, is divided among the manufacturers. The manu-

factured surplus, therefore, which is exchanged for it, CHAPTER cannot amount to a larger sum, and unless foreign supplies are introduced, the two surplusses will be completely equal. The agricultural population of France, therefore, being large, causes the manufacturing population to be comparatively small, because but a small agricultural surplus can be spared for its support:—and as the manufactured surplus cannot exceed the agricultural surplus without foreign trade, the manufactured surplus must be small also. Not only, therefore, do small estates and small farms cause the agricultural surplus to be small, but they cause the manufacturing body, and manufactured surplus, to be relatively small also.

To this manufactured surplus of £86,000,000, or to the trade which the manufacturers carry on with the landed interest in exchanging manufactures for food, should be added, the trade which they carry on with each other in the exchange of manufactures for clothing and furniture. But as it is fair to conclude, that two-thirds, at least, of the wages of labour are laid out in subsistence, it is impossible to put this trade at more than one-third of the trade of £86,000,000, which is carried on with the landed interest, or at about £28,000,000. Adding, therefore, the trade of £86,000,000, which the manufacturers carry on with the landed interest, and the trade of £28,000,000, which they carry on among themselves, to the gross agricultural produce of £520,000,000, the gross income of France, arising from her productive classes, will be £634,000,000, which divided among her population of 30,000,000, will

CHAPTER give £21 a head. Though, therefore, a revenue of
 II. £60,000,000 may be raised, by collecting only £2 a head
 from the united population, yet as the residue will be no
 more than £19, no revenue can be paid without deducting
 from the necessities of life.

	ACRES.
England consists of	33,000,000
Wales	5,000,000
Scotland	19,000,000
Ireland	21,000,000
	<hr/>
	78,000,000

The waste land of England is estimated at 2,000,000 of acres, of Wales 3,000,000, of Scotland 12,000,000, and of Ireland 5,000,000 ; in all 22,000,000, leaving 56,000,000 of cultivated acres.

The average rent of a cultivated acre, through England, Wales, and Scotland, was estimated, before the reduction of our currency, at thirty shillings, and the average rent of a cultivated acre in Ireland at twenty shillings. This will make the average rent for the 56,000,000 of cultivated acres twenty-seven shillings an acre ; and for the whole 78,000,000, nineteen shillings an acre, one shilling less than the average rent of land in France.

According to this estimate, the net income arising from the land of the united kingdom will be £76,000,000, and the gross income, or gross agricultural produce, on a cal-

culation of four rents, £304,000,000, £216,000,000 less CHAPTER
than the gross landed income of France. II.

The principal land agents and surveyors, who were examined before the corn committee of 1814, made, indeed, the average rent of an acre in England more than 30s. as they valued the gross produce on farms where sheep-walks were included at £7. 10s. an acre, and on good arable farms at £10, a capital at the rate of £10 an acre being first laid out upon them, without which, it was conceived, no farm could be properly conducted. This sum would be held, however, to be a very inadequate capital in Scotland. The testimony of these surveyors comes with the more weight, as they were called upon to shew that the price of agricultural produce was too low, in order that good grounds might be given to the committee for the introduction of the corn bill, to raise the standard against importation. But, notwithstanding such authority for a higher rate, 30s. seems to be generally admitted as a fair average. Should, however, the present low prices continue, by a refusal on the part of government to restore our currency to such an amount as will cause the same good faith to be kept with the farmers and manufacturers as is kept with the public creditors, it will be impossible to estimate the gross produce of an acre at more than £4, instead of £6; and the average rent of land, on the renewal of leases, must be reduced to 20s. an acre, instead of 30s. But as it may be presumed, that the farmers and manufacturers will pursue the necessary measures to have justice done them, I shall take prices as they were before the contraction of

CHAPTER the currency, and conclude that the rent of land in Eng-
land will continue at 30s. and that the gross produce of
an acre will again be six pounds.

The population of the United Kingdom is about 17,000,000,—England containing 9,538,827, Scotland 1,805,688, Wales 611,788, and Ireland about 5,000,000; but 17,000,000 of people bears nearly the same proportion to 78,000,000 of acres, as 30,000,000 of people bears to 130,000,000 of acres. England and France are, therefore, on a par in the proportion which their population and territory bear to each other. But they are widely different in the proportion which their agricultural and manufacturing population bear to each other, and in the proportion which their population and produce bear to each other: the agricultural population of France being relatively great, and the manufacturing population small; and the agricultural population of England being relatively small, and the manufacturing population great; and the produce of France being relatively small, from its division among a large population, and the produce of England being relatively great, from its division among a small one. The prevalence, however, of the small-farm system in Ireland, makes it necessary that the comparison should be formed between France and England only, as the condition of the lower orders in Ireland is worse than in France. Unless the comparison is made between two countries, one of which is entirely possessed of large estates and large farms, and the other of small estates and small farms, it would not sufficiently illustrate the principles of the work.

England, comprising Wales and Scotland, consists of CHAPTER 40,000,000 of cultivated acres, and 11,956,303 people, ^{II.} exclusive of the army and navy, which, during the war, amounted to 640,500, and made the whole population 12,596,803. The number of families is 2,101,597 ; of which 895,998 are employed in agriculture, 1,129,049 in manufactures, and 519,168 in professions, or without occupation, but principally consisting of the aged and infirm, withdrawn from the industrious classes. The average number of which a family is composed being five, will make the agricultural population 4,479,990, the manufacturing 5,645,245, the unproductive 2,595,840, and the whole population 12,721,075. But for the sake of round numbers, I will take the agricultural class at 4,000,000, the manufacturing class at 6,000,000, the unproductive class at 2,000,000, and the whole population at 12,000,000.

As the average gross produce of an English acre, before the diminution of the currency, was £6, the gross produce of the 40,000,000 of acres was £240,000,000, and the average value of the labour of the agricultural population of 4,000,000, £60 a head. But it has already been shewn, that the average value of the labour of the agricultural population of France is £20. 16s. per head, the value produced by the agricultural labourer of England being three times as much as the value produced by the agricultural labourer of France.

As the agricultural population of England comprises no more than a third of the whole, and as it may be ad-

CHAPTER mitted, that all classes consume nearly the same quantity
 II. of food per head, it follows, that no more than a third of
 what is grown in England is consumed by those that raise
 it, and that the remaining two-thirds are consumed by the
 8,000,000 of manufacturers and other inhabitants, which
 necessarily implies an agricultural surplus to the amount of
 two-thirds, or £160,000,000.

Of this surplus, three quarters, or £120,000,000, are exchanged for manufactures, and given to the 6,000,000 of manufacturers. The other quarter, or £40,000,000, is distributed among the unproductive class of 2,000,000, for private and public services, with or without the process of taxation, and for poor's rate.

Without an agricultural surplus to this extent, it is impossible that so large a body as 8,000,000 of manufacturers and other inhabitants could be maintained. Foreign supplies to a considerable amount may certainly be introduced, but no powerful and effective body of manufacturers can subsist, unless they are principally supported by the home surplus. Our importations of foreign grain have not hitherto amounted to more than £10,000,000; but it will hereafter be shewn, that the more the import of corn is encouraged, the higher will be the price of corn in the home market, and the greater the number of manufacturers, and the greater the amount of manufactured produce.

Nothing, therefore, can shew the superiority of large

estates and large farms more, than that an agricultural body **CHAPTER**
of 4,000,000 should be capable of supporting 8,000,000 **II.**
of manufacturers and other inhabitants, or double their
own number; and nothing can shew the inferiority of
small estates and small farms more, than that an agricul-
tural body of 25,000,000 should be capable of supporting
no more than 5,000,000 of manufacturers, or only one-
fifth of their own number. But it is because England has
so small an agricultural body to maintain, that she can
maintain so large a manufacturing one; and it is because
France has so large an agricultural body to maintain, that
she can maintain so small a manufacturing one. England
is the only country in the world where the manufacturing
population exceeds the agricultural. In all other States
the agricultural population is four, five, six, and seven, to
one. Other causes have certainly contributed to favor the
growth of the manufacturing interest of England, as well
as her agricultural system; but had not her agricultural
population been as small as it is, and her agricultural sur-
plus as large as it is, her manufacturers could never have
reached their present number.

But in addition to the advantages which our manufac-
turers derive from this system, they possess a great su-
periority over the manufacturers of other countries, from the
application of greater mechanical powers to almost every
branch of work. By acting on the same principle in ma-
nufactures as in agriculture, the raising of a large produce
with few hands, our manufacturers have advanced in
wealth in the same way as the landed interest. Fabricat-

CHAPTER ^{II.} **ing** better goods in quality, and more in quantity, by the aid of this machinery, than the manufacturers of other nations without it, they have surpassed all others in the extent of their trade. Besides their home trade with the landed interest, and their home trade among themselves, they have a trade with foreign nations to the amount of about £60,000,000 a-year. During the late war, France was scarcely capable of carrying on any foreign trade, and her customs produced so little to the revenue, that they were expunged from the public accounts. Should peace continue, and better commercial principles prevail throughout Europe, her trade will not only recover itself, but be greatly augmented. But at present her foreign trade would make but little addition to the sum total of her wealth.

It would not, however, be fair to add the whole of this trade of £60,000,000, which our manufacturers carry on with foreign nations, to the home trade of £120,000,000 which they carry on with the landed interest, as a large proportion of the foreign produce imported forms the materials of exchange with the landed interest, and is a substitute for home produce, instead of an addition to it. Deducting, therefore, a third for wine, tea, fruits, spices, &c. &c. as a substitute for home produce, and adding the remaining £40,000,000 to the £120,000,000, the two trades together will amount to £160,000,000. To this sum is to be added the home trade which the manufacturers carry on among themselves, and which may be taken at one-third of the trade with the landed interest, or

£40,000,000; making the united trade which our manufacturers carry on £200,000,000. This sum divided among the manufacturing population will give £33 a head.

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The gross agricultural produce of £240,000,000 being, therefore, added to the gross manufactured produce of £200,000,000, the gross produce of England, or the gross income arising from her productive classes, will be £440,000,000; the two productive classes of 10,000,000 dividing £44 a head, and the whole population of 12,000,000 dividing £36 a head,—£15 a head more than the population of France.

That this estimate is greatly below the real amount is sufficiently evident from the returns of the income tax. The amount of this tax for England, Wales, and Scotland, was nearly £15,000,000; eleven millions of which was paid by the landed interest, and four by the manufacturing. The eleven millions paid out of the land necessarily implies a net produce, or net income, of £110,000,000; and on a calculation of four rents for the gross produce, a gross income of £440,000,000. The four millions paid by the manufacturing interest implies a net income of £40,000,000; and calculating the net produce at 20 per cent. on the gross, a gross income of £200,000,000, making together a gross income of £640,000,000, instead only of £440,000,000; but as the poorer classes were entirely exempted from the payment of the tax, the real income of the country must be much more. It is no part

CHAPTER of my plan, however, to give the highest estimate that can be
 II. formed of the wealth of England, but merely to state the
 difference in the wealth of any two countries, from the
 adoption of a restrictive, and the adoption of a stimulative,
 system of population.

From this comparative view of the population and produce of France and England, it appears that the gross income of France being £634,000,000, and the gross income of England only £440,000,000, the income of France is £194,000,000 more than the income of England; but that from the division of her £634,000,000 among a population of 30,000,000, her people have only £21 a head; and that from the division of the £440,000,000 of England, among a population of only 12,000,000, her people have £36 a head, or £15 a head more than the people of France. It is obvious, therefore, that the people of England can pay three-sevenths of their income, or £15 a head to government, making a revenue of £180,000,000, and yet have as much left as the people of France, though exempted from all taxation. And that if a revenue of only £60,000,000 were required from each country, though the people of England would pay £5 a head, and the people of France no more than £2, yet as the English would have a residue of £31 a head, and the French only a residue of £19, the taxes of England would be paid with much more ease than the taxes of France.

It is this surplus income, arising from the magnitude of her produce, compared to the paucity of her people, that

that constitutes the sole secret of the superior wealth of **CHAPTER II.** England. Had her population been as extended as her statesmen have always wished it to be—had she possessed 24,000,000 of people instead of 12,000,000, she would have been as poor as France, and not only have had no surplus above necessaries, but hardly necessaries enough. It is the great extent, and easy command, of this surplus, that has enabled her to raise such vast supplies, wage such extensive wars, and direct her efforts with such general success, in whatever cause she engaged, as she could apply it in the proportions that were requisite to carry the objects she desired.

It is true that France can send an army into the field at less expence than England ; but as England can afford to spend £180,000,000 a year before France can afford to spend a shilling, the difference in the expence gives no advantage to France. It only shews that the general condition of the people of France is so low, that the pay of a soldier, small as it is, is preferable to the poverty they endure. During the late war, England had above 1,200,000 men under arms, and, had more been wanted, more might have been had.

It is evident, therefore, from this comparison, that the wealth of a nation does not depend on the gross amount of its produce, as the amount will be great or small according only to the number of people among whom it is divided ; and that a country with a small produce and small relative population, may be much richer than a

CHAPTER country with a large produce but still larger relative popu-

II. lation. It is also evident, that an agricultural system of large estates and large farms, and a manufacturing system of substituting mechanical for manual labour, are the only means by which wealth can be obtained, as they are the only means by which population can be duly restricted, and a large produce raised by few hands. It is by these principles, and these principles only, that a surplus above necessities can be procured, and poverty be made to disappear.

According to existing prejudices, it is not easy to conceive how a nation with less money and less people, can be richer than a nation with more money and more people ; but it is because the people of the one country are fewer with relation to produce than the people of the other, that they can divide a larger income, and are richer in proportion to the excess. If the population of France were only 15,000,000, instead of 30,000,000, she would be the richest country in the world, as she would have an excess above her present income to the extent of £21 a head, or a surplus income above necessities of more than £300,000,000.

It is impossible to fix the precise proportion that ought to subsist between the agricultural population and territory of a country, as no country has yet been in a sufficient state of prosperity to afford an example ; and such is the variable nature of land, that the same proportion would not in all instances apply. The agricultural population of Great Britain being 4,000,000, and the land 40,000,000

of acres, there is one person to ten acres ; but as the same **CHAPTER**
quantity of produce might be raised by fewer hands than
are now employed, the landed interest would be still richer,
if the farms were still larger. But population and produce
are then in the best proportion to each other when there is
the greatest difference between them, because the people
then have the greatest quantity of produce to divide, or the
largest income to share. The sole object should, therefore,
be to make this difference as great as possible. If no
addition could be made to the produce of a country, either
in agriculture or manufactures, without such an augmen-
tation of people as would lessen this difference, the country
would be richer without the addition than with it. If a
family were placed on a barren mountain, which, when
brought into produce, would not yield sufficient to main-
tain them in due prosperity, and it was necessary to give
them some part of the previous stock of produce to raise
them to an equal, or nearly equal, degree of comfort with
the rest of the population, the country would be richer had
the mountain continued barren and the family not existed.
It is better, therefore, that the sterile spots of a country
should remain uncultivated than cultivated, if the numbers
that are necessary to bring them into produce would add
more to population than the corn that was raised would
add to produce. The population of a country can never
be too small, unless such a quantity of produce can be
added to the existing stock, by the employment of more
hands, as will raise the proportion of produce above popu-
lation to a higher degree. In America, and all new states,
the large tracts of fertile land that are brought into culti-

CHAPTER vation will have this result. But as no such tracts exist in
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old states, except in Russia, and as the existing amount of produce may be raised by a much less population than is now employed, an accession of numbers would only add to the general poverty, by a greater relative decrease of produce. The population of France, therefore, and almost all old states, should be reduced till further reduction would lessen produce in a greater degree than population.

In forming the requisite funds to furnish a large revenue, the foregoing comparison sufficiently shews, that the great point to which government should direct its attention is also that of as small a population and as large a produce as possible, in order that there may be as large a surplus income as possible, out of which the taxes can be paid. Though a government may be rich where the people are poor; yet it cannot be rich without an extortionary system of taxation, and depriving the people of some share of the necessities of subsistence. If a large revenue is to be collected, it can only be collected, without causing distress, by leaving a large residue for the comforts of life. Where the incomes are insufficient to admit of such a residue, misery must be the inevitable result. It is fortunate, therefore, for mankind, that in legislating most for their own interest, governments legislate best for the happiness of the people; as, for the purpose of providing for the easy collection of a large revenue, they must provide a rich population to pay it. But as no population can be rich, unless there are large properties to make them so, the laws of a country should be so framed as to cause them to

be large. This can only be done by a law of primogeniture, as no large properties can exist where a constant division is going on by an equal law of inheritance. But not only should a law of primogeniture be established, that there may be large estates and large farms, and a rich agricultural population, but the substitution of machinery for manual labour should be encouraged as much as possible in manufactures, that there may be a rich manufacturing population.

France can adopt no effectual measure for the reduction of her population, and the creation of a larger relative produce, except the revival of the law of primogeniture; but these objects would, in some degree, be farther promoted by the conversion of a considerable part of her woodland into large estates and farms, by the abolition of her foundling hospitals, and by the establishment of a free trade.

The destruction of the great families of a kingdom is one of the chief evils of the law of equal inheritance. The order of nobility and country gentlemen, as it exists in England, exists no where else, because no where else does the law of primogeniture prevail to a sufficient extent to suffer the estates to remain of the requisite magnitude to support the order. When the Emperor of Russia came into England he was reported to have said, that he would rather be a Country Gentleman of England than Emperor of his dominions. The remark, if made, shewed an intimate acquaintance with the true springs of happiness; but, whe-

CHAPTER ther made or not, it is certain, that there are many country

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gentlemen, who would be very unwilling to change conditions with him. It is to this order that England is so peculiarly indebted for the establishment and preservation of her constitutional liberties, and it is this order, that France should be more anxious to rear up, than any other.

France possesses about 18,000,000 of acres of woodland; 5,000,000 belonging to the crown, and 13,000,000 to individuals, forming a tract of land nearly as large as Ireland, the produce of which is almost wholly consumed as fire-wood. But if coal were burnt, instead of wood, in the principal towns, and 10,000,000 of these acres were converted into large estates and large farms, 5,000,000 consisting of estates of 20,000 acres, and 5,000,000 of estates of 5,000 acres, the whole 10,000,000 being divided into farms of 500 acres, an order of 250 noblemen, 1,000 country gentlemen, and 20,000 tenants, in some degree similar to the nobility, gentry, and tenantry, of England, would be at once created. The 10,000,000 of acres should consist of the 5,000,000 belonging to the crown, and 5,000,000 more belonging to individuals, which should, in the first instance, be purchased by government, and afterwards re-sold, in allotments of the size required; a certain number of years being given to the buyers to complete their purchase.

But the prejudices in France are so strong against the consumption of coal, that it would be a matter of great difficulty to overcome them; but if they could be sub-

dued, a sufficient quantity of coal might be drawn from French Flanders, or England, to supply the whole kingdom. The manufacturing interest, too, would be benefitted by a timber trade with the Baltic, from the demand of a greater quantity of manufactured produce to supply the materials of exchange.

The whole of England, with the exception of the waste land, is divided into parks, pleasure-grounds, and large farms ; scarcely a trace of which is allowed to remain in the divisions that take place under an equal law of inheritance. But little is left for ornament in France, except the rows of trees on the public roads, which have a becoming air of grandeur on the approach to large towns. But if the law of primogeniture were made the general law of Europe, and the division of estates were every where prevented, there is no reason why the whole of the continent should not be divided in the same manner as England, and the elegancies and comforts of life be every where apparent.

As the agricultural surplus of England is larger than that of France, and gives support to a larger body of manufacturers, the towns of England are larger than those of France. London contains 149,000 houses, and 1,100,000 inhabitants. Paris contains no more than 29,000 houses ; but as poverty induces many families to reside in the same house, the inhabitants amount to 580,000. By the public returns, the ten first towns of England contain a larger population than the forty first towns of France.

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Though it is totally impossible that the population of a country can be otherwise than poor under an equal law of inheritance, yet no country can boast more numerous and better regulated hospitals, to prevent the misery that results from poverty, than France. Of this description are her national hospitals, for the reception of all children, that are sent to them under two years old. Noble and generous as were the views of those who founded these hospitals, yet the mischievous effects that have resulted from them fully attest the mistaken principles of humanity, on which they were formed. They were originally established for the purpose of preventing the crime of infanticide; but as three out of four of the children, that are admitted, die, notwithstanding the unremitting care of those, who officiate, and the exemplary attention that is paid to the health, cleanliness, and comfort of the children, it is evident that the crime of infanticide is committed to a much greater extent, by this real, but deceitful, system of exposure, than it could possibly be had no such establishments been founded. But though so large a proportion of the children never again return to the world, yet such is the dissolution of morals, from the immunity from expence, which these institutions afford to the parents, and such, consequently, the number of illegitimate births, that a further stimulus is given to population than what an equal law of inheritance would of itself create; and the people, already too numerous and too poor, are made still more numerous and still poorer, by these powerful incentives to an illicit increase. According to the returns of 1815, the population of Paris was 580,609, and the births 22,612. Out of this number

of children, 13,630 were born in wedlock. The remaining **CHAPTER**
 8982 were illegitimate, and, therefore, for the most part, **II.**
 placed in the hospital. The number of children belonging
 to the hospital, out at nurse, amounted to 16,000. If the
 illegitimate births of all the other great towns of France
 bear the same proportion to the whole number of births
 as they bear in Paris, it follows, that above a third of their
 population must be born out of wedlock.

Such a fact would exhibit an extent of libertinism unparalleled in any other age or country. There are many names, of ancient and modern times, justly eminent for virtue and benevolence,—many philosophers and many poets,—who have endeavoured to lay down a better system of society than any that has hitherto existed, and have pictured out, in glowing colours, a Golden Age, where all people were to live together as choice directed, and where a perfect community of goods, and perfect equality, were to reign. Certainly no country ever yet approached so near to this wished-for consummation of things as France in her existing condition. But what is this, in plain terms, when reduced to practice, but universal poverty and universal profligacy?

Unless suffering of some kind attend upon crimes, they are sure to occur, and sure to increase. By taking away the penalties of expence and disgrace that ought to follow a breach of the laws, on which the moral order of society depends, government becomes accessory to the depravity that ensues. If the father were made to find provision for

CHAPTER his illegitimate offspring, the licentiousness of the age
 II. would, in some degree, be corrected. But while these
 establishments to save the charge continue, libertinism will
 continue with them. Not only, therefore, have these in-
 stitutions a mischievous tendency to increase the propor-
 tion of population, to produce and add to the poverty of
 the country, but they have the still more mischievous
 effect of encouraging a general relaxation of morals, and
 causing infinitely more crime and misery than they prevent.
 The humanity, therefore, that dictates their abolition, will
 be somewhat better founded than the humanity that dic-
 tated their establishment.

I shall hereafter enquire into the benefits of a free trade ;
 but in proportion as an unrestricted system opens more
 markets, and leads to a greater quantity of produce than a
 prohibitory system, it will be so far the interest of France,
 and all other countries, to adopt it.

CHAPTER III.

The System of Population in China not only stimulative but violently impulsive.—Its pernicious effects.—Misery and Poverty of the People.—Periodical Famines.

POOR, however, as France is, in comparison with England, from the adoption of a stimulative, instead of a restrictive, system of population, yet is she in a state of perfect affluence in comparison with China, which has not only pursued a stimulative system of population, but a violently impulsive one. If the wealth of a nation could be estimated by the gross amount of its produce, without reference to the number of its people, China would be the richest nation in the world, as her collective produce is, perhaps, greater than that of all Europe; but estimating her produce with relation to her people, she is instantly converted into the poorest, as she not only possesses no surplus income for the comforts of life, but not even a sufficient one for the bare necessities of subsistence,

The population of China is chiefly agricultural, and amounts, according to the best authorities, to nearly 333,000,000 of people. The extent of her territory is 800,000,000 of acres. It has already been shewn, that the agricultural population of England gives no more than

CHAPTER one person to ten acres, and the agricultural population of
 III. France no more than one person to five acres ; but if a
 sixth be taken away from the population of China for the
 manufacturing body, her agricultural population will not
 give less than one person to three acres. Averaging the
 net rental of her land at twenty shillings an acre, her gross
 produce or gross income will amount to the enormous sum
 of £3,200,000,000 ; but when this sum, stupendous as it
 is, is divided among her comparatively still more enor-
 mous population, it gives no more than £10 a head, or
 only half the income of the population of France. If,
 therefore, France is but little more than half as rich as
 England, she at least may boast of being twice as rich as
 China.

The vast population of China is occasioned not only by
 the stimulative system of an equal law of inheritance, but
 by the still more impulsive system of the rights of patri-
 archal power, which give the father the privilege of claim-
 ing the earnings of his sons and grandsons, as a security
 against want in old age. Her law of inheritance is more
 limited than the Roman law, as it divides the property of
 the father among the sons only, to the exclusion of
 daughters ; but as it was thought that a country was rich,
 instead of poor, in proportion as it was populous, this law
 was not deemed of sufficient force to carry population to
 the extent required. Recourse was therefore had to the
 more effectual stimulant of the patriarchal prerogative.
 The interest which a father obtains in the productive
 labour of his sons by this privilege, induces him to impose

marriage as a sacred duty upon them, that he may look forward to as large a provision as possible, from the earnings of those who spring from him. Tyrannical as is the principle, upon which this system is founded, as it is little less than starving the children to feed the parent, its obvious and necessary result is a numerous and poor population.

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Such, indeed, is the excess of population above produce, occasioned by these united stimulants, that the interposition of mere distress is not sufficiently operative as a check to maintain the ordinary level, and famine, with all its horrors, occurs about once in seven years, to restore the customary balance.

No country ever exhibited in such vivid colours the misery that ensues from encouraging, instead of repressing, the principle of population. From the scarcity of food, rice is almost considered as a luxury, and confined to those who are comparatively in easy circumstances, while vegetables of an inferior description, with dogs, rats, grubs, and insects, every thing that lives, and every thing that dies, form the sustenance of the poorer classes. The wages of labour are so low, that they are never more than enough to give the labourer the scantiest supply of the worst provisions by which body and soul can be kept together. A penurious and anxious economy, restlessly awake to save and manage in every article of household expenditure, is indispensably necessary, to enable even the better classes to scrape together an uncomfortable subsist-

CHAPTER ence. As there are no hereditary titles, and no great land-

III.

owners, there is no middle order of society. None are rich, except those who are employed in administering the government, and who form a body of about 40,000 persons. But among these, if any one accumulates a fortune, and founds a family, it is a common remark among the Chinese, that the equal law of inheritance, in three generations, reduces them to a level with the common mass of the people. Such is the tendency of over—population to bring a country to the lowest possible condition, which human nature is capable of supporting, that, with the exception of a few exhibitions of gaudy finery on public festivals, want, filth, and misery, pervade the whole empire.

The poverty occasioned by excessive numbers never fails to call forth the most painful industry in the suffering inhabitants to prevent the encroachments of impending famine; and the Chinese have been uniformly praised for the efforts they have made to cultivate barren tracts, and difficult steeps, that almost defied the labour of man, though the produce they yielded was but little calculated to give competent support to the families that raised it. These endeavours only shew how completely the channels of profitable labour are choked up, and to what thankless and ungrateful toil the supernumerary population are condemned, to obtain even the scantiest portion of subsistence. Nor are the needy efforts of this wretched people conspicuous in the agriculture of the country only; they are apparent in the various branches of manufactured industry, and are every where carried beyond the point, where

due remuneration is attainable. The competition of **CHAPTER III.** labourers allows so little to be gained, that it may be truly said, that half the nation live upon what nothing but famine would induce an European to touch.

As the wealth and strength of a nation consist in its people, in the produce that is raised by their labour, and the armies that are raised by their numbers, governments have always thought, that the greater the population, the greater must be the wealth and strength of a kingdom. They never sufficiently reflected, that the limits of the world, and the limits of a kingdom, admitted only of a limited produce, which could give due support but to a limited number of people; and that, if the number exceeded the just proportion, poverty would prevail instead of wealth, as the shares of produce would be too small to afford a competent subsistence, and weakness would prevail instead of strength, as the surplus income would be too small to put in motion and maintain an effective military body. The more limited, therefore, the number of the people that divide the produce, the greater will be individual wealth, and the larger will be, or may be, the public revenue.

From these three distinct systems, which the three nations of England, France, and China, have pursued, in regulating the principle of population, it may be deduced, that the restrictive system leads to wealth,—the stimulative system to poverty,—and the violently impulsive system, not only to poverty, but to misery and famine. It is obvious,

CHAPTER therefore, for the happiness of mankind, that the **restrictive**
 III. system is that only which should be followed.

For the purpose of carrying this system into effect, it is necessary that the agricultural body should be divided into three separate classes, of land-owners, tenants, and labourers; that the land-owners should have large estates, in perpetuity, by limiting the inheritance to the eldest son,—that the tenants should have large farms, and be totally distinct from the class of labourers,—and that no encouragement should be given to the increase of labourers, beyond what the wages of labour would rear. All classes being thus restricted to their due proportion, all would possess the share of wealth which they ought to have.

It is impossible to contemplate the general condition of mankind over the surface of the globe, without being struck with the large account of indigence and misery that every where presents itself; but as this account would have no existence, were the restrictive system of population, which is here recommended, universally adopted, it is of the utmost importance that the laws and customs, which would cause its adoption, should universally prevail.

It is by these deductions of patient labour, in the school of political economy,—by this cold theory of dry reasoning, and hard facts,—and not by the rhapsodies of the visionary enthusiast, that poverty can be driven from the haunts of man, and a real golden age be made to arise.

CHAPTER IV.

System of Population in Russia, Austria, and Prussia.—

*The Abolition of Slavery in Russia recommended.—Im-
perfect Balance of Power in Europe.—The practicability
of a better division.—General establishment of free Con-
stitutions.*

IN Russia, Austria, and Prussia, a partial law of primo-
geniture takes place, and among the chief nobility the **CHAPTER
IV.** share, that accompanies the title, is generally of sufficient
magnitude to enable them to maintain the superiority of
their station with becoming dignity. But as all other
classes are subjected to the Roman law of inheritance,
and as the custom of small farms is universally prevalent
through each of the three states, poverty pervades every
order below the first rank of nobility. Throughout the
whole extent of Russia the peasantry are slaves, and
through all the provinces of Austria and Prussia, the
peasantry continue in such a state of vassalage as to be
scarcely above the condition of slavery. With the ex-
ception, therefore, of the chief nobility, no class is pos-
sessed of a competent share of property in either of the
countries, and as so few have an income above necessaries,
no adequate funds exist in either of them, for the due
supply of a public revenue. The large population and
small properties resulting from the operation of the
Roman law, by preventing the practicability of individual

CHAPTER wealth, prevent the practicability of a large revenue, otherwise than by exacting it from the necessities of subsistence, and the distresses of the poor.

IV.

As the Roman law of inheritance, however, has not caused the same extended division of the land in these countries as in France, as a rich nobility with large estates has been partially suffered to remain, large under-properties may be created with more ease, and population and produce be brought to a just proportion by readier means.

The first step towards the attainment of this object, in Russia, should unquestionably be the abolition of slavery, and a conversion of the slave-rent into land-rent. The wealth of a Russian landowner, at present, consists in the number of his slaves, from whom he receives so much a head, usually from ten to forty shillings, such a proportion of the estate being separately allotted to them, as is deemed adequate to furnish them with necessaries, and provide the stipulated assessment. But the income which a Russian nobleman procures from a given tract of land, conducted in this manner, is much less than an English gentleman receives from a similar tract, let out by the acre; and if the Russian estates were converted into large farms, after the example of England, and contracted for by the acre, not only would the landowners obtain a higher rent, but a wealthy and respectable order of tenantry, and a free and independent order of labourers, would be substituted for a poor and wretched cast of slaves, whose continuance, in these days, in a state of servitude,

is as disgraceful to their country, as it is degrading to **CHAPTER IV.**
human nature.

By this reformation, which interest and humanity alike combine to recommend, the Emperor might establish in his own dominions, the same state of things which he so much admired in England ; the same class of country gentlemen, the same gradation of orders, and the same general appearance of wealth, ease and comfort, which made him so emphatically ask “Where were *our* poor ?” Nothing more is necessary for this conversion, than the general substitution of the law of primogeniture for the Roman law of inheritance, and the establishment of large estates, large farms, and freedom. The whole of his empire may be made to exhibit an extended succession of parks and pleasure grounds, with the accompaniment of large farms, and not only not a slave, but not a pauper be seen to blot the landscape. The same laws and customs that have realized this order of things in one country can realize it in another. However slow and gradual the transition may be, as the same causes must necessarily lead to the same effects, the result is certain.

The peasantry are not the only sufferers under this tyranny: the inhabitants of the towns are equally oppressed. They also are for the most part slaves, and, as labourers in manufactures earn more than labourers in husbandry, they pay a heavier duty to their owners for permission to work as artificers. As the duty is usually in proportion to their gains, the slaves either carefully con-

CHAPTER IV.
ceal what they make, or make no more than enough to pay the duty and find themselves in subsistence. Immediately that they refuse to accede to the terms that are demanded, let them be ever so extravagant, they may be forced from their trade, and sent back to the country as day-labourers, on the estates of their masters. The assessment, therefore, operates as a fine upon success, and, as it is a complete prohibition to the free efforts of labour, it is a complete prohibition to the accumulation of wealth. Under this system, it is impossible that the towns, which are, generally speaking, but little more than a cluster of logwood huts, can improve, or manufactures be promoted. But if the persons of the manufacturers were free, and their property secure, the large agricultural surplus that would be raised by a conversion of the slave rent into land-rent, and small farms into large ones, would cause a proportionate extension of manufactures for materials of exchange: and a proportionate improvement of the towns would ensue. This reform, therefore, would advance the manufactures of the country to the full as much as its agriculture; and as large properties and individual wealth would be the necessary consequence, the interests of government would also be advanced in the same degree, by the means it would obtain of increasing the public revenue, according to the increase of individual opulence.

It is not, however, that the population of Russia is large in proportion to her territory, but large in proportion to her produce, as her slaves raise no more than

enough to provide themselves with bad food, and pay **CHAPTER IV.** their fine. If they raised more, it would either become the property of their masters, or they would be mulcted at a higher rate. Her produce, therefore, bears a less proportion to the extent of her territory, than the produce of any other country; and as long as the present oppressive system continues, it cannot be augmented. Hence her poverty, so inconsistent with the vastness and productive power of her empire, is not only occasioned by the small farm system, but by the abridgment of slave labour—by making it contrary to the interest of the slaves to exceed a limited amount of produce; and it is fortunate for the liberties of mankind, that the government of a country, where slavery is tolerated, should participate in the evil it fosters, and be relatively as poor as the slaves that belong to it. It is absolutely necessary, therefore, if wealth and happiness are to be deemed the ends of good government, and if Russia is to be raised to a level with England, that there should be freedom of person and security of property,—that a land-rent should be substituted for the slave-rent,—that small farms should be converted into large ones,—and that the law of primogeniture should be made to extend to all classes.

The condition of Austria and Prussia is somewhat better than that of Russia, as the state of vassalage, in which the greater part of their peasantry are retained, is somewhat better than the slavery, in which the Russian peasants live. There is also more security of property,—less restriction on the exercise of industry,—and the inha-

CHAPTER bitants of the towns are free. But there is the same
IV. partial limitation of the law of primogeniture to the chief
nobility, and the same general extension of the Roman
law of inheritance to all other classes; the same division
of estates into small farms; the same, or nearly the same,
disproportion between population and produce; and con-
sequently the same, or nearly the same, general pre-
dominance of poverty.

The great distinction between England and all the States of the Continent, is the large farm system, which can only take place under a law of primogeniture, because the division of estates, under the Roman law, necessarily brings about the division of farms. The inevitable effect of this division is, small properties, large population, and poverty, instead of large properties, small population, and wealth. It leads to a less agricultural surplus, for the supply of the towns,—requires less manufactures to be raised as materials of exchange,—and causes less funds for furnishing a revenue; it gives rise to a wretched race of people, badly fed, badly clothed, and badly housed, instead of a rich and happy tenantry, and a class of labourers, comparatively well fed, well clothed, and well housed; it constitutes, in fact, the sole difference between a good and bad order of things; between riches and poverty; and between happiness and misery. To prevent the division of the land into small properties, is the sole secret of national prosperity. The great object of the Continental States should, therefore, be, if they wish to acquire the wealth of England, to establish large estates and large

farms, a rich body of country gentlemen, and a distinct CHAPTER
class of tenantry and labourers. By separating the lower ^{IV.} ~~orders~~
orders into two distinct classes of tenants and labourers,
instead of continuing them as a mixed class of tenants and
labourers together, the pauperism with which the world
has hitherto been afflicted, will wholly disappear.

It is much to be lamented, that the Roman law of inheritance has found more favour in the new world than the law of primogeniture. Unless a speedy alteration take place, this law will commit the same ravages there as in the old world, and America will exhibit the same character of distress from large population and small produce, which so strongly marks the Continental States of Europe. But as yet the law has not had time to develope itself, as it is not till the third generation, that its impoverishing influence becomes conspicuous, and when it does become conspicuous, the evil is irremediable, as the property has been divided, never again to be put together. The Americans might have followed a wiser example, by treading in the footsteps of their parent country.

The prosperity of Europe, however, can never be complete without a different balance of power and different governments. Under the present system, France and Russia united, could overthrow the other states, and, by afterwards contending with each other for pre-eminence, cause an universal monarchy to be established. Such an event may not be deemed probable, but the fallen Hero of St. Helena nearly

CHAPTER brought it about ; and if two young monarchs were placed
IV. on the thrones of France and Russia, with but a common
share of military ardor, the attempt may certainly be made.
Europe, however, should be so divided, as not only to pre-
vent the probability, but the possibility, of success, from any
such a combination. The only means of establishing her
security on a permanent basis is, to restore the kingdom of
Poland ; to unite the states of Italy into one sovereignty ;
and effect the deliverance of Greece. The Restoration
of Poland has often been contended for by the Whigs of
England ; and though their remonstrances have not hitherto
been attended with success, an opportunity may occur,
when this injured country may once more resume her
ancient rank among the nations of Europe under happier
auspices.

The union of the States of Italy, under one sovereign,
is not only desirable, for the better preservation of the
balance of power, but is indispensably necessary, if she is
ever to be permitted to possess the means of self-defence,
and be rescued from the thraldom of her dependence on
Austria, or France, as victory leans to one side or the
other. In her present disunited state, she will always be
subjected to the inroads of one of these nations, as her
petty sovereigns have nothing but the pomp of power,
without the substance. They have neither fleets, armies,
revenue, nor any possible means of procuring them.
Divided as the country is, there is no scope, nor command,
for great statesmen or great generals ; no extent, in any
of the states, for a competent number of wealthy noblemen

and country gentlemen to constitute the materials of a **CHAPTER**
 good government; nor territory enough in any of them to **IV.**
 afford a sufficient agricultural surplus for the formation
 of a rich and flourishing metropolis. It is not the
 liberation of one State that must be effected, but the
 liberation of all, that all may be placed under one
 government. Had the short-lived efforts that were
 lately made for freedom, in Naples and Piedmont,
 been attended with success, no sufficient improvement
 could have been made in the general state of Italy, unless
 the independence of the whole country had been subse-
 quently established, and a general union of all its States
 been formed under one head. If Italy were once more
 united under one government, with a constitution similar
 to that of England, and similar laws and customs for the
 promotion of her wealth, she would again be distinguished
 for arms as well as arts, and be capable of contributing a
 powerful support to the maintenance of the common
 liberties of Europe.

But if the liberation of Italy is desirable, how much
 more is the liberation of Greece an object of interest:
 not only because the tyranny by which she is oppressed is
 so much more severe, but because every recollection which
 we love to cherish, combines to make us wish, that the
 country, from which the world has learnt all that is digni-
 fied in philosophy,—all that is great in eloquence,—all
 that is sublime in poetry,—and all that is admirable in art,
 may be as free and happy as human institutions are capa-
 ble of making it. May the present contest end in her
 deliverance and in her independence !

CHAPTER IV. It would certainly be better that Poland, Italy, and Greece, should be liberated with the acquiescence of the Ruling Powers of Europe than by insurrection, as they otherwise sooner or later will be, notwithstanding the late failure in Italy; and if the three principal Potentates, who are most interested in their fate, understood their real interests, they would at once consent to their deliverance. If a prince of the house of Russia were placed on the throne of Greece, a prince of the house of Austria on the throne of Italy, and a prince of the house of Prussia on the throne of Poland, stipulation being made for the perpetual separation of these crowns from those with which they are connected, each of these powers would be more secure than it now is, and Europe be divided as it ought to be. This alteration is not only dictated by sound policy, but no man can contemplate the condition of the Poles, Italians, and Greeks, without acknowledging that the interests of humanity loudly call for it.

But, besides carrying this partition into effect, Constitutions similar to that of England should every where be established, notwithstanding the fears and the frowns of the Holy Alliance. Let the character and intentions of a reigning monarch be ever so good, where absolute authority is possessed, there is no security to the people, without the aid of deliberative bodies, that the succeeding reign may not be big with cruelty and oppression. That the public interests of every country on the continent require the union of more talents than the frame of their

present governments is capable of containing, the existing **CHAPTER**
state of Europe sufficiently shews. Were the laws and **IV.**
customs, which are here recommended for the due restriction
of population, and the creation of national wealth,
universally made to prevail, there can be little doubt,
but that free constitutions would be speedily made to pre-
vail also. It is for monarchs to chuse, whether they will
reign over a poor and wretched people, with absolute au-
thority and small revenue, or a rich and happy people,
with limited authority and large revenue. If they prefer
despotism and poverty to wealth and liberty, it is the duty
of their subjects to resist the ambition, which knows no
gratification but in their oppression and misery, and achieve
for themselves a better destiny.

CHAPTER V.

Principal Trade between the Country and the Towns.—Corn and Manufactures always exchanged for each other.—Corn should be too little and Manufactures too much.—Errors of the Country Gentlemen.—Error of Lord Liverpool.—Towns produce in proportion to the quantity of Food they receive.—The import of Corn to be encouraged.—The Corn Trade to be free.

CHAPTER

V.

HAVING thus explained, that the Wealth of a nation depends on the comparative amount of its population and produce ; and having laid down the system by which wealth may be created, and poverty exploded, I shall now proceed to examine the Principles of Commerce, which, from the prevalence of the theory of the Balance of Trade, have not been sufficiently developed.

The principal trade that is carried on throughout the world, is the trade between the country and the towns, or an exchange of corn for manufactures. Natural and obvious as this trade is, all our bad legislation on the subject of corn has proceeded from not adverting to it. As farmers do not sell the surplus produce of their land to each other, but take it to the market towns to be sold to the manufacturers ; and as manufacturers do not sell their surplus manufactures to each other, but exchange them

for subsistence, or agricultural produce, it is evident, that **CHAPTER**
 there is nothing else for which the surplus of the one body **V.**
 can be exchanged but for the surplus of the other.

As corn and manufactures, therefore, are exchanged for each other, it is necessary that they should every where exchange for the same quantity of each other ; but they cannot exchange for the same quantity of each other in all countries, unless they are in the same proportion to each other in all countries. Where their proportion is different, therefore, one will be too little and the other too much ; and that which is too little will be dear, because it will exchange for more of the other than it does elsewhere ; and that which is too much will be cheap, because it will exchange for less of the other than it does elsewhere. Where corn, therefore, is too little, manufactures will be too much ; and where corn is dear, manufactures will be cheap. The price of corn, therefore, will depend on the quantity of manufactures which the towns produce to exchange for the corn, or on the number of manufacturers which they contain. Where manufactures are partially excessive, and the number of manufacturers is greater than the home growth of corn can support, corn will be too little and manufactures too much, and corn will be dear and manufactures cheap ; because corn will exchange for more manufactures than it does elsewhere. Where corn is partially excessive, and the number of manufacturers is fewer than the home growth of corn can support, corn will be too much and manufactures too little, and corn will be cheap and manufactures dear ; because corn will

CHAPTER exchange for less manufactures than it does elsewhere. In
 V. order, therefore, to have corn dear and manufactures cheap, it is necessary that corn should be too little and manufactures too much ; or that there should be a supernumerary body of manufacturers beyond what the home growth of corn can support.

But if corn is to be too little and manufactures too much, foreign corn must be brought in to make good what is wanting, or it cannot be too little : or if there is to be a supernumerary body of manufacturers, beyond what the home growth of corn can support, foreign corn must be brought in to support them instead, or no supernumerary body can exist. Large importation and high price, therefore, must always go together, as they always have done, and always will do. One effect cannot take place without the other. It is impossible that there can be a high price for corn, unless corn exchanges for more manufactures than in other countries ; but it is impossible that corn can exchange for more manufactures than in other countries without a partial excess of manufactures ; and it is impossible that there can be a partial excess of manufactures without a supernumerary body to create it ; and it is impossible that there can be a supernumerary body without the import of foreign corn to support them. It is impossible, therefore, to separate high price from large importation.

That money may be enabled to act with effect as an equal measure of value through the world, it is requisite that

corn and manufactures should every where be at the same **CHAPTER**
price ; but as they cannot be at the same price, unless they
are every where in the same proportion, it is requisite, for
the purpose of enabling money to find its level, that they
should no where be too much nor too little. But as the
difference of laws, climate, soil, and position, causes a
greater quantity of manufactures to be raised in some
countries, in proportion to corn, than is raised in others,
and therefore causes a partial excess of manufactures in
some, and a partial excess of corn in others, it is impos-
sible to bring corn and manufactures to the same propor-
tion and price in all, without exchanging the surplus ma-
nufactures where manufactures are partially excessive, for
the surplus corn where corn is partially excessive. This
exchange, if the trade of the world were free, would al-
ways be made, as there would be a profit in conveying
either the one produce or the other from the place where
it was partially excessive and cheapest to the place where
it was partially deficient and dearest, till the disproportion
was corrected. Corn and manufactures, therefore, would
always be brought, or have a constant tendency to be
brought to the same proportion and price in all countries,
with the exception of the charge of transit between them.
A difference to the extent of this charge might always ex-
ist ; but if trade were open, the difference in the price of
corn and manufactures, in any two countries, could never
exceed the expence of bringing in the one and taking out
the other.

To make, therefore, the price of corn in this country

CHAPTER higher than the price of corn in others by the charge of
 transit, it is necessary that there should be a difference in
 the proportion between corn and manufactures in this
 country and others, by our having our corn too little, and
 our manufactures too much, and by all other countries
 having their corn too much and their manufactures too
 little. And as our coal, iron, and canals, enable our towns
 to raise manufactures at a cheaper rate than the towns of
 any other country, it is more easy for us to break the level,
 by having our corn too little and our manufactures too
 much, than any other country, and therefore more easy
 for us to have the price of our corn above the price of corn
 in other countries, by whatever is the expence of bringing
 in the corn, and taking out the manufactures, to make
 good the difference.

But the expence of bringing in the corn will depend on
 the extent to which it is wanted ; on the extent to which
 manufactures are partially excessive. Where the partial
 excess of manufactures is but slight, and the number of
 manufacturers beyond what the home growth of corn can
 support is small, or the additional quantity of manu-
 factures for which corn will exchange, is small, the price
 of corn will be but slightly superior, because the expence
 of bringing in the necessary quantity, to supply the defi-
 ciency, will be but slight ; but where the excess is large,
 and, the number of manufacturers beyond what the home
 growth of corn can maintain, is great, the price will be
 so much higher, as is the expence of bringing in so much
 more corn. And in proportion as supplies are required,

from the most distant parts of the world, as well as the ^{CHAPTER} nearest, to make the balance even, the price will be higher ^{V.} and higher. The price of corn, therefore, will be highest, when the excess of our manufactures is greatest, because the expence of bringing in the corn will be most. The years of largest import, therefore, will always be the years of highest price, because they will be the years when the partial excess of our manufactures is greatest, when the number of manufacturers, beyond what the home growth of corn can support, is most, and when corn is too little and manufactures too much, in the greatest degree; and therefore, when corn will exchange for most manufactures, and when most corn will be wanted, to correct the disproportion, and maintain the general level. From the shipment of the first bushel of corn for sale, to the present day, the price of corn has never been regulated on any other principle, than that of a partial excess of manufactures.

Since, then, large importation and high price must always go together, when the corn bill was brought in to prevent import, it was brought in to prevent high price: though certainly no such an effect was intended by those who introduced it. By getting rid of the supernumerary body of manufacturers, who before made corn too little and manufactures too much, and therefore made corn exchange for more manufactures here than elsewhere, it decreased our manufacturers to no more than what the home growth of corn could support; and by no longer permitting a partial excess of manufactures, or no longer

CHAPTER permitting our corn to be too little, and our manufactures
V. too much, made our corn exchange for no more manufactures than in other countries; and therefore brought down the price of corn to a level with the price of other countries. The manufacturers who before provided for the corn trade, and who by this bill were thrown out of employment, were reduced to the alternative of suffering through want, and coming on the parish, or of settling in those countries, from whence the corn would have come, had it not been prohibited, for the purpose of carrying on the same trade there, which they were prevented from carrying on here, and eating the same bread there which they were prevented from importing and eating here. No other choice was left them; for as all the trades that were fed by the home supply of corn, had their full complement of workmen, no opening could be made for their inlet. As our annual average importation of corn has been, for these last twenty years, about 1,200,000 quarters; and as our annual average consumption is estimated at a quarter of corn per head, we have lost by the corn bill the annual labour of 1,200,000 of our manufacturing population. The bill, therefore, was in fact a law to interdict the production of so many millions worth of manufactures, as the import of 1,200,000 quarters of corn would give rise to; for as there were no means of supporting the supernumerary body of manufacturers, the manufactures ceased to be made. By the reduction, therefore, of our corn and manufactures to the same proportion as in other countries, instead of large importation and high price, there was no importation, and low price;

and so far was the landed interest from being benefitted by the bill, that they were greatly injured by it. But not only did the bill conduce to the general impoverishment of the landed interest, and to the ruin or banishment of the manufacturers, who sustained the corn trade; but by diminishing the amount of our manufactured produce, it so far diminished the national income, and contracted the funds for furnishing the revenue. It injured the shipping interest, both abroad and at home, connected with the corn trade; and it involved the countries that supplied us with corn in the same difficulties in which it involved ourselves; as, by stopping the trade, they could no more dispose of their surplus corn than we could dispose of our surplus manufactures. Had Ministers been as earnestly bent on injuring their country, as they were on serving it, by the introduction of the bill, it would have been scarcely possible for them to have selected any measure that could have taken a wider range of mischief.

It is greatly to be regretted, that so much error prevails on this subject among the country gentlemen, as their own interest, as well as that of their country, is materially affected by it. They think that it would be better to export corn than import it,—to undersell the Continent than be undersold by it,—and to grow corn enough to supply our manufacturers instead of less than enough. As the price of corn must always be lower in the country that exports corn, than in the country that imports it, if we are to become an exporting nation, the price of corn must be lower here than abroad, and the income of the landed

CHAPTER
V.

CHAPTER interest proportionally less than the income of the landed
V. interest in other countries. And if we are to undersell the continent, instead of being undersold by it, the landed interest must be reduced to the same state of comparative poverty, to be qualified to undersell the Continent, for unless the price of corn were lower here than on the Continent, we could not undersell the foreign grower. And if we grew corn enough to supply our manufacturers, instead of less than enough, corn and manufactures would be in the same proportion here as in other countries, and the price of corn would be no higher here than in other countries, as it would exchange for no more manufactures here than in other countries. There is no other state of things that can possibly make the price of corn higher in this country than in others, the currency of all countries being in the same proportion, than a partial excess of manufactures, and scarcity of corn,—than breaking the balance between corn and manufactures, by our having our manufactures too much, and our corn too little, and other nations having their manufactures too little and their corn too much, and therefore, making our corn exchange for more manufactures than in other countries.

But though our corn should always be too little, and our manufactures too much, yet in point of fact, our corn can never be too much, though our manufactures should always be more to make it too little. Let what quantity of corn may be produced, manufactures should be produced in a greater degree, that manufactures may always be excessive and corn deficient. To be in full prosperity, we should

grow as much corn as we could; but let it be as much as **CHAPTER**
the soil could contain, it should not be enough to bring **V.**
corn and manufactures to the same proportion as in other
countries, or the price of corn could not be higher than
in other countries. Though, therefore, we can never
grow too much corn, notwithstanding the celebrated de-
claration of Lord Liverpool to the contrary, yet manu-
factures should always be more, that more corn may al-
ways be wanted, and that large importation and high
price may always continue. The quantity of corn is li-
mited in all countries by the limits of territory; the quan-
tity of manufactures is unlimited and illimitable; and as
towns produce in proportion to the supply of food they
receive, and as our towns will produce more manufactures
in proportion to the supply of food they receive, than
those of any other country, it is but importing the corn,
and feeding our towns with a large supply, and a large
relative excess of manufactures will always be produced,
or a large body of manufacturers, beyond what the home
growth of corn can maintain, will always exist, to make
corn too little and manufactures too much, and raise the
price of corn in this country to a proportionate extent
above the price of corn in others; but unless our towns
are supplied with foreign corn, no supernumerary body
of manufacturers can exist, no partial excess of manu-
factures can be produced, and as our corn will not ex-
change for more manufactures than in other countries,
the price of corn can never be higher than in other
countries.

CHAPTER V. As it is impossible to have corn and manufactures both dear, it is more to the interest of a country to have corn dear and manufactures cheap, than corn cheap and manufactures dear; because the collective produce of the country will be larger, and the incomes, both of the agricultural and manufacturing bodies, will be greater, by having corn too little and manufactures too much, than by having corn too much and manufactures too little. Where corn is too little and manufactures too much, the price of corn will be high, and the agricultural body rich; and as the manufactured surplus will be superior to the agricultural, the manufacturers will comparatively raise a large quantity of manufactures and be rich also. Where corn is too much, the price of corn will be low, and the agricultural body poor; and as the agricultural surplus will be superior to the manufactured, the manufacturers will comparatively raise but a small quantity of manufactures, and be poor also. A high price of corn, therefore, is the best test of prosperity, not only because the landed interest will be so much the richer for it, but because it is a proof that the country which possesses it has a greater relative extent of manufactures than any other, and is comparatively richer than any other by the excess.

As it is more easy to grow corn than raise manufactures, the progress of opulence is from agriculture to commerce. Where corn is too much and manufactures too little, a country is in the first stage of improvement; where corn and manufactures are equal it is in the second stage of improvement; and where manufactures are too much and

corn too little, it is in the highest state of improvement; **CHAPTER**
and in proportion as manufactures become more and ~~more~~
more excessive, the wealth of the country will be greater
and greater.

Every country must be in one of these three situations. Either its manufactures must be too much and its corn too little, or its corn must be too much and its manufactures too little; or its corn and manufactures must be in the same proportion, as they are in other countries. Where corn is imported for manufactures, corn will be too little and manufactures too much; and the manufactured surplus will be superior to the agricultural by the whole amount of manufactures sent out for foreign corn to make good the difference. Where corn is exported for manufactures, corn will be too much and manufactures too little, and the agricultural surplus will be superior to the manufactured by the whole amount of corn sent out for foreign manufactures to make good the difference. Where corn is neither exported nor imported for manufactures, corn and manufactures will every where be in the same proportion; and the two surplusses will be equal to each other. But as the price of corn will be higher, and the amount of manufactures greater, where corn is too little, than where it is enough or too much, of the three situations in which a country can be placed, it is better that its manufactured surplus should be superior to its agricultural, than equal or inferior, that the price of its corn may be highest, and the quantity of its manufactures most. But as the manufactured surplus cannot be superior to

CHAPTER the agricultural, or as manufactures cannot be too much,
V. nor corn too little, without the import of foreign corn, to
make up the deficiency, there can be no question that the
corn trade should be free to allow the import.

But it by no means follows, because manufactures are too much and corn too little, and the manufactured surplus is superior to the agricultural, that therefore the whole manufactured produce of the country will be superior to the whole agricultural produce; and that the manufacturing interest will be richer than the landed interest. On the contrary, as the towns can only produce in proportion to the supply of food they receive, the whole manufactured produce of the country can only be superior to the agricultural surplus, by the amount of the corn imported, and the trade which the manufacturers carry on among themselves. The landed interest, therefore, will be richer than the manufacturing interest, according as what they reserve for their own consumption, is superior to the corn that is imported, and to the exchanges which the manufacturers make among themselves for clothing and furniture. But not only is the principal part of what the manufacturers make themselves laid out in subsistence, but the produce that is imported for manufactures exported, is to a considerable degree conveyed by subsequent exchange to the landed interest. Almost all that a manufacturer makes is sheer surplus, scarcely any part of what he produces being consumed by himself; while a large proportion of what is raised by the landed interest is consumed in the expence of cultivation, or in

establishments suitable to the rank which the landed pro- CHAPTER
prietors hold in society. In proportion, therefore, as the corn, which the nobility, country gentlemen, and farmers V.
of England reserve for their own consumption, surpasses the amount of the foreign corn that is imported and the trade which the manufacturers carry on among themselves, they are collectively richer than the manufacturing interest; and as they have more produce to divide and fewer to partake of it, the agricultural population being only 4,400,000, and the manufacturing population 5,600,000, they are individually richer by the superiority of the sum to be divided, and the inferiority of the number to share it. But the greater the wealth of the manufacturing body, the greater always will be the income of the agricultural body, as it is impossible that corn can be too little, and manufactures too much, in too great a degree; and therefore, if the manufacturing interest were richer than the landed interest, the landed interest would be still richer than they now are. But in order that the wealth of the manufacturing body should surpass the wealth of the agricultural, it is necessary that more manufactures should be raised than the whole agricultural produce of the country amounts to.

England, however, is the only country where so large a manufactured produce is divided among so small an agricultural population. In France, there is only the productive power of a manufacturing body of 5,000,000 to be divided among an agricultural body of 25,000,000. Such is the advantage of the large estates and large farms of England over the small estates and small farms of France.

CHAPTER In proportion, however, as the manufacturing population
V. of France is decreased, her agricultural population will be
increased.

But for the Corn Bill, it might also have been said, England is the only country where the manufactured surplus surpasses the agricultural, and corn is too little and manufactures too much ; but in consequence of our prohibitory system, the American corn trade has been transferred to France ; and France, therefore, at the present moment, has the advantage of having her corn too little, and her manufactures too much, instead of us, and has consequently the advantage of having the price of her corn higher than it is in any other country. Even a small shipment of corn has been made from England to France, to so low a condition have our country gentlemen reduced themselves ; and if our prohibitions are to continue, the state of the two countries will be reversed, by France having her corn dear and her manufactures cheap, and England having her corn cheap and her manufactures dear. But the trade between America and France is a forced one ; and immediately that our ports are open, as the towns of England can produce more manufactures in proportion to the quantity of food they receive, than the towns of France, the trade will again come back to us. The Deputies of the Chamber have taken the same alarm at the introduction of the corn, as our country gentlemen did ; and instead of hailing the trade as an auspicious occurrence, have censured it as injurious to the public welfare, by causing the price of corn to fall instead of rise, notwithstanding the rise it has occasioned.

Long before the introduction of the corn bill, our **CHAPTER**
country gentlemen had regarded with a jealous eye the **V.**
large importations that had taken place of corn, notwithstanding the high price which they always brought with them; and thinking that we could grow a sufficiency of corn for our own consumption, and that if we did grow enough, the price would be higher than if we grew less than enough, they passed their prohibitory law. As far as making the home growth of corn sufficient for our consumption, the bill has completely answered, for as towns can only produce according to the quantity of food they receive, and as withdrawing so much food is withdrawing so much manufacture, the immediate operation of the bill was to bring our corn and manufactures to a balance, and make our corn enough for our consumption, by reducing to want, or dispersing, the supernumerary body of manufacturers, who before made it too little. But as bringing our corn and manufactures to the same proportion as in other countries, is bringing the price of corn to the same level as in other countries, the ulterior object of the bill was not answered, as the price of corn fell instead of rising; and our country gentlemen have now found out by experience, what they might have before found out by reason,—that growing enough for our own consumption is not so profitable as growing less than enough. Instead of regarding the large importations as an evil, by adding to our corn, and therefore, making corn too much, and lowering its price, they should have regarded them as a good, by causing more in proportion to be added to our manufactures, than was added to our

CHAPTER corn, and therefore, making corn too little, and raising
V. its price. But as it was natural to conclude that every
thing must be diminished in value, in proportion as it is
increased in quantity, it was necessarily conceived that,
as these importations added to the general stock of corn,
they detracted from the value of the home growth; but
a little further reflection would have led to the inference
that, as the quantity of corn is only great or small, com-
pared to the quantity of manufactures, if the introduction
of the corn made manufactures exceed corn in a greater
degree than before, the price of corn would be higher,
instead of lower, by the import. If manufactures were a
fixed quantity, without the power of increase or decrease,
the introduction of the foreign corn, by adding to the
gross stock of corn, would have lessened the value of the
home proportion; but as more was added to our manu-
factures, by the increased productive power of our manu-
facturers, in consequence of the increased supply of food,
than was added to our corn, the gross amount of corn was
less in proportion to the gross amount of manufactures,
during the years of import, than it was before, or has been
since, and its price was accordingly higher in those years
than it was before, or has been since.

That a free corn trade will bring back the times of too
little corn and too much manufacture, notwithstanding
the large retrograde strides they have taken, in consequence
of the corn bill, there can be no doubt. The advantage
which this country possesses in her coal and iron, which
are not only necessary for working the steam engine with

cheapness and effect, but are necessary for the spirited carrying on of almost every kind of manufacture, as well as the advantage she possesses in her canals for the easy conveyance of the materials, that compose her manufactures; and their easy delivery to the ports, when made, give her such a superiority over every other country, that immediately that the towns are supplied with plenty of additional food, plenty of additional manufactures will be produced, to make corn too little and manufactures too much, and restore to us the prosperity we have lost by our restrictive system.

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CHAPTER VI.

The Farmers and Manufacturers fraudulently deprived of their Income by the Reduction of the Currency.—Re-establishing the Prices of 1812 and 1813 the only means of restoring their Income.—Good faith to be kept with them as strictly as with the Fundholder.—Their enormous losses.—Two ways of bringing the Pound Note to par with Gold.—The wrong one taken by Government —A Paper Currency, at a fixed amount, better than a Metallic one at a variable amount, for the due maintenance of Contracts.—Error of Mr. Vansittart.—Necessity of fixing the amount of the Currency, to prevent the recurrence of losses.

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THOUGH the times of too little corn and too much manufacture may certainly be brought back by a free corn trade, yet the country would be deceived if it expected that the high prices of the best times, when corn was too little and manufactures too much, or the high prices of 1812 and 1813 would, as matter of course, be brought back with them. Corn may be made dearer than it now is, compared to manufactures ; but as the contraction of our paper has established a lower scale of prices for every thing, corn and manufactures must both be lower than they were in those years, notwithstanding our advancement to a better state of things by a free trade. But as

every country may regulate its currency at will, and have what prices it pleases, it would certainly be right to return to the prices of 1812 and 1813, that the farmers and manufacturers may be re-instated in the income which they then possessed, and of which they have since so fraudulently, but so unintentionally, been deprived. The income of the farmers and manufacturers entirely depends upon prices. They have no means of making an income but by what they sell, and unless they can sell now at the same rate as they sold at then, it is impossible that they can obtain the same income. To restore to them, therefore, the income they then possessed, the same scale of prices must prevail ; and to establish the same scale of prices, the same amount of currency must prevail. The years of 1812 and 1813 were the last years of high prices, because they were the last years before the run on the country banks occurred, and before the Bank of England began the reduction of its paper, in contemplation of a speedy return to cash payments.

As it is in the power of Parliament so to regulate the amount of the paper of the Bank of England, or, if it should think proper to have a paper of its own, so to regulate the amount of government paper, as to raise or lower prices at its option, the only point which it is necessary to determine is, what is the fair price that ought to be fixed, to give to the farmers and manufacturers what is their right, and leave to the public creditor, and every other annuitant, what is their right. The average price of wheat in 1812 and 1813 was about 120 shillings a

CHAPTER quarter, and as something is due to the farmers and manufacturers for the losses they have sustained since those years, 120 shillings will not perhaps appear too high a standard. As the price of all other produce will be in the same proportion, the manufacturers will derive the same benefit from the correspondent high price of their manufactures, as the farmers will derive from the high price of corn. Wheat for a short period was as high as 133 shillings a quarter, but should that price be now determined upon, it would take too much from the fixed incomes, and give too much to the fluctuating ones: 120 shillings, therefore, appears to be a juster standard for giving to each party what is their due; but if this should not be deemed a satisfactory price, it would be better for the country gentlemen and public creditors to determine among themselves what they may conceive a more appropriate one. But in coming to this determination, it is necessary that they should consider that the higher the standard is fixed, the greater will be the national income, and the greater the ease with which the revenue will be paid. When once the price is fixed, no consideration whatever should induce either party to alter it, as the due fulfilment of all contracts depends on the faithful maintenance of prices at the same standard; and fraud must be the necessary consequence, by one party losing and the other gaining, whenever a deviation occurs. A sufficient quantity of paper should therefore be issued, till the price of wheat can be quoted in the gazette at 120 shillings, or whatever may be the price determined upon; and, after that, not a single pound-note more, nor a single pound

note less should ever be issued, unless prices alter from an **CHAPTER VI.**
alteration of produce,—unless Parliament should, here-
after, see reason, from a general reduction of prices, in
consequence of a general increase of produce—in con-
sequence of a large increase of manufactures, from a large
influx of foreign corn and colonial produce,—to allow a
proportionate increase of paper, to restore prices to the
same standard, for the purpose of keeping incomes at the
same amount, and enabling contracts to be fairly fulfilled ;
but no increase should be allowed without the authority
of Parliament.

There is no necessity, however, for any alteration in the amount of the currency, on account of any partial alteration in the price of corn, from a fluctuation of seasons, or on account of any partial alteration in the price of a given manufacture, from the improvement of machinery, as the farmers make the same income, and the manufacturer a greater income, notwithstanding the alteration of prices. If prices fall from an increase of corn, the additional quantity makes up for the deficiency of prices, and the tenant gets the same income as before ; and as both he and his landlord are benefitted in the same degree, by having their money go so much further, no fraud is committed on either side. If prices rise from a decrease of corn, the rise of prices makes up for the deficiency of quantity, and the tenant gets the same income as before ; and as both he and his landlord are injured in the same degree, by not having their money go so far, no fraud is committed on either side. But if there were a general re-

CHAPTER duction of prices, from a general increase of produce,—

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if, for instance, prices were reduced a half, in consequence of produce being doubled, by double the quantity of land being cultivated and double the quantity of manufactures being established, the amount of currency should be doubled, to raise prices again to the same standard, or the farmers and manufacturers would lose half their income. But in every instance where an increase or decrease of currency takes place, without a proportionate increase or decrease of produce, and therefore causes prices to rise above or fall below the same standard, fraud is the inevitable consequence. If prices rise from an increase of currency, the quantity of corn continuing the same, the tenant is benefitted, and the landlord injured, as the tenant makes more, without paying more, and as the same sum will not go so far, the tenant cheats his landlord, by not giving him more than the same sum. If prices fall from a decrease of currency, the quantity of corn continuing the same, the tenant is injured, and the landlord benefitted, as the tenant makes less without paying less; and as the same sum will go further, the landlord cheats his tenant by not taking less than the same sum. There should, therefore, be no increase of currency, unless a general reduction of prices, from a general increase of produce, should make the increase necessary to bring prices up again to the same standard, and make incomes the same; and as there can be no general increase of produce without an increase of manufactures, from an increased supply of foreign corn and colonial produce, and as corn and colonial produce are every where limited by the limits of territory, the gene-

ral increase of produce must be slow and gradual; and it is not probable that Parliament will be called upon to authorise an increased issue of paper to remedy a general reduction of prices, in consequence of such an increase of produce, for many years to come. Our currency, therefore, should be kept at a fixed amount, to keep prices at a fixed standard, and keep incomes the same, till this increase occurs.

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All the bad faith that has been shewn to the farmers and manufacturers, and all the distress with which the country has been afflicted, have been owing to our ignorance of the mischief that arises from an alteration in the measure of value, or an alteration of prices, occasioned by an alteration in the amount of currency, without any alteration in the amount of produce to justify it; for as prices should always be kept at the same standard, nothing can justify an alteration in the amount of currency, but the object of restoring prices to the same standard, for the purpose of keeping incomes the same. It is perfectly easy for any one to conceive the fraud that would be committed on those who were now under contract to find so many feet, gallons, or bushels of any particular article, if all at once the foot, the gallon, or the bushel were increased a third, and the parties were called upon to fulfil their contracts, notwithstanding this addition, though no such an increase was contemplated by the original agreement. But it is not so easy to conceive that the same fraud is committed on all farmers and manufacturers, by calling upon them to fulfil their contracts, when a reduction of the currency a third, has caused the reduction of prices a third below what they were, when

CHAPTER the contracts were made, though no such an increase in

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the value of money, or, what is the same thing, no such a diminution of their income, was intended by the original compact. Yet the fraud would be precisely the same in both instances, as both parties would be called upon to give a third more than it was a part of their agreement that they should give. Every expansion or contraction of the currency, the quantity of produce continuing the same, causes precisely the same injustice, through all the relations of society, by altering the measure of value, as any expansion or contraction of a foot, a gallon, or a bushel, would do by altering the measures of length and quantity; and it is as much the duty of Government to guard against any increase or decrease of the one, as it is to guard against any increase or decrease of the other. Strange as it may sound to the ears of those who never thought on the subject, the increase of money is just as great an evil as its decrease.

When any intimation has been thrown out in Parliament, that the public creditor should receive a less interest than he bargained for, Ministers have always very properly remarked, that they would rather make any sacrifice, and have the country make any sacrifice, than violate the faith that was pledged to them. In this feeling there are few who do not participate with them; but it is singular, that they do not see that they violate their faith in the same manner to the farmers and manufacturers, by lowering the rate of prices, which lessens their income, as they would violate their faith to the public creditors, by lowering the rate of interest to lessen their income,

The farmers and manufacturers have as clear and sound **CHAPTER VI.** a title, in honor and honesty, to the income for which they stipulated, when they made their contracts, as the public creditors, when they made theirs. When a landlord grants a lease to his tenant, each party takes the average rate of prices, as the measure of what the one is to pay and the other to receive. The agreement can only be fairly executed between them, in proportion as these prices are maintained without alteration by any alteration in the amount of the currency. By lowering, therefore, the rate of prices, on which the income of the farmer depends by a contraction of the currency, Government as completely breaks faith with him, as it would break faith with the public creditor by lowering the rate of interest on which his income depends. It is impossible, by any subtlety of reasoning, to make any greater difference between the two cases, than that the one is an indirect fraud, by taking away so much money through the medium of prices, and the other a direct fraud, by taking away so much money without any medium at all. There can, therefore, be no doubt, that Government is as strictly bound to protect the farmers and manufacturers by the maintenance of the same rate of prices, as it is to protect the public creditors, by the maintenance of the same rate of interest; that its faith is virtually as strongly pledged that the rent shall be fair between the landlord and tenant, as that the interest shall be fair between the public creditor and the public. But not only is Government bound to see that justice is done between the landlord and tenant, and the public creditor and the public, but it is bound to see that justice is done between man and man in all the

CHAPTER pecuniary engagements of society; and as justice cannot

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be done, unless the currency is maintained at the same invariable amount, while produce continues at the same amount, to maintain the same invariable state of prices, Government should no more allow of its increase or decrease than of the increase or decrease of any other measure.

On the first foundation of a society it matters not what is the amount of currency; whether it consists of five millions, fifty millions, or five hundred millions, as prices would be in the same proportion, and all would have the same proportionate income, whatever it was, nor would a country be any richer with the greater, than with the lesser currency. But when once the amount of the currency is fixed, and prices are determined, and contracts made according to the existing rate of prices, as fraud will ensue if the currency is altered, without produce being altered in the same degree, by causing an alteration of prices, no motive whatever should influence Government to admit of its being altered. There can be no doubt that the increase of currency which took place in this country between 1783 and 1812 and 1813 ought never to have been allowed; but as it was allowed, and as prices were raised, and leases signed, and contracts made, with an understanding that the prices, high as they were, were to continue, Government have now no right to turn round on the farmers and manufacturers, and say,—we must break faith with you, because we permitted prices to be too high. It was their own fault, and not the fault of the farmers and manufacturers, that the prices were

so, and there would be as little justice in altering the compact to the disadvantage of the farmers and manufacturers because prices were too high, as there would be in altering any other compact, because the terms were not approved of.

So little has been written on the powerful effects of an expansion or contraction of currency, that the vast decrease of national income that takes place under a comparatively slight contraction, and the vast increase that takes place under a comparatively slight expansion, are but little understood. The extent, therefore, of the loss which the farmers and manufacturers have sustained, by the reduction of our currency, is but little known and little conceived. The precise proportion that exists between the amount of a nation's currency and the amount of a nation's income, has never been ascertained, because no correct estimate has been formed of the amount of a nation's money, or whatever may constitute the materials of its currency, or of the amount of a nation's income arising from the productive power of its agricultural and manufacturing classes. But according to the public returns of 1812 and 1813, the average amount of our currency was about 70,000,000*l.*; 30,000,000*l.* issued by the Bank of England, and 40,000,000*l.* by the Country Banks. The whole of our national income, during the same period, arising from the labour of our productive classes, may be estimated according to the prices which then prevailed, at about 700,000,000*l.* If these estimates approach the truth, it follows, that the national income is

CHAPTER ten times the amount of its currency. If, then, the cur-

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rency of a country should at any time be contracted five millions, it is evident that the national income will be diminished fifty millions, and that the farmers and manufacturers, or productive classes, will lose fifty millions a year, by the reduction of prices that will ensue; and if, on the contrary, the currency of a country should at any time be expanded five millions, the national income will be increased fifty millions, and the productive classes will gain fifty millions a year, by the advance of prices that will ensue.

But since 1812 and 1813, the currency of the country has been reduced a third. The utmost issues of the Bank of England were 33,000,000*l.* and the utmost issues of the country banks, a little above 40,000,000*l.* Ten million has been taken from the paper of the Bank of England, as by the last returns, before the substitution of gold for small notes, the issues were no more than 23,000,000*l.*; and as the paper of the country banks must be decreased in the same proportion, or to the amount of 13,000,000*l.* the whole contraction has been to the extent of 23,000,000*l.* Our currency, therefore, has been lessened a third, from 70,000,000*l.* to 47,000,000*l.*; and according to the proportion between currency and income, the national income has been reduced from 700,000,000*l.* to 470,000,000*l.* and the farmers and manufacturers have sustained a loss of 230,000,000*l.* a year, by the reduction of prices: so powerful are the effects of a contraction of the currency, and so vast is the decrease of the income of a nation from a comparatively slight decrease of its currency!

High, however, as this estimate is of the loss, which the **CHAPTER VI.**
farmers and manufacturers have sustained, there is no fal-
lacy in the calculation, of which I am aware, to authorise
a conclusion, that it is overstated. On whatever principle
the estimate is formed, the result will still shew, that their
loss has been immense, though no other calculation may
possibly carry the loss to so vast an extent. According
to the current prices of 1812 and 1813 the gross produce
of an acre was worth six pounds; but if it be admitted
that prices must be reduced a third, in consequence of cur-
rency being reduced a third, the gross produce must now
be lowered to four pounds. In England and Scotland
there are 40,000,000 of cultivated acres, which, at six
pounds an acre, gross produce, make 240,000,000*l.* and
at four pounds, 160,000,000*l.* being a loss to the farmers
of 80,000,000*l.* a year. As the manufactured produce
of the same years was estimated according to the same
prices, at 200,000,000*l.*, it must now be reduced to
130,000,000*l.* and the loss to the manufacturers will be
70,000,000*l.*, making the united loss of the farmers and
manufacturers 150,000,000*l.* a year. Great as this loss
is, it is by no means overcharged, as the income, which de-
pends upon prices, must necessarily be reduced in the
same proportion in which prices are reduced; and if it be
admitted, that prices have been diminished a third, the
deduction is inevitable, that the incomes which depend
on them, must be diminished a third also.

Had I, however, taken the value of the gross produce
of an acre in 1812 and 1813 at nine pounds, instead of

CHAPTER six, as I should have been justified in doing by the Corn
 VI. Report of 1814, the loss to the farmers would now be
 three pound an acre, instead of two, which would bring
 up the calculation to 190,000,000*l.* instead of 150,000,000*l.*
 and make it more nearly approach the first calculation of
 230,000,000*l.*; but as I would rather expose myself to
 the charge of under-rating than over-rating the wealth of
 England, in forming a comparison with France, I took
 the valuation of six pounds in preference to that of nine.

Whether, therefore, the loss which the farmers and manufacturers have suffered, be estimated according to one calculation at 230,000,000*l.*, or according to another at 190,000,000*l.*, or according to a third, at 150,000,000*l.* a year, the loss will in each case be immense. It may be as great as the highest calculation, but it cannot be less than the lowest. Whichever estimate is taken, however, any one of them will sufficiently shew, how fatally the farmers and manufacturers would deceive themselves, if they looked to public economy and retrenchment as a means of relief; for if the whole of the national debt were annihilated, and an interest of 40,000,000*l.* a year were given up, the giving of it up would be but of little avail to enable them to retrieve themselves, as they would still be losers, according to the first calculation, of 190,000,000*l.* a year, —according to the second, of 150,000,000*l.*—and according to the third, of 110,000,000*l.* a year. However praiseworthy Mr. Curwen's efforts have been to repair the injury which the agricultural body has received, it is unnecessary to allude to the saving of 500,000*l.* a year, by

the repeal of the agricultural horse duty, as administering CHAPTER
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any perceptible aid at all. Nothing can restore to the farmers and manufacturers the income they possessed in 1812 and 1813, but the prices of 1812 and 1813; and nothing can restore the prices of 1812 and 1813, but the same amount of currency. If the contraction of the currency from 70,000,000*l.* to 47,000,000*l.* has occasioned a diminution of the national income from 700,000,000*l.* to 470,000,000*l.* and a loss to the farmers and manufacturers of 230,000,000*l.* a year, a re-expansion of the currency, from 47,000,000*l.* to 70,000,000*l.* will restore the national income to 700,000,000*l.* and enable the farmers and manufacturers to recover the ground they have lost. Had Ministers been aware that the withdrawing of ten millions of paper by the Bank of England, and the consequent withdrawing of a similar proportion by the Country Banks, would have diminished the national income in the way that it has done, and defrauded the farmers and manufacturers of so many millions a year, it is evident that they would never have suffered the reduction to have been made. Had they foreseen the effect of the contraction, and committed the fraud with their eyes open, instead of with their eyes shut, they would have been guilty of as great a crime as it is possible for Ministers to commit, as the farmers and manufacturers have to all intents and purposes been robbed of their money, as completely as if it had been taken from their persons. Since, then, it is clear that the farmers and manufacturers are as fully entitled to the income which they possessed in 1812 and 1813, as the public creditors, landlords, annuitants, placemen, and

CHAPTER VI. pensioners, and the army and navy, are to theirs; and since it is equally evident that they have been dispossessed of it, without any criminal intention on the part of Government to defraud them of it, there can be no doubt that prices should be raised by the re-issue of paper to such a standard, as to make the national income what it was in 1812 and 1813, and reinstate the farmers and manufacturers in the prosperity which they then possessed. And as this re-issue may be made without impeding, for any long period, the resumption of cash payments, if it should be deemed wise to resume them, it would be as unwarrantable as unjust not to make it.

When it was in contemplation to return to cash payments, there were two ways of bringing the pound-note to par with gold. One was to keep the existing amount of our currency without further increase, and wait till the currencies of other countries were augmented, by the circulation of paper and the produce of mines, to the same comparative amount as ours, and thus have their gold brought down to the value of our paper: and the other was, to decrease our currency to the same comparative amount as theirs, and thus have our paper raised up to the value of their gold. Unfortunately, with the blindness of ignorance, we chose the latter method: but there can be no question whatever that we should have chosen the former. It is by the reduction of our currency, and the reduction of our prices, to a level with foreign money and foreign prices, that our farmers and manufacturers have been thrown into their difficulties, and that our national

income has been so diminished; but if we had waited CHAPTER
without making any addition to our paper, till their cur- VI.
rencies were augmented to the same relative amount as ours,
and their prices raised to a correspondence with ours, our
pound note would equally have been brought to par
with their gold; and as our prices would have continued
the same, the diminution of our national income, and the
loss which our farmers and manufacturers have endured,
would have been wholly prevented. The pound note
would have continued in a state of depreciation below the
value of foreign money a few years longer, and it would
have been perfectly right to have permitted it so to con-
tinue, as all the indirect fraud that has been committed,
has solely resulted from raising it to par. It was unques-
tionably wrong, in the first instance, to have allowed such
an issue of paper, as to have caused its depreciation; but
having allowed it, it was impossible to raise it to par, by
any contraction of our own currency, without breaking
faith, as has been done, with all those who made contracts
under its depreciated value, and reducing them to diffi-
culty. No further evil would have occurred by per-
mitting it to remain in the depreciated state in which it
was, though further evil would have ensued by lowering
its value in a greater degree by the issue of more paper,
as the fixed incomes would then have suffered in the same
manner in which the fluctuating incomes have now suf-
fered by raising its value. Had we pursued this plan, and
kept steady to the existing amount of our paper, without
any further addition, there would have been no diminution
of prices, and no diminution of the national income; rents

CHAPTER and taxes would have been paid with ease, and the country

VI.

would have been in the highest state of prosperity, instead of the lowest state of distress. In order, therefore, to replace us in the situation in which we were, in 1812 and 1813, and keep us in that situation, it is necessary that our paper should again be increased to a sufficient amount, to raise the price of wheat to the requisite standard, to restore us to it, and then that our paper should be increased no more, unless sufficient grounds should hereafter be made out to Parliament to justify its increase, for the purpose of maintaining the same state of prices, and keeping incomes the same.

If this re-issue should take place, as the pound note will again be depreciated below gold, and the exchange again become unfavourable, all the guineas and sovereigns that have recently been put in circulation by the Bank will be sent out of the country in the same manner as in the previous coinage of 1817, when about seven million of guineas and sovereigns appeared and disappeared in a few months. But as the office of money is to maintain contracts between man and man with even-handed justice, and as gold cannot in the present instance be retained without occasioning the breach, instead of the observance, of contracts, it is highly desirable that it should be sent out.

No inconvenience, however, will either internally or externally result to our trade from the exchange being unfavourable, as it was sufficiently explained in the *First Volume* of this Inquiry that not a bale of goods less would go out, nor a bale of goods more come in, in consequence of its be-

ing unfavourable—the exchange being nothing more than **CHAPTER VI.** a compensation for the difference in the value of money, or for the difference of prices in different countries, by the allowance of a discount, or premium, according as prices are superior, or inferior, from a relative excess or relative scarcity of currency.

But what time may elapse before the currencies of the continent will be augmented in the same proportion as ours, and before the value of their gold will be brought down to the value of our paper, it is impossible to determine. The augmentation depends on the issues of their Governments, the issues of their Banks, and the produce of Mines; and as all these are uncertain, no precise period can be fixed: it may be five, or it may be ten, years: but provided that our paper is kept at the same invariable amount, the longer the period before the currencies are brought to a common level the better, as less fraud will be the consequence. The evils that attend a paper circulation are two—the evil of increase, and the evil of decrease. Under an increase, fixed incomes suffer according as they are diminished in value, from the same sum not going so far—under a decrease fluctuating incomes suffer according as they are diminished in amount, and have the same sum to pay. But if paper were kept without increase or decrease it would be a better measure of value and medium of exchange than gold, which, though less than any other substance, still increases in amount, as the mines produce more than enough to supply its waste. The precious metals were selected as a measure of value and medium of exchange merely because

CHAPTER they were less liable to increase or decrease than any thing

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else, and were therefore less liable to cause a variation of prices, and be susceptible of a change of value, than any thing else. But if our paper were exempt from any increase or decrease whatever, not only would there be no necessity for resuming cash payments, but it would be better for the country if they never were resumed. But as the currencies of the continent will some time or other be augmented in a greater degree than ours, and gold will come over, our small notes should be called in as fast as it does come over, that no increase of currency may take place. Constituted however as our paper circulation now is, that part which consists of Country Bank-paper is liable to decrease from alarm. It is, however, less liable to be affected by a panic than formerly, as the banks are better established, and are on a better understanding with the Bank of England. But should runs be renewed, the whole circulation of the country should be supplied by the paper of the Bank of England, or the paper of Government. Nothing more is necessary to give effect to the system here recommended than to repeal the Bullion Act, the grand cause of all our distress, and allow the Bank of England to issue such a quantity of paper in loans to government as will raise the price of wheat to its appointed standard, but never afterwards to allow it to contract or expand that quantity a single note without the authority of Parliament.

The Bank of England, however, should possess the discretionary power of issuing the necessary quantity of paper to supply the place of any Country Bank paper that may be

withdrawn in consequence of the bankruptcy of a country **CHAPTER**
 bank, or in consequence of a partial run, as it should be our **VI.**
 object to keep prices at the same standard, that Contracts
 may be duly fulfilled, and unless the notes of the Bank of
 England were allowed to supply the place of Country Bank-
 notes, when withdrawn, this object could not be effected.
 The Bank should also have the power of increasing or dimi-
 nishing its loan to government as merchants are more or
 less in want of discount, care being taken that neither a
 greater nor less quantity of paper should be altogether out
 in circulation.

But instead of considering that our low prices are occa-
 sioned by the decrease of our currency, ministers contend
 that they are occasioned by the increase of corn. If this
 were the fact, as the increase of corn from good seasons
 would make up for the decrease of prices, the farmers would
 have the same income as before, and as that income would
 go so much further they would be in a state of wealth in-
 stead of in a state of poverty, and all the petitions that have
 been sent up to Parliament, complaining of distress, would
 be so many fabrications of what had no existence. But if
 it be true, that a diminution of income has taken place,
 the low prices must have proceeded from a decrease of cur-
 rency, for had they proceeded from an increase of corn no
 diminution of income could have occurred. A reduction
 of income, therefore, necessarily implies a reduction of cur-
 rency, as one effect cannot take place without the other.
 The reduction of the currency, however, is not matter of

CHAPTER argument, but matter of fact, unless the Bank returns are
VI. to be discredited.

In the debate, in which Lord Liverpool made an avowal of his principles of political economy to the country, and asserted that our corn was too much, and not our currency too little, he particularly desired that the subject might be inquired into. Upon inquiry it will be found that for these last two years we have had 2,400,000 quarters less than we have had for twenty years before, for as we have imported no corn, and as the crops of the two last years by the report of the Agricultural Committee have been nothing more than average ones, our corn has been less instead of greater by the 1,200,000 quarters a year of foreign corn, which was before our average import, and as the loss of the corn has occasioned a loss of the manufactures, to which its import gave rise, our aggregate produce has been so much less instead of so much greater than it was in 1812 and 1813, and had our currency continued the same, prices would have been higher now than then, in proportion as our produce is less. But as our currency has been diminished also, and diminished in a much greater degree than our produce, prices have fallen instead of risen, notwithstanding the decrease of our produce which ought to have raised them. Instead, therefore, of our farmers and manufactures having the same income which they had in 1812 and 1813, and having that income go so much further in consequence of produce being more, they have a less income than they had in those years, in consequence of currency being less; and as they have the same rent and taxes

to pay, without the same means of paying them, they are **CHAPTER VI.** poorer instead of richer, as they would have been, had the low prices proceeded from produce being more instead of from currency being less.

But notwithstanding that our corn has been less by 2,400,000 quarters during these last two years than it has been for twenty years before, yet it has unquestionably been too much, because the Corn Bill by lessening our manufactures has made it too much. But when Lord Liverpool asserted that our corn was too much, as he is not aware of the exchange of corn for manufactures, he did not mean that we grew too much, and possessed too much with reference to manufactures, but that we grew more, and possessed more than we had done for twenty years before. In this opinion he was evidently mistaken, and that the quantity—lessened as it is—is now too much is his own fault, for had he been competent to explain the evil tendency of the Corn Bill to the country, and had caused its rejection, we should now have been making large importations, and growing too little instead of too much; and as the price of corn would have been so much higher compared to manufactures, our distress would have been so much less.

Unless Ministers will take more pains to make themselves masters of the principles of currency it is impossible that they can legislate correctly. When Mr. Baring, who sees further into this subject, than any other member, made a motion for a Committee, to revise the bullion act, to which he candidly confessed, though an original supporter of the

CHAPTER measure, that he attributed all the difficulties of the coun-

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try, Mr. Vansittart opposed the motion, on the grounds that when the pound note was depreciated below the value of gold, he was pressed from year to year to raise it to par, and now, that he had brought it to par, he was pressed to depreciate it again, which he saw no sufficient reasons for doing.

But if Mr. Vansittart had given the subject a little further consideration he would have known that those who pressed him did right in both instances. While our currency was on the increase, and was every year increasing more and more, all the fixed incomes in the country were becoming of less and less value, and the public creditors and annuitants of every description were strenuous in their endeavours to prevail on Government to stop the progress of the evil, and maintain their incomes at the same uniform and steady value, by preventing prices from rising. And now, on the other hand, when our currency is on the decrease, and is every year decreasing more and more, all the fluctuating incomes of the country are becoming less and less in amount, and the farmers and manufactures are equally strenuous in their endeavours to prevail on government to stop the progress of the evil, and maintain their incomes at the same uniform and steady amount, by preventing prices from falling. When our currency is increasing, the owners of fixed incomes are clamorous because they are injured, and the owners of fluctuating incomes are silent because they are benefitted. When our currency is decreasing the owners of fluctuating incomes are clamorous because

they are injured, and the owners of fixed incomes are silent **CHAPTER VI:**
because they are benefitted. But it is the duty of Government to maintain our currency without increase or decrease, that prices may be maintained in the same state, and that neither party may be defrauded. By the plan which is here recommended, good faith will be kept with both parties, as all that is recommended is, that both may be placed in the same situation in which they were in 1812 and 1813, before any reduction in our currency was made, and that when they are placed in this situation the fixed incomes of the country may never again be deteriorated by an increase of prices, nor the fluctuating incomes by a decrease of prices. This is the only fair arrangement that can be made, and unless it be made, good faith and justice are nothing but a name, and the government of the country is any thing but an honourable one.

To urge on their claims, however, the farmers and manufacturers must, on no account, relax in their Petitions to Parliament. The fault of the petitioners, this year, was that they prayed for relief in general, without specifying how relief was to be given. Had they prayed for the repeal of the bullion act, and for such measures with regard to the currency, as would raise prices to the standard of 1812 and 1813, and maintain the integrity of their incomes with the same good faith with which the integrity of the incomes of the public creditors was maintained, the prayer of their petition would most probably have been

CHAPTER granted. But the best reliance of the farmers and manufacturers is on the country gentlemen, for as rents cannot be paid, unless farmers flourish,—and cannot be high, unless manufacturers flourish—the country gentlemen are more interested in supporting the rights of the farmers and manufacturers, than any other body. But not only are they personally interested in keeping the incomes of the farmers and manufacturers from being lessened, but they are the natural guardians of their tenantry, and if they fail to come forward at this crisis to give effect to their claims, they will betray the trust that is reposed in them, and shamefully swerve from their duty.

As the convictions for false coining exceed the convictions for forgery, the convictions for false coining during a given period being according to Lord Lansdown's statement in the House of Lords 3191, and the convictions for forgery no more than half that number, or 1581, it is obvious that a paper currency is productive of less crime than a metallic one. But even if it were not, it could hardly be contended that the innocent should be made to suffer for the guilty, and that the farmers and manufacturers should be deprived of 230,000,000*l.* a year for no other reason, than because forgeries are committed to the extent of 30,000*l.* or 40,000*l.* a year; and since we cannot go on without a paper system, when forgeries nearly to the same extent, would most probably be committed, if the additional paper for giving the 230,000,000*l.* a year to the farmers and manufacturers were not issued.

But I hope in a future part of this work, to cause a more CHAPTER
general impression in favour of making the punishment ^{VI.} ~~loss of life~~
for forgery loss of liberty, instead of loss of life.

It is impossible not to concur with those who object to tampering and dabbling with the currency, as all the mischief that has ensued has been solely occasioned by our meddling with it, and it is to prevent this mischief from ever again occurring, that I propose the inviolable preservation of our currency at a fixed amount, unless Parliament should have reason to increase it from an increase of produce, that prices may always be kept at a fixed standard. But as we have proceeded to tamper and dabble with the currency, till our farmers and manufacturers have lost 230,000,000*l.* a year by it, nothing can be more unjustifiable than to get out of the dabbling by fastening this loss upon them, when we can get out of it without letting them suffer any loss at all ; and as increasing the currency to the amount of 1812 and 1813 will prevent the loss, and keeping it at that amount, will prevent all future dabbling, and all future loss, there can be no doubt that it would be better to fix our currency at that amount, than fix it at the present amount, to the ruin of half the nation.

But there are some who contend that the decrease of currency is a risk, which the farmers and manufacturers take upon themselves in the same manner as a decrease of produce, and that Government is not called upon to repair the injury that arises from it. But as this is saying that

CHAPTER those who are wronged ought not to be redressed, the par-
 VI. tisans for this opinion are not likely to be very numerous.

As these who drew up the report of the Agricultural Committee, were not sufficiently acquainted with the principles of commerce and currency,—as they knew nothing of the exchange of corn for manufactures, or of the necessity of having our currency at a fixed amount to prevent loss from a variation of prices,—they had no grounds to recommend a large import of corn, for the purpose of making our manufactures excessive, nor any grounds for recommending an increase of currency for the purpose of covering the losses that have been incurred ; and as they, therefore, failed to point out the true remedy for our difficulties, they necessarily disappointed the expectations of the public, and made the “ Report ” a bubble.

Since, then, it is necessary for the due fulfilment of all contracts, that prices should be kept invariably the same ; and since there are no other means of keeping them the same, but by placing our currency under the control of Parliament, for the purpose of keeping them so, it is absolutely necessary that the plan which is here suggested should be put into execution. No other plan can save the fixed and fluctuating incomes of the country, from constant deterioration, by a constant change of prices ; no other plan can add 230,000,000*l.* to our national income ; nor can any other plan give us back the prosperity we have in so extraordinary a manner flung away by our Corn Bill and

Bullion Bill, and raise us once more to the proud emi- CHAPTER
nence on which we stood in 1812 and 1813. Certainly no VI.
country ever yet reduced itself from so high to so low a si-
tuation as we have done by the simple effect of bad legis-
lation only. Since, however, on repealing the Bullion Act
and raising the price of corn to 120 shillings the ports will
be open, the repeal of the Corn Bill will be no otherwise
necessary, than as it is a disgrace to our Statute Book

Prohibitions as injurious to the Country that makes them as to the Country against which they are made.—Commerce an Exchange of what is partially excessive in one Country for what is partially excessive in another.—Impossible to Export without allowing Import.—A Commercial Union between France and England equally beneficial to both Countries.—Means of establishing it.—Free Trade with all the World.—Open Ports and open Markets.—A general Free Trade the best Security for universal Peace.

CHAPTER VII. **T**HE well-being of a country, however, not only requires that the trade in corn should be free, but it requires that the trade in manufactures should be free also. The principal province of commerce is to bring all produce, whatever may be its nature, to the same proportion and price in all countries, for the purpose of preventing the injury, that arises, wherever a difference occurs. Where any particular produce is relatively more abundant, and therefore cheaper, than a free trade would allow it to be, the sellers are injured, and the buyers are benefitted; where any particular produce is relatively scarcer, and therefore dearer, than a free trade would allow it to be, the buyers

are injured and the sellers are benefitted ; but as the sellers of one produce are the buyers of another, it is the common interest of both buyers and sellers, in all countries, that there should neither be excess nor deficiency, but that all produce should be freely permitted to come to the same proportion and price, in all places, that the same justice may be indiscriminately administered to all, and that money may every where be enabled to act with effect as an equal measure of value. It is not only requisite, therefore, that corn and manufactures should every where be in the same proportion to each other, but it is requisite also, that manufactures of all kinds should every where be in the same proportion to each other ; and as there is a profit in conveying them from the place, where they are partially excessive and cheapest, to the place where they are partially deficient and dearest, till the level is made good, it is obvious, if the trade of the world were free, that they would be in the same proportion, and at the same price in all places, with the exception of the charge of transit between them, as the price of no produce could vary more in any two places, if the intercourse were open, than was the amount of this charge.

But the restrictive system of commerce, which is more or less prevalent through the world, prevents this level from being perfected, and in some countries causes a partial excess of various kinds of produce, and in others a partial scarcity ; but I shall endeavour to shew, that in every instance where the level is interrupted, by preventing any given produce from going from the place where

CHAPTER ^{VII.} it is partially excessive and cheapest to the place where it is partially deficient and dearest, and from thus coming to the same proportion and price in all places, the country that makes the prohibition suffers just as great an injury as the country against which the prohibition is made. All commerce consists in exchanging what is partially excessive in one country, for what is partially excessive in another. If, therefore, any one country should forbid the excess of another from coming in, it is the same thing as forbidding its own excess to go out, as no country can receive the produce of another, unless its own produce be admitted in return. It therefore injures itself precisely in the same degree in which it injures its rival. It prevents its own superfluity from supplying the deficiency of another, and it prevents the superfluity of another from supplying its own deficiency. By depriving the produce, of which the foreign excess consists, of the best market, it deprives the produce of which its own excess consists of the best market, and in the same manner in which it makes the foreign excess so much cheaper, by confining it at home, it makes its own excess so much cheaper by confining it at home. It inflicts, therefore, no injury whatever on its rival that it does not inflict on itself; and as nothing is gained where a country injures itself in the same proportion, in which it injures another, it would be more consistent with good sense to do away with the prohibition, and inflict no injury at all.

But not only does the prohibition keep the two countries poorer in the same degree, but it prevents them from be-

coming richer in the same degree, as it prevents them from **CHAPTER**
 increasing their partial superfluities to supply each other. **VII.**
 By confining the various kinds of produce, of which each excess consists to the home market, each excess is necessarily limited by the demand of the home market, or by the demand, which one kind of home produce makes for another; but by permitting an exchange between the two excesses, each excess would not only have the home market to supply, but the foreign market to supply also, and would be increased in proportion to the demand of the foreign market, or in proportion to the amount of the foreign excess, which was to be given in exchange for it. Not only therefore is a prohibition to import a prohibition to export, but it is a prohibition to create the additional produce which a free trade would otherwise give rise to. It not only therefore operates to make a country so much poorer by confining its produce to the home market, and making it exchange for so much less than it otherwise would do, but it operates to prevent a country from becoming so much richer by preventing its produce from being increased to supply the foreign market as well as its own.

Where, however, the prohibition to import is on one side only, it is practicable to a limited extent, to maintain an intercourse by the intervention of bullion, for as bullion may be procured to a certain amount by the export of produce to an intermediate country, and may afterwards be made use of to purchase the produce of the prohibiting country, a trade may be carried on to the extent to which bullion can be obtained. The intercourse between this country

CHAPTER and China is principally maintained by this medium, as

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British manufactures are for the most part forbid. But the trade between the two countries is considerably strengthened by the necessity of resorting to the bullion. Were a free intercourse allowed between all produce that was partially excessive in England, and all produce that was partially excessive in China, instead of fixing bounds to the trade according to the partial excess of bullion only, the intercourse would be greatly extended. The supply of bullion is necessarily limited, but manufactures are unlimited; and as enlarging the communication would cause the excess of each country to be augmented to supply the other, each would be alike enriched by its freedom. Though, therefore, where the prohibition is on one side only, the intervention of bullion will prevent the prohibition to import from being a decisive prohibition to export, yet the intercourse between the prohibiting country and others will be greatly contracted by the employment of the bullion, for as the trade will be only open to one superfluity, instead of being open to all, it will be in proportion only to the amount of the bullion, instead of being in proportion to the amount of every other excess, and both will sustain an injury according as the intercourse is more contracted than it otherwise would be.

But among the States of Europe, the prohibition to import the manufactures of each other is on all sides, as all foreign goods, made up for sale, are, generally speaking, interdicted in all. No bullion can, therefore, be used as an auxiliary medium, because no manufactured pro-

duce can be imported, after it has been purchased by the **CHAPTER**
bullion. The prohibition to import, therefore, is a con- **VII:**
clusive prohibition to export, for where none are per-
mitted to buy, none can have the means of selling. Not
only, therefore, are all the countries of Europe so much
poorer by this prohibitory system of imports, but all are
prevented from becoming so much richer, as all are pre-
vented from increasing their superfluities to supply the
deficiency of each other.

It is, however, very generally held to be consistent
with sound policy, to prohibit the import of manufactures
from abroad, for the purpose of encouraging rival manu-
factures at home. But in every instance where a cheap
foreign manufacture is prevented from coming in to fa-
vor a dear home one, the restriction is not only made at
the expence of the Landed Interest, but it is made at the
expence of all the Manufacturing Classes, that are not con-
cerned in the favored manufacture, as all give so much
more for it, than they otherwise would do, and are con-
sequently so much the poorer. It is impossible that a
manufacturer could give a worse reason for not having a
particular trade opened, than that he should be undersold
by the foreign manufacturer if it were open, as every per-
son in the country, except himself, would be benefitted by
his being undersold, and would give the very reason for
opening the trade which he would give for keeping it
shut. It is no more just that a foreign manufacture
should be prevented from coming in, than the home ma-
nufacturer may be richer, and the public poorer, than that

CHAPTER the home manufacture should be prevented from going

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out, that the public may be richer and the home manufacturer poorer. Of the two acts of injustice, as partial interests should give way to the general interest, it would seem at first view to be more consistent with reason, to sacrifice the individual to the public, than the public to the individual, and prevent the export of the home manufacture, that the public may purchase it at a lower price ; but as this prohibition, if followed up in other instances, would lead to the total subversion of commerce, it is not only more just, but more to the interest of all persons, that manufactures should be left to find their level as they may, than that they should be obstructed by prohibition either of import or export.

By preventing the import of a cheap foreign manufacture, the buyers or the would-be buyers are injured ; by preventing the export of a cheap home manufacture, the sellers or the would-be sellers are injured ; but as a prohibition to import is a prohibition to export, in the same manner in which the seller of the dear home manufacture is benefitted, the seller of some cheap home manufacture, that would otherwise have gone out, is injured. But as it is unjust to benefit one seller at the expence of another, not only are prohibitions prejudicial, as they injure the buyers or would-be buyers, but they are prejudicial as they injure some other seller.

The home manufacturer is entitled to no other encouragement beyond the foreign manufacturer, than the pro-

fit of the charge of transit, and if he is incapable of bringing his manufacture to market at a cheaper rate than the foreign manufacturer, with this charge in his favour, there is no reason why he should be supported to the injury of all the rest of the community ; as in the same proportion in which his produce is made dearer than it otherwise would be, all other produce is made cheaper than it otherwise would be. The public, therefore, would not only be losers instead of gainers by exchanging their produce for his manufacture, instead of the foreign one, but, as prohibiting imports is prohibiting exports, the trade of the country would be unduly contracted to serve the interests of the few, instead of the interests of the many.

The prohibition of imports arose out of the theory of the balance of trade : for as no notion was entertained that an increase of money was an evil, instead of a good, and as it was always thought that an individual got rich by getting money, it was conceived, that a nation must get rich by getting money also ; and as buying or importing was thought to take money out, and selling or exporting to bring money in, exports were every where encouraged and imports every where restricted,—to the destruction of all commercial freedom. But as the theory of the balance of trade, which was supposed to lead to the gradual accumulation of money according to the annual amount of the excess of exports, has no foundation either in reason or in fact, the whole prohibitory system of imports is constructed on what has no real existence, as was sufficiently explained in the First Volume of this inquiry, the

CHAPTER excess of exports being nothing more than the amount of
 VII. foreign expenditure. If the theory of the balance of trade were correct, and led to the constant accumulation of money according to the annual amount of the excess of exports, the only effect that would result from it would be the constant deterioration of the fixed incomes of the country by a constant rise of prices.

All commerce between independent states consists in the exchange of equivalents, notwithstanding that each country gives what is of less value, and receives what is of greater: for as each gives what is partially excessive and receives what is partially deficient, each gives what is cheap, and receives what is dear: but as what is given by the one country is of the same value as what is given by the other, and what is received by the one of the same value as what is received by the other, the exchange between them is precisely equal. Though, therefore, the value of what is imported exceeds the value of what is exported to pay for it, yet it is not that one country gains against another, and that one gets rich at the expence of another, as we have been erroneously taught to believe through the theory of the balance of trade, but all get rich together, according to the extent of their intercourse, by exchanging what is partially excessive in the one, for what is partially excessive in the other, and supplying their mutual deficiencies, by their mutual superfluities.

The efflux and influx of money entirely depend on its relative abundance or scarcity; and as the prohibition of

imports and encouragement of exports have no effect to CHAPTER
make money either scarce or abundant, they have no effect
to make it either come in, or go out ; and if they had
effect to make it come in, they would do harm instead of
good, by raising prices and defrauding fixed incomes of
their due.

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The sole end of Prohibitions, therefore, is to interrupt the partial excess of one country from exchanging for the partial excess of another, and by confining the produce of each at home to prevent it from coming to the same proportion and price in all countries, as it is the common interest of all that it should come, to obviate the injury that arises from a difference of prices. No doubt can, therefore, be entertained that imports should be made in order that exports may be made, and that the trade in manufactures should be as free as the trade in corn, that all nations may exchange them to more advantage than they now do and increase them for each other's supply.

If therefore a Free Trade were allowed, each country would be as much interested in the increase of the partial excess of every other country as in the increase of its own partial excess, as a diminution in the amount of a foreign excess would cause a diminution in the value of its own excess, as its own produce would be so much cheaper and foreign produce so much dearer than before. Instead therefore, of the wealth of one country causing any diminution in the wealth of another, the wealth of one materially adds to the wealth of another ; and so far should all nations be from pursuing the policy which they now pur-

CHAPTER ^{VII.} sue of endeavouring to enrich themselves by impoverishing others, but which is as ineffectual as it is injurious, that each should endeavour to increase the partial excess of another, that its own excess may exchange for so much more and be of more value.

But the interest which one country takes in the partial excess of another, is reciprocal only while their exchanges are reciprocal. The instant that their exchanges with each other are prevented the interest ceases, and as the excess of each, by being confined to the home market will be proportionably cheaper, each will sustain the same loss. No circumstance therefore can be a stronger bond of union between any two countries than their exchanging what is partially excessive in the one for what is partially excessive in the other. If such a commercial union were established between France and England, not only would the two countries be so much richer from each having an additional market to supply, but the advantages that would result from the intercourse would promote a more friendly disposition towards each other than has hitherto subsisted, or than is likely to subsist, unless such an inter-web of interests is established.

The principal produce which is partially excessive in France is wine, brandy, oil, vinegar, fruits, silks, cambrics, merinos, printed papers, porcelain, glass, jewellery, millinery, and embroidery.—The principal produce which is partially excessive in England is, coarse woollens, worsteds, flannels, blankets, carpets, kersymere, cottons of all kinds, hard-ware of all kinds, and white ware.

Under the present restrictions, as neither country has CHAPTER
the power of buying of the other, neither has the VII.
power of selling to the other, and each country sus-
tains the same loss. All the produce that is partially ex-
cessive in France is cheaper than a free trade would allow
it to be, and all the produce that is partially excessive in
England is cheaper than a free trade would allow it to be.
The sellers of the French goods that are partially excessive
in France are injured, and the buyers of those goods, or
the same sort of goods in England are injured, as the sel-
lers get less and the buyers give more than they otherwise
would do. In the same manner the sellers of the Eng-
lish goods that are partially excessive in England are in-
jured, and the buyers of those goods, or the same sort of
goods in France are injured, as the sellers get less and the
buyers give more than they otherwise would do. But if
one excess were permitted to be exchanged for the other,
the sellers in each country would get what was their due,
and the buyers in each would give no more than their due,
and neither would sustain an injury.—France would ex-
change her excess to more advantage, and England would
exchange her excess to more advantage, and each country
would be benefitted in the degree in which the produce of
each was brought to the same proportion and price in
both. But not only would the two countries be benefitted
by exchanging their produce to more advantage, but they
would be benefitted by having so much more produce to
raise for the supply of each other. At present the supply
of each is limited to the home market, but as a free inter-
course would cause a large additional market to be open-

CHAPTER ^{VII.} ed in England for French goods, and a large additional market to be opened in France for English goods, both countries would be richer by the additional produce that would be required.

The two trades that would be most likely to be injured by this union, would be the cotton trade in France, and the silk trade in England; and the more they were injured, the better it would be for the rest of the community in each country, as cotton goods would be so much cheaper in France, and silk goods so much cheaper in England. Should, therefore, an union be established, each trade should be indemnified by its Government if a loss should occur, as it would be unjust to withdraw the protection that had been afforded them without due compensation; though, in fact, there is no reason why the cotton trade should not be carried on as cheaply in France as in England, except from the greater scarcity of iron and coal for the making and working the machinery, nor is there any reason why the silk trade should not be conducted as cheaply in England as in France, except from the duty which is imposed on the raw silk, and which, in the event of a free trade, would of course be withdrawn. The compensation, therefore, to be made, should be more on account of the protection that was virtually pledged to these manufactures by their governments, than on account of any peculiar disadvantage, to which either the cotton trade is subjected in France or the silk trade in England. In whatever manufacture, and under whatever circumstances, manufacturing labourers

are thrown out of employment, and no suitable work is open to them, it is the duty of Government at all times to provide for them as adequately as possible by the offer of a new settlement and a competent maintenance, till they can support themselves in comfort. But it would be impolitic in the extreme to forego the advantages that would result from a free intercourse, merely because the cotton trade was to suffer in one country, and the silk trade in the other, when the more that they suffered the better it would be for the rest of the public in both countries. But there is no reason to conclude that the silk trades of Lyons and Spital Fields would injure one another more than the silk trades of Spital Fields and Coventry injure one another in this country, nor that the cotton trades of Rouen and Manchester would injure one another more than the cotton trades of Manchester and Glasgow injure one another in this country.

No commercial treaty is requisite to settle the terms of intercourse. All that is necessary is to remove the prohibitions and let the trade be free, as any restriction would be equally injurious to both countries, and none should be allowed, except in the instance of any particular produce, the import of which might be deemed prejudicial to public morals and health. If cotton goods were cheaper in England than in France, and were prevented from being brought into France, all in France except the cotton manufacturers would be injured by paying more for their cottons than they otherwise would do; and if silks were cheaper in France than in England, and were prevented from coming into England, all in England,

CHAPTER
 VII. except the silk manufacturers, would be injured by paying more for their silks than they otherwise would do ; and as preventing imports is preventing exports, each country would suffer by losing the additional demand for its produce, which the foreign trade in cotton would create in France, and the foreign trade in silk would create in England, above the home trade.

The principal duties that are an impediment in this country to an unrestricted trade with France are those on wine, raw silk, and brandy. The duties on wine amount to about 2,000,000*l.*, those on silk to about 500,000*l.* The duty on brandy, notwithstanding the loss we should incur by the restriction in a commercial point of view, should be continued to prevent the excesses that would follow from the commutation. It is only necessary, therefore, to provide a substitute for the duties on wine and silk. There is no fairer tax for this purpose than that on inhabited houses. There are 2,101,559 inhabited houses in Great Britain. If, therefore, an average duty of two pound more were put on each house, by a per-centage on the estimated rent of each, more than enough would be raised to supply the place of these duties. As the houses of the towns are more numerous than the houses of the country, this tax would fall somewhat more on the manufacturing than on the landed interest ; but as the manufacturing interest would be more benefitted by the opening of the trade, it is but just that they should pay comparatively more. There are some other duties on French goods that require to be commuted as well as the duties on wine and silk, and there are other ways and means of raising money, as well

as other taxes which it would be better to change also, as CHAPTER
 the sale of lottery tickets, and the excise on salt, and if the VII.
 tax on houses were raised on the average to five pounds a
 house, instead of two, so as to bring in ten million instead
 of four, the public would be greatly benefitted by the com-
 mutations it would allow. The tax on houses is not only
 an eligible tax as it is a direct one, instead of an indirect
 one, and therefore prevents more from being raised than
 is paid to Government, but it is an eligible tax because it
 would tend to obstruct the erection of small cottages, and
 check the spread of a poor population.

The duty on all wines, and the prohibition of all silks,
 should be withdrawn, as well as the duty on French wines,
 and the prohibition on French silks, as the cheaper that
 wines and silks were brought into the market, the dearer
 would British produce be, and the further would the in-
 comes of individuals go. The wines and silks of Spain,
 Portugal, and Italy, should therefore be admitted duty-free,
 as well as the silks of India and China, and the more that
 were imported the greater would be the quantity raised of
 British produce to pay for them, and the richer would all
 the countries be that were engaged in the traffic. As the
 people of England, from the comparative coldness of the
 climate, or from some other cause, which it is not here ne-
 cessary to inquire into, are more addicted to spirituous li-
 quors than the people of France, it would be imprudent
 to allow their unrestricted use ; but as brandy is not
 more unwholesome than rum, gin, whiskey, or British
 spirits, there is no reason why it should not be admitted to

CHAPTER a fair competition by an equalization of duty. In making this
 VII. exception to a free trade with France, the loss to England
 would be as great as the loss to France, as in whatever pro-
 portion brandy was prevented from coming in, British pro-
 duce would be prevented from going out; but as the good
 that would ensue from so much additional wealth would
 be no recompense for the evil that would ensue from a
 further degradation of morals, it is fit that the sacrifice
 should be made. It is only necessary to read the Report
 of the Committee of the House of Commons, on the effects
 of withdrawing the duty on whiskey, to be convinced of
 the propriety of continuing the duty on brandy.

On the part of France little more is requisite for the open-
 ing of the intercourse than the removal of her prohibitions,
 as it has been her system rather to prohibit foreign manu-
 factures altogether than discourage them by heavy duties.
 There is scarcely any thing in the question to affect her
 revenue otherwise than as the country will be so much
 richer her revenue will be paid with so much more ease.

The advancement of their mutual wealth is not, how-
 ever, the most important consideration for the establish-
 ment of this commercial union between the two countries;
 it is of much greater consequence that it should be esta-
 blished for the purpose of preventing the frequent wars to
 which both are unhappily too prone. It is, therefore, to be
 hoped that no idle prejudices, no false conception of one
 country being able to over-reach another, and gain against
 another by any commercial code that can be devised, will

prevent this good from being realized, as it is totally impossible to adopt any restrictive measure that is disadvantageous to one country, without being equally disadvantageous to the other.

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VII.

But it is not to be wished that the freedom of trade should be established only between France and England ; it should be extended to every country in the world, by the removal of the prohibitions, and the commutation of the duties, that now obstruct it, as every one would be enriched by having a larger market opened for its own produce, and affording a larger market for the produce of others. All would buy more, because all would raise more to sell, and in proportion to the difference all would be more opulent. But the commutation of duties is not so necessary as the removal of prohibitions. Where no more produce would be imported by the withdrawing of a duty than would be imported by suffering it to remain, there is no necessity for commuting it, as the interests of commerce are not injured by its continuance. The duties on tea, sugar, tobacco, timber spices, and currants, are more or less of this description, as the trade in these articles is not susceptible of sufficient increase to make the commutation a matter of moment. And as these duties, with those on wine, silk, and spirits, are the principal sources of the revenue arising from our customs, it is by no means necessary to make any material alteration in our revenue laws for the purpose of putting our trade on as good a footing, or nearly as good a footing, as if it were perfectly free. The commutation of the duties on wine and silk is not only called for because

CHAPTER the trade in these articles is susceptible of great increase,
VII. but because it would be impossible to establish a free trade with France, and let in every other produce of which she has a partial excess, without their commutation.

But not only is it the interest of all countries to establish a free trade together, but it is the interest of any one country to open its ports and emancipate its trade, though no other country should follow its example, as the more it received of the produce of others, the more it would sell of its own. If England permitted the free import of the various kinds of produce, of which the partial excess of France consists, though France continued her prohibitions against us, we should be all the richer for it, for as we must sell as much as we buy, if the free trade led to the introduction of a greater quantity of French goods, than would otherwise come, as it unquestionably would do, it would lead to the exportation of a greater quantity of English goods of some kind or other than would otherwise go; and England would in the same manner be benefitted by such a commerce with France, as she now is by such a commerce with China. The wealth of any one country would therefore be increased by establishing a free trade with all other countries, though all other countries continued their present restrictive system, for as every restriction which it imposed on itself to buy, would contract its means of selling to the same extent, it would prevent the produce from being raised, that would otherwise be required to pay for what it bought, and so far prevent its being richer.

Few treaties have been more praised than the Methuen CHAPTER VII. ~~CHAPTER~~ ~~VII.~~ Treaty, and perhaps no treaty ever merited praise so little, as its sole object is to impose a tax upon England for the benefit of Portugal. By taking the inferior wines of Portugal at a high price, instead of the superior wines of France at a low price, we have been annually paying as a tribute to Portugal whatever was the difference between their prices, and consoling ourselves during the whole period with the delusion that we were doing ourselves a great good instead of a great injury by the loss we incurred by it. But we should not only have fared better, and been no more out of pocket, had we continued to consume French wines, and raised whatever was the difference between the price of the two wines by a direct tax for the service of Portugal, but we should have had the larger market of France to supply, instead of the smaller one of Portugal, and have so far had a better trade. As a direct aid to Portugal, when necessary, is greatly preferable to the annual imposition which our indirect support exposes us to, if we now commuted the duty on wines for a tax on inhabited houses, we should not only save the tribute we now pay to Portugal in the superior price of her wines, but have better wines for our consumption, as well as a more extended trade. Even, therefore, if France withdrew none of her prohibitions against us, it would be more to our interest to make the commutation, and import the wines of France, leaving it to the French to select whatever equivalent might best answer their views. Whether they choose raw, manufactured, home, or colonial produce, would in reality be precisely the same thing to us.

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VII. That the theory of the balance of trade should have led to a restrictive intercourse with foreign powers, is not so remarkable as that it should have led to a restrictive intercourse between different provinces of the same kingdom. The commercial regulations between England and Ireland have been almost as rigid as those between England and France. Instead of considering that each country would be enriched by exchanging what was partially excessive in the one for what was partially excessive in the other, and by exporting what was cheap and importing what was dear, till the produce of each was brought to the same proportion and price in both, England resolved to buy as little as possible from Ireland, and take no advantage of what she possessed cheap, lest her money should go to Ireland; and Ireland resolved to buy as little as possible from England, and take no advantage of what she possessed cheap, lest her money should go to England. As therefore, neither would buy much of the other, neither could sell much to the other. Ireland, therefore, has been kept so much poorer, according to the extent to which she has been deprived of the English market, and England has been kept so much poorer, according to the extent to which she has been deprived of the Irish market. But as the restrictions that have been imposed between the two countries have been made against themselves, to no one's benefit, and to everyone's injury, it is impossible that their markets can be too soon opened to each other, in order that the produce of each may pass as freely to the other as the produce of either between any two of their own countries; and as this intercourse will cause the produce of

each to be increased to supply the other, both will be enriched in proportion to the augmentation. Every thing, therefore, should be reciprocally admitted by both countries, except spirits, which, from their deleterious nature, should be subjected to the same common duty over the united kingdom, as the dearer they are made to the consumer the better. Parliament having pledged itself to take the trade of the two countries into consideration the ensuing sessions, it is to be hoped that a perfect freedom of trade will be established between them, with this exception only.

England and Ireland, however, have not been the only dupes to the fallacy of the theory of the balance of trade in their domestic intercourse. A few years back, no corn was permitted to pass from one province to another, either in France or Spain, and, to this day, the corn of Hungary, Bohemia, and the Italian provinces, is not suffered to go into Austria, though no manufactures, except those of Austria, are suffered to go into those countries. As the provinces, therefore, are prevented from selling to Austria, Austria is of course prevented from selling to them. No other reason need be given for the general stagnation of trade throughout the Austrian dominions.

The same prohibitory system that pervades Austria, pervades all the lesser states of Germany. As all are prevented from buying of their neighbours, all are prevented from selling to their neighbours. All, therefore, have a confined market, instead of an extended one, and commerce can scarcely be said to exist.

CHAPTER **VII.** But as it is the interest of every country to exchange what is partially excessive at home, for what is partially excessive abroad, and for each to increase its own excess, that it may command so much more of the excess of another, it is the interest of all to allow the utmost possible freedom of trade, that the superfluities of one may supply the deficiencies of another, and all be enriched together.

Open ports and open markets should, therefore, every where take place of close ports and close markets; and instead of mutual hostility for mutual impoverishment—instead of the formidable artillery of offensive and defensive duties and prohibitions, which all nations now play off against each other, in the eternal and implacable war of modern commerce, where peace is never signed—there should be one common bond of union among all, for the enrichment of each other; for as no one country can injure another without injuring itself in the same degree, each will best promote its own interest in promoting the interest of others.

Nor is this bond of union desirable only because it will advance the common wealth of all countries; but it is desirable because it will afford a better security for the maintenance of Universal Peace.

CHAPTER VIII.

Erroneous Principles on which our Connection with India is formed.—Impolicy of preventing British Subjects from holding Land.—Effect of withdrawing this Law.—Essential for the Interests of India, as well as England. Advantages of throwing open the Indian Trade.—Division of India into Districts.—Establishment of a Government on the Model of the British Constitution.—Removal of the Seat of Government to Delhi.—Conquest of the Territory of the Niger and the Nile.—Re-possession of Alexandria.—General Improvement of the Condition of the Indians and Africans.

CHAPTER VIII.

WHEN we first obtained footing in India, the only good, that we thought we could derive from a foreign settlement, was, the money we could draw from it by means of a favorable balance of trade. Nothing, therefore, was to be regarded but the commercial monopoly, that we might supply the settlement to the exclusion of all other nations, and secure to ourselves all the money that it laid out in foreign merchandise. How much produce, therefore, we could send out, and how much money we could bring home, was the principle on which our connection

CHAPTER with our settlements was formed. But so far has our con-

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nection with India been from leading to a favorable balance of trade and the influx of money, that it has uniformly led to an unfavorable balance, and the efflux of money: for as the mines of the Western hemisphere have been more productive than the mines of the Eastern, there has been a regular flow of money Eastwards to bring its value in the two hemispheres to the same level, and our trade has been in a great degree supported by the bullion, we have carried out for this purpose. The effect, therefore, of our intercourse with India has been directly contrary to the principle upon which our relations with her were formed, as instead of causing money to come in, they have caused money to go out; and, according to the old tenets, we have so far enriched India, instead of India enriching us.

But though our connection with India was originally made with the view of bringing home a large balance of bullion, which never came, and which, if it had come, would have been an evil instead of a good; yet have we derived considerable benefit from the intercourse, though from our ignorance of the principles of commerce, the benefit has been much less than it might have been. Instead of forming our relations with India as a dependent country, we have formed them with her as an independent country, and instead of making her give much more than she receives, we have made her give no more than she receives. We ought to have formed a connection with her in the same manner as with the West Indies, by the pos-

session of her land, which would have enabled East India CHAPTER
land-holders, resident in England, in the same manner VIII.
as West India land-holders, resident in England, to have
drawn their incomes to this country in India produce. By
this system, we should have had a large balance of produce
in our favour, instead of a large balance of money, and the
gain to this country would have been, in the same manner
as our gains from the West Indies, the excess of imports
above exports, or what we receive more than what we
give. But as the sole benefit, that we thought was to be
derived from India, was the money we could get by a fa-
vorable balance of trade, the first law, that was made by
the Company, when it established itself, was, that no Bri-
tish subject should be a holder of land, which, if India was
ever to give to us more than we gave to her, was passing
the only law to prevent it.

We have, therefore, conducted our intercourse with In-
dia on the footing of an independent country, instead of
on the footing of a dependent one, and though the trade
which is carried on with an independent state is always
beneficial, as it leads to the export of what is cheap, and
the import of what is dear, yet as it is nothing more than
an equal interchange of produce for produce, it is not so
beneficial as a trade with a dependent country, which in-
stead of being an equal exchange of produce for produce,
returns us more than an equality and enables us to gain
in proportion, as what we bring home is more than what
we send out.

CHAPTER Notwithstanding, therefore, that we have now been in
VIII. possession of an Indian empire for more than fifty years, we have derived, through sheer ignorance, no further advantage from it than if it had remained under its Native Princes, except from the fortunes which individuals have made there. These fortunes have probably amounted to four or five hundred thousand a year, part of which has been remitted in India produce for home investment, and part has been left on loan in India. The proportion which is left in India may now amount, by the gradual accumulation that has taken place, to between twenty and thirty millions; and as the rate of interest in that country is eight, ten, and twelve per cent., the annual remittance to this country in India produce, for the payment of the interest, may be between three and four millions. As the receipt of a surplus revenue has hitherto been just as ideal as the receipt of the bullion from a favorable balance of trade, the amassment of the fortunes of individuals, and the payment of the interest, arising from what is left of those fortunes in India, constitute the only benefits which we receive from the possession of India beyond what we should receive, if we were totally dispossessed of it, but still retained the liberty of trading there.

But as India, according to Mr. Waller Hamilton, consists of 829,000,000 of acres, and a population of 134,000,000, or of a territory and population nearly equal to that of all Europe, if 400,000,000 of acres out of the 829,000,000 were possessed by British subjects, and only one-fourth of the proprietors were resident in

England, estimating the net produce of an English acre in India at a pound, the India land-holders would draw over 100,000,000*l.* a-year from that country to this in payment of their incomes; and as the estates would be better conducted under British subjects than by the natives, the funds for furnishing a public revenue would be so much greater, and a surplus revenue to the amount of fifty millions a-year might easily be remitted also.

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The merchandise, in which this united sum would come over, would partly consist of the means of subsistence, partly of raw produce for manufactures, and partly of manufactured goods. The produce for subsistence would principally consist of wheat flour, rice, sugar, coffee, spices, rakk, and tea. The raw produce for manufactures would principally consist of indigo, fine wool, cotton, silk, and diamonds; and the manufactured goods of piece goods, silk goods, and shawls. As about two thirds of this produce would be exchanged by the India land-holders who resided in England for British manufactures, the population of our towns would be proportionally enlarged, and as a greater relative excess of manufactures would be created, corn would be dearer and manufactures cheaper than they now are, and the landed interest, as well as the manufacturing interest would be so much more prosperous. For the easy payment of the surplus revenue into the exchequer, Contractors should be authorised to bid for it, in the same manner as a loan is now bid for, and should be allowed to draw it to this country, in whatever manner might best suit their own interest. But as these uni-

CHAPTER ^{VIII.} ~~ted~~ remittances would cause an immense increase in the trade between this country and India, and as individuals ought not to be deprived of the means which this trade would afford of making fortunes, it would be unfair to continue the commercial privileges of the Company, and the whole of our Indian trade, not excepting that to China, should be thrown open to the public. But the civil rights of the Company, so far as they are concerned in the collection, management, and disposition of the revenue, should remain as at present.

It is not, however, for the exclusive benefit of England, that the law of the Company, which forbids a British subject from being a landholder should be abrogated, but it is to the full as much for the benefit of India. The great object of all Governments should be to better the condition of the lower classes of mankind ; all policy, in comparison to this end, is mean and paltry ; and as it is impossible that any adequate improvement can be made in the state of the Indian peasantry without the conversion of India into large estates and large farms by the aid of an intelligent body of British landholders, it is absolutely necessary that a power should be given to British subjects to become landed proprietors. At the present moment the whole of India is divided like Ireland into the smallest allotments that can give sustenance to a family. So scanty is the supply of food that the peasantry may always be said to be on the verge of famine, and as no plan, except that of enlarging the allotments by removing and employing the supernumerary population in a different manner, can be of any ser-

vice, British proprietors should as much as possible be introduced to give effect to the plan, wherever they can be introduced without prejudice to the native land-owners. Some idea may be formed of the existing state of India from the facts, that there are no roads, no wheel carriages, nor such a simple implement of husbandry as an iron plough through the whole of our dominions. All internal traffic is conveyed on the backs of oxen, which travel from town to town heavily laden, and brutally used, in tracts worn by their own feet; though in the time of Aurungzebe a traveller could go from one end of India to the other along magnificent roads, shaded on each side by rows of trees, and raised, where necessary, in lofty mounds over the flat and inundated plains.

According to the laws of the Ayeen Acberry, the tenure of land in India is strictly feudal, and the whole of the soil belongs of right to the Company, as head of the Government. Under the Moguls the land was divided among the people in greater or smaller proportions on paying to Government, according to agreement, a fourth, a third, a half, or two-thirds of the produce; and the revenue was for the most part collected in kind. Jaghires, or grants of land, were made to the Officers of State, and those who were employed under Government, on the payment of a fourth, or a less proportion of the produce, and these Jaghires were again granted to sub-tenants, who gave a half, or greater proportion of the produce, the difference constituting the income of those who held offices. Had the Company, therefore, remunerated

CHAPTER their servants by grants of land instead of salaries, it would
 VIII. have been in strict conformity with the ancient law of India, and if this had been done in the first instance, at the same time that permission had been given to those who realised a fortune to become proprietors of land, there can be no doubt that we might at this moment have been drawing from India forty or fifty millions a-year instead of only four or five.

It is impossible, however, that this error in our connection with India can be too soon repaired. But no efficient plan for the improvement of the country can be carried into effect, unless a better Government for the internal administration of affairs is provided than now exists.

It is impossible that sufficient local knowledge to conduct the interests of India as they ought to be conducted, can be acquired, without dividing the country into a certain number of districts, and appointing proper officers, with due authority to superintend them ; nor is it possible to adopt the requisite measures to raise her to prosperity, without the institution of deliberative assemblies, to canvass the laws that ought to be passed for the purpose.

The 800,000,000 of acres, therefore, of which India consists, should be divided in the first instance into 80 large provinces, consisting of 10,000,000 of acres each, and these should be sub-divided into 800 smaller provinces, consisting of 1,000,000 of acres each. The eighty superiors, or lord-lieutenants, of the larger provinces should

form an Upper House, and the eight hundred subgovernors, or deputy lieutenants of the smaller provinces, should form a Lower House. Ministers of state should be appointed similar to those of this country, who should constitute a Cabinet Council, and the Governor-General should be invested with the necessary powers to preside over the whole; but instead of representing the person of his Majesty, he should execute the chief functions of Government in the name of the Court of Directors.

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A proper jealousy has always been shewn in this country at suffering the patronage of India to get into the hands of Ministers, but it must be admitted, that the confinement of their patronage to the India Directors has too much shut out the sons of men of rank and fortune, who have had the advantage of the best education which the country affords, from Indian offices, and has therefore deprived India of the benefit, which cultivated talents and high classical attainments never fail of conferring, wherever they are brought into action. To open the offices of India, therefore, more liberally to the higher classes, half of the nominations to the government of the Provinces, and to seats in the House of Assembly should be made by the Board of Controul, and half by the East India Directors, but no person should be eligible to these appointments, without a previous residence in India for a given number of years. The persons nominated should be appointed for life, but should at the same time be subjected to dismissal on conviction of misconduct by impeachment.

**CHAPTER
VIII.** Without a Constitution so formed, or without two de-

liberative assemblies for the discussion and enactment of suitable laws for the improvement of the country, there can be no effectual plan for the consolidation of our empire, no security for the permanence of our power, no means of introducing the lights of science, and the advantages of civil liberty, nor any adequate measure for bettering the condition of the lower classes. An elective Government, in the present state of things, is totally impracticable, but hereafter, when the situation of the country is materially improved, when British proprietors increase, and a race of men exist who are capable of exercising the elective franchise to their own advantage, the benefit should not be withheld.

Should this Government, or a Government in some degree similar to this, be established, the seat of Government should be removed from Calcutta to Delhi, not only on account of the greater salubrity of Delhi, but for more effectually resisting any attack that might be made by the only powers that are likely to endanger our supremacy. Delhi is also better situated for communication with England, for as steam boats now go at the rate of ten miles an hour, or 500 miles in two days, and as from the mouth of the Indus to Suez is not much above 3000 miles, nor from Alexandria to London, through the straits of Gibraltar, above 3800, it is perfectly practicable, making every allowance for delays, to have dispatches from India in four or five weeks, instead of four or five months, as is now the case.

As India is possessed of large uncultivated tracts of land that would well repay the hand of labour, if brought into produce, correct surveys should be made of the whole country, and estimates should be formed of the number of persons which these tracts, when raised to fertility, and properly divided, could duly support. A more judicious application may then be made of the productive power of the labouring classes, by removing the poor from the districts where population is most oppressed to the districts that required clearing in such numbers as the estimates directed ; and as the land, when brought into produce, should be divided among those who cleared it in such proportions as the best consideration for the welfare of the whole body dictated, the poor would in all instances be better off by joining the clearing parties, than by remaining in want and idleness at home ; the ultimate object in all cases being to establish large estates and large farms, without more labourers than the wages of labour can properly support.

In addition to the facility which the uncultivated tracts of India give for a better division of the population, and a better direction of the national industry, the proximity of New Holland offers further means of relief for the overcharged numbers ; and as districts may be chosen of the same temperature as India, the natives would be exposed to no hardships from an alteration of climate. All attempts to emancipate the poor from the slavery of body and mind, in which they now live, will be wholly impracticable, as long as they continue in their present condition.

CHAPTER VIII. To raise them above want is the first step towards amendment, and when once this step is made, all the advantages which the good and great are desirous of conferring upon them may be easily obtained. To advance them this step, therefore, no means should be untried, no difficulties unencountered, and no expence should be thought too much.

The revenue of India, at the present moment, amounts to no more than 20,000,000*l.* and small as this revenue is, compared to the vast extent of our empire, it is not collected without producing the utmost embarrassment and distress, because, from the smallness of the properties, there is no surplus income above necessaries, out of which the revenue can be paid. But if India were divided into large estates and large farms, after the manner of England, and the landowners and tenants had a large surplus income for luxuries and comforts, the funds for furnishing a revenue would be so much larger, and a revenue might be raised to any amount, to which it might be wanted. It is highly important, therefore, that the law of the Company forbidding British subjects from being proprietors of land, should be withdrawn as soon as possible, that a sufficient revenue may be collected, to raise our Sinking Fund to fifteen or twenty millions a year for the reduction of our Debt. There are no surer means of preventing wars, than to be in readiness to meet them, and if we had the power at any moment of raising a war-revenue of fifty millions, in addition to our ordinary peace-revenue, by means of a sinking fund of twenty millions, by a property-tax of

twenty millions more in consequence of extending the ^{CHAPTER} ~~CHAPTER~~ ^{VIII.} tax to Ireland, and by additional duties on customs and excise to the amount of ten millions, there would be little danger of the frequent recurrence of hostilities.

But there is another part of the world, the prosperity of which we are almost as strongly called upon to promote as the prosperity of India, I mean that portion of Africa through which the Niger and the Nile take their course. But to promote its prosperity, it is necessary that we should imitate the policy of the Romans, and appropriate it by our arms in order to civilize it by our laws; but in our subsequent treatment of it we may surpass the Romans, by giving it wealth and freedom by the institutions we establish. Now that there are grounds to suppose, from the arduous labours of a Parke and a Burkhardt, who too dearly purchased the esteem of posterity, that the Niger and the Nile are one stream, there is no river that presents so fertile a region to the cupidity of the civilized world, and none consequently that offers so desirable a conquest. This extended tract would constitute the richest ex-European dominion of any that has yet been subdued, for as almost the whole course of the river lies between the tropics, the return to the cultivator from such a supply of water and such heat would be greater than that of any other part of the globe. In the opinion of Mr. Burkhardt it would be easy to make a conquest of this territory with thirty thousand men. Of this there can perhaps be little doubt, as the natives though brave, are undisciplined, and insufficiently

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provided with the means of warfare. But as it would be impossible to retain possession of the country without a chain of encampments along the whole line of the river which runs about 2000 miles, it would certainly be imprudent to undertake its reduction without double this force. Should our views be directed to its acquisition, Indian troops should be employed in greater numbers than our own in consequence of their suffering less from the influence of a warm climate. But the gaining of this territory would be but of little benefit either to ourselves or to others, unless British subjects were encouraged to settle round the encampments to introduce the improvements of civilized life, and were supported in their efforts by large bodies of Indians, whose efflux would be as serviceable to India as their influx would be serviceable to Africa. But it is not through interest only that we should be prompted to make this acquisition ; we should be prompted to it to rescue its unhappy natives from the darkness and despotism under which they now live; and we should be prompted to it, above every other consideration, as it presents to us the only means of giving a finishing blow to the Slave Trade. To gain possession of a country from interest only may be deemed an unworthy motive; to gain possession of it from humanity only may be deemed an idle and romantic one; but when interest and humanity both combine to urge us to the enterprize, we should be wanting to ourselves if we failed to undertake it.

But in order to make the conquest available to more extended purposes, it is necessary that we should again have

possession of Alexandria, and as Egypt is almost always in **CHAPTER**
rebellion to the Porte, there can scarcely be a doubt that **VIII.**
Turkey would be induced to give us the re-possession of
it either on the presentation of a fixed sum or the payment
of an annual tribute, such a commercial treaty being made
with the Porte as may best suit her views and policy. As
Alexandria would then be made the key both to our Afri-
can and Indian possessions, British produce and manufac-
tures, whether for supplies or commerce, might be sent
through the whole line of our posts on the Nile and the
Niger; and should the projectile power of steam be capa-
ble of being applied to ships of burthen in the same man-
ner as it is now applied to packets, our commerce with In-
dia may be carried on in one-fourth part of the time and
at one-fourth part of the expence with which it is now
conducted. But whether the Nile be connected with the
Niger or not, as it is evident from the testimony of all tra-
vellers that there is a long line of water communication in
the interior of Africa, and that the banks of the rivers are
highly fertile, there can be no question as to the policy and
facility of making the conquest, which is here recom-
mended.

In the elevated situation to which we are now raised we
have it in our power by our arms, our laws, and our in-
fluence, to better the condition of the lower classes of man-
kind over a large proportion of the globe; and if we fail to
make use of the means we possess, we fail in what is due
to ourselves and the world.

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VIII. But whether the plan which is here suggested for raising the natives of India and Africa to a better state be attempted, or whether they be left in the poverty and wretchedness that have so long oppressed them, it is absolutely necessary that the land of India should be opened to British purchasers, and the trade of India be opened to the British public. Without this concession we shall derive less advantage from India than from an independent State, as every independent State, except China, is open to the whole community instead of only to a limited body. But by pursuing the whole policy which is here recommended, India and Africa may both be brought, in the lapse of years, to a rival state of prosperity and civilization with ourselves.

CHAPTER IX.

Our Connection with the West Indies formed on correct Principles.—Injudicious Restrictions on the Planters.—Impolicy of our Navigation Laws.—The Planters as much interested in the Emancipation of the Negroes as the Negroes themselves.—Plan of Emancipation.—Absurdity of taxing England for the Benefit of Canada.

FORTUNATELY when Columbus discovered the West CHAPTER
IX. India Islands, there was no Commercial Company to dictate in what manner they were to be traded with, and though gold was the object of every enterprise, and gold was got, it was got to the deterioration of all the fixed incomes of Spain, as well as all the fixed incomes of the rest of Europe; those however, who got the gold, gained to the extent to which it was obtained. But as adventurers very soon discovered, that it was more to their advantage to raise produce, than simply to barter their merchandize for gold, they very wisely took possession of the soil and grew sugar. In consequence of acting on this policy, we now draw about 300,000 hogsheads of sugar from our trans-atlantic possessions, which, estimating sugar at 70 shillings a cwt. exclusive of duty, the price at which it ought to be, to remunerate the planter, and averaging the hogshead at 1300

CHAPTER cwt. make 13,500,000*l* a year, but had we attempted no-
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thing further than to exchange our merchandise for gold dust with the Caribbees according to the tenets of public Companies we should now have been getting no more than the proportion of gold, which would have fallen to our share among the other nations of Europe out of what the industry of the Caribbees could have scraped together, amounting probably to 200,000*l.* or 300,000*l.*, those who obtained the gold being benefitted proportionally to the advantage of the exchange, and all fixed incomes being proportionally injured. The superior amount of the sugar shews how much more lucrative to adventurers has been the appropriating of the soil and raising produce, than the going in quest of gold ; and how much more beneficial this cultivation has been to the community at large. It also shews how much more profitable to the country is our West India trade in consequence of this appropriation of the land, than our East India trade, though our East India connection, if we now correct our error and appropriate the land in the same way, will bring in six, eight, and ten times as much as our West India connection.

But should our East India interests improve to such a degree as to be likely to send forth so vast a produce, the West Indians would be just as jealous at the introduction of East India sugar, as our country gentlemen are at the introduction of corn from other countries. But as sugar is an article of subsistence, and supplies the place of some other food that would be used if there were no sugar, it so far adds to the aggregate support of the country ; and

as it causes so much additional population in proportion **CHAPTER IX.**
 as it adds so much to the general sustenance, and will **IX.**
 cause so much more population in proportion as it is supplied so much more, there will be the same demand for its consumption when raised to 500,000 or 1,000,000 hogsheads as there now is though no more than 300,000. It is never adverted to by those who entertain apprehensions that any additional supply of food of whatever nature will lower the price of the existing stock, that population is an increasing or decreasing quantity in proportion to the amount of the subsistence that is obtained ; and if a greater and greater degree of food is supplied population will increase in a greater and greater degree to keep pace with the supply, and by raising a greater and greater degree of manufactures to exchange for the food will maintain its price at the same standard.

But though our West Indians have not been prevented from appropriating to themselves the soil of our West India islands under a conception that we could derive no good from a commercial intercourse with them except by the bullion we obtained through a favorable balance of trade, yet are the planters clogged with many unnecessary restrictions as injurious to the public as themselves in raising their sugar.

They are not permitted to draw supplies from any country but this, unless in British bottoms ; they are not permitted to take their sugars to any other country but this ; and they are not permitted to refine their sugar in their

CHAPTER own islands. All these restrictions are as prejudicial to
IX. the country at large, as they are to the West Indians.

The public are injured because sugar is brought dearer to market in consequence of these restrictions than it would be without them; and the West Indians are injured because they are put to more expence in raising their sugar than they would be without them. Whatever makes foreign produce dear and British produce cheap is detrimental to the British public, because it prevents their produce or their income from going so far as it otherwise would do. It should be the policy of our Government to make British produce dear and foreign produce cheap, that British produce may exchange for a great quantity of foreign produce, instead of foreign produce exchanging for a great quantity of British produce. In proportion, therefore, as these restrictions make British corn and manufactures cheap, and sugar dear, or British corn and manufactures exchange for a smaller quantity of sugar instead of a greater, they are so far injurious to the British public and lessen the amount of our income.

The negroes are principally supported by dried fish from Newfoundland; but the supply is often a stinted one, and as an auxiliary provision trade might be opened with America it is highly to the interest of the British public, as well as to that of the West India planter, that it should be opened, as British produce would be so much dearer and sugar so much cheaper than it now is; and not only would our negroes be more amply and comfortably sup-

ported, but our own agricultural and manufacturing poor **CHAPTER IX.** would be better supplied with dried fish than they now are. The planters would always draw their manufactures from England, because they can buy them cheaper than any where else. Of manufactures they cannot take too much; but of provisions they cannot take too little, as whatever they take is robbing our towns of food and preventing manufactures from being too much and food too little as they ought to be. It is evident, therefore, that the West India planters should be permitted to draw supplies from whatever quarter, and in whatever way it may be their interest to draw them.

They should also be allowed to send their sugars direct to whatever country they pleased, and in whatever ships they pleased, as the greater the income of our West India planters the greater will be the general income of the country. They are now compelled to bring their sugar to a British port before it can be sent to a foreign port, not to their own benefit, as they must pay so much more for the greater length of the voyage; not to the benefit of the Exchequer, because a drawback of the duty is allowed; not to the benefit of the British consumer, for he does not purchase it; nor to the benefit of the British sailor, as it takes up the time which he could otherwise employ with equal advantage to himself and more advantage to his country. It is therefore to no one's benefit and to every one's injury; and the sooner this freedom is allowed, the better will it be for the planter, the foreign consumer, the

CHAPTER sailor, and the country, and not the worse for the Ex-
IX. chequer.

The West India interest is not, however, the only interest that suffers by the injudicious restrictions of our Navigation laws. Every branch of our commerce is injured by them, in proportion as they increase the expence of transit, and make the interchanges of produce slower and fewer. But what constitutes the chief objection to these laws is, that they have an effect directly opposite to the end they have in view, as they cause the number of our seamen to be less instead of greater; for, as there would be more intercourse and more voyages were our Navigation free, more sailors would necessarily be employed. But even if it could be shewn that the restrictions conduced to the engagement of a greater number of sailors instead of a less, it would be better to raise a direct tax for the support of our Navy to the amount of the additional charge which these laws impose on our commerce than raise it indirectly by this prohibitory system, as our trade would be so much more extended, and the nation so much the richer. But when it is evident, on the contrary, that these laws are as injurious to our Navy and our sailors by cramping the Merchant's service, as they are to our trade by the increased expences and delay which they subject it to, there can be no question as to the policy of repealing them, and throwing open our Navigation to be carried on as the interests of commerce dictate that it should be carried on. This is one among many instances

of indirect taxation in our code of laws, by which we try **CHAPTER IX.**
to over-reach others and end in over-reaching ourselves.

The refining of sugar is prohibited in the West Indies, because it would prevent the same amount of duty from being collected on the raw produce; but as a sufficient duty may be put on the import of lump sugar to make up the deficiency, this objection is easily obviated. Sugar would then come cheaper to the British consumer by the difference in the expence of bringing over the brown sugar in cask to be refined here, and bringing it over already refined in lump. By saving the expences, which these different restrictions occasion to the planter, his income would be so much greater, and as he could afford to sell his sugar so much cheaper, the public would be proportionally as much benefitted as himself.

If the West India planters were allowed the same liberty in the cultivation and sale of their sugar, as the Landed Interest are allowed in the cultivation and sale of their corn, (and there is no reason why one body should not have the same privileges as the other) it is quite clear that they would not feed their negroes by supplies from England, nor stint them to the supply of fish from Newfoundland; it is quite clear that they would send their sugar to a foreign port without bringing it in the first instance to a British port; and it is quite clear that they would refine their sugar in their own islands, to save the expense of freight for so much unnecessary bulk as the bringing over the brown sugar to be refined here takes up; and what their own interest does not prompt them to do, they ought no more to be

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compelled to do, than the Country Gentlemen should be compelled to do what their own interest does not prompt them to. They ought not to be subjected to the existing restrictions, even if it could be proved that the public were benefitted by them as the public have no right to injure any set of men or any individual for their own good; but when it is evident that the public suffer precisely in the same proportion in which the planter suffers, it is not only unjust to impoverish the planter, but it is as impolitic as it is unjust, and as illiberal as it is impolitic.

But the removal of these restrictions is not all that is necessary to place the West India planters in the situation in which they ought to be placed. They have suffered exactly in the same degree in which the farmers and manufacturers have suffered from the contraction of the currency. The planters, like them, can only make an income by what they sell, and if they cannot sell at the same price at which they sold in 1812 and 1813, they can no more make good their engagements, than the farmers and manufacturers can make good theirs. Almost every planter is more or less indebted to his merchant, and as the consignments now sell from the diminution of the currency for little more than enough to pay the island charges, and the interest of their debt, the planters have scarcely sufficient for the ordinary expences of life. But it is as incumbent on Government to see them righted as to see the farmers and manufacturers righted, and it is as necessary that the currency should be fixed at a high amount, to relieve them from their difficulties, as it is for the purpose of relieving the farmers and manufacturers from

theirs. Just and necessary, therefore, as is the removal of **CHAPTER IX.** the restrictions, and important as the relief would be which their removal would occasion, yet nothing can restore the planter to the prosperity which he possessed in 1812 and 1813, but the prices of 1812 and 1813,—but the same policy which is necessary to restore the farmers and manufacturers to theirs.

But in discussing the interests of the West India body, there still remains one interest to be considered that far surpasses the others in importance, I mean the interest of the negro population. Much as has been done to ameliorate the condition of this class of British subjects,—much yet remains to be done to raise them to the same political state with ourselves, and if they can be raised to the same state without injury to the planters, we are unquestionably called upon to do it. I shall therefore endeavour to shew not only that the planters will suffer no injury by emancipating the negroes, but that they are as much interested in looking forward to the day of emancipation as the negroes themselves.

If a West India plantation could be put on the footing of an English farm, and be cultivated in the same manner by hired labourers, who would be as industrious and well-disposed as the common order of English labourers, there is perhaps no West Indian who would not admit that the change would be for the better, and if this be admitted, the only question to consider is, whether a negro can be

CHAPTER brought to discharge the duties of a day labourer in every
IX. respect as well as an European can.

From the beginning of the world to the present day there never was an owner of slaves who did not say that they were an idle, deceitful, lying, cunning, low, ignorant, and worthless set of people. The Greeks thought their slaves so, and the Turks now think the Greeks so,—the Romans thought us so, and all other nations from whom they took prisoners; and we think the blacks so; and should the blacks in their turn become masters they will think their slaves so. I take it for granted that slaves have uniformly deserved these epithets, as it is perfectly consistent with human nature that they should so act as to deserve them; but nothing can be more unfair than to deduce from this fact that the same men will have these qualities if raised to a state of freedom. Their bad qualities are the effect of their slavery not the fault of their nature. All men are willing enough to work where their own interest is concerned, but most unwilling where it is not. Strenuously as a day labourer will exert himself when he is to earn bread for himself, yet put him to work under the dread of the scymitar, the cart-whip, or the cudgel, and all the passions immediately come into play that make him what a slave owner always finds him and always will find him. A slave must be made of different materials from what other men are made of if he were not so. It is impossible, therefore, to infer that a slave would not be a good day labourer, when emancipated,

because he is a very bad day labourer in a state of slavery. **CHAPTER IX.**
On the natural superiority, which the whites with as much truth as modesty lay claim to, it is unnecessary to expatiate, as the blacks have in every instance when brought to the test shewn themselves fully equal to Europeans in all the requisites of peace and war, and if they have the same military and political means they will always shew themselves so.

There is no other difficulty in substituting voluntary for compulsory labour than the difficulty of making the transition from one to the other without injury to the blacks or injury to the planters. If there were a sudden and immediate emancipation all would for a time be riot and confusion, and the planters would sustain great loss before the blacks could be brought to settle steadily to work. But no loss would ensue if a law were made that all children born of slaves after a given year should be free. These children, during infancy, should be supported at the public expence, and taught to labour as they rose to manhood for so much a-day to accustom them as well to the sweets of gain as the hardships of toil. The negroes in a state of slavery should also be gradually brought to work for daily wages and find their own provisions instead of working for daily rations. When slavery was abolished in St. Domingo the land was cultivated for a third of the produce instead of for so much money, but the introduction of the wages of labour after the manner of England would in every respect be more eligible.

CHAPTER IX. If an estimate were made of the difference in the expence of cultivating a plantation by the hired labour of freemen and cultivating it by slave labour, there can be no question that the free labour would be cheapest notwithstanding the inferior food on which a slave is made to live, as more work would be done by fewer hands. Labour would be better divided and better conducted. The plough would be substituted for the hoe in more instances than it now is, and more economy and ingenuity would be brought into action. Notwithstanding, therefore, that the negroes would be better supported and consume more a-head per day than they now do; yet as fewer would be employed for the same quantity of work, the additional expence of maintenance would be saved in the comparative paucity of hands, and a plantation would on the whole be cultivated for less money. If a wheat farm will pay for free labour, how much more ought a sugar farm to be able to do it.

But not only would emancipation lead to a cheaper mode of cultivation, but as property would be doubly secure from the contentment and comfort of a free population, all of whose good qualities would be called forth instead of all of whose bad ones, there can be no doubt that it is to the full as much the interest of the planters to make the blacks free, as it is the interest of the blacks to become so. Should this emancipation be realised, a planter would have very different sensations in visiting his estate when peopled with a free and happy race, from what he now feels in viewing the involuntary victims of

his better fortune, let him shew to his slaves what kind- **CHAPTER**
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The same plan of emancipation should be pursued in the Southern provinces of the United States, and in every other country where labour is conducted by a negro population.

In examining the remaining part of our Colonial System—our trade with Canada—we shall find that the same restrictions have been made use of, as in every other trade, and made use of in the same manner as in all other instances to our own disadvantage. To favour Canada against ourselves, or raise a tax on England for the benefit of Canada, we have imposed a law on ourselves to take her bad timber at a high price instead of the good timber of Norway at a low price; and by thus making Canada produce dear and British produce cheap, instead of British produce dear and Canada produce cheap, we have enriched the Canadians at our expence by diminishing our income to increase theirs. This law is precisely the same in principle as the Methuen treaty, which compelled us to take the inferior wines of Portugal at a high price instead of the superior wines of France at a low price, making Portugal a present of the difference as a gratuitous tribute. If Canada is to be assisted by taxation on England, it is much better to assist her by a direct than indirect vote of supply, as indirect taxation always causes the public to pay more than was intended. We shall not

CHAPTER only now pay more for Canada timber than Norway timber.
IX. **IX.** but we shall pay more for every thing in which Canada timber is used, for ship-building as well as house-building, and consequently for the whole freight of our trade. It would, therefore, have been more to our interest to have bought Norway timber at a low price, and raised the difference which we shall now pay for Canada timber above that of Norway by a direct tax for the support of Canada. The grant of this benevolence to Canada comes with the worse grace at the present moment, not only because the voice of Ministers is raised as loudly for economy as the voice of the public, but because it is in direct opposition to the principle laid down by the Committee on Foreign Trade. Lord Lansdown and Lord Lauderdale so satisfactorily explained the impolicy of this restriction on the Timber trade to the country, that it is surprising that Ministers should have ventured to saddle the public with a continuance of it. It would certainly have been more manly to have called at once for an annual tribute to Canada, according to the difference in the price of her timber and that of Norway, than to have made us a party to this side-wind support of her by an insidious system of taxation, so contrary to the sincerity that ought to subsist between Government and the people.

It is evident from the foregoing review of our trade that the whole of our commercial policy is founded on erroneous principles and narrow views, and till a more enlightened and liberal system be established,--till the

celebrated reply of the merchants of France to Colbert, of **CHAPTER**
 “*Laissons-nous faire!*” be implicitly acted upon, and **Commerce** **IX.**
 be as free as the air we breathe, it is impossible that
 we can be raised to so high a state of prosperity as we
 otherwise might be.

CHAPTER X.

Crimes prevented more by the Fear of Disgrace than the Fear of Death.—Commutation of the Punishment of loss of Life for loss of Liberty.—Benefit of making Transportation in all instances last for Life.—Fairness of the Law of Transportation.—Imprisonment to be commuted as much as possible for Transportation.—Necessity of a more equitable Plan for the Administration of Justice.—Transportation not calculated to lessen Population.

CHAPTER X.

IT is remarked by *Sallust*, that in contemplating what most conduced to the greatness of Rome, he attributed it to the influence of a few illustrious men who rose superior to the times in which they lived, and exalted their country by the marked pre-eminence of their genius and virtues. Wherever free states have been established such characters have always arisen. They arose amidst the corruption of the Grecian States, and they made, as they appeared, the cities that they swayed, notwithstanding the depravity of the main body of the people, the pride and glory of the world. They have arisen amidst the corruption of our own age, and a *Hampden*, a *Russell*, a *Chatham*, and a *Fox* have nobly asserted our rights and liberties. It is one of the great advantages that a free state has over an arbi-

trary one, that such men have the means of coming forward to benefit their country by the exercise of their powers. But no public men have arisen till of late years to better the world by the efforts of benevolence, and improve the structure of society by legislating on broader principles of humanity. Mr. Wilberforce by the weight of his moral character, which always has and always ought to have influence, as well as by the force of his talents, has done much to ameliorate the state of our negro population; and we owe to the private worth and eloquence of a Buxton the feeling that has been excited to mitigate the severity of our criminal laws. But these efforts, it may be hoped, are but the faint beginnings of a system to amend the civil and moral condition of mankind in every part of the globe.

The commission of crimes is prevented much more by the fear of Degradation than the fear of Death. Death has unquestionably always its terrors, but it is not the dread of dying that deters mankind from offending against the laws, but the dread of dying dishonorably. It is easy to procure any number of men who will run the risk of an honorable death for the daily pay of a scanty pittance, but few out of the number could be brought to do what would expose them to the risk of an ignominious one. So powerful is the sense of personal degradation that all vices and all crimes are for the most part dreaded in proportion only to the disgrace they impart. There are few men who have not committed acts which, in a moral point

CHAPTER of view, are highly criminal, but which, as they bring no

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~~~ adequate disgrace, are too little heeded by the world at large; but charge a man of the loosest habits with any crime that will degrade him from society and he will be as indignant as the most virtuous of men. The fear of disgrace, therefore, is a much stronger operative principle to sustain the moral state of the world, such as it is, and prevent the commission of crimes, than the fear of death.

The interests, therefore, of order and good government would lose nothing by changing the punishment of death for some other punishment, that excluded corporal suffering, but was attended with such a degree of degradation as the crime might seem to require. For murder, and intent to murder, the punishment of death should be awarded on the principle of retaliatory law; but all other crimes of magnitude, as forgery, house-breaking, and highway robbery, should subject the criminal to loss of liberty instead of loss of life, and the punishment of death should be commuted for that of transportation, but transportation under very different circumstances from those with which the sentence is now accompanied. This sentence is at present but little regarded as a punishment, because the convicts are not subjected to the hardships that are requisite for their amendment; but if they were, in all instances, transported for life, and liable to hard labour and hard fare, for five, ten, and fifteen years, or for life, according to the extent of their crime, it would be much more dreaded than it now is, and would be punishment enough for any crime short of murder or intent to murder.

That those who are transported should never be allowed to return is for their own good as much as it is for the good of the country, as there would be no means of obliterating their disgrace if they did return, nor would any prospect of thriving be open to them. But in the country to which they were sent, where they were no more degraded than others, and where no partial reflection could be cast on them, they might gradually be stimulated to surpass each other in propriety of conduct, till they eventually became good members of society, and particularly as there should be a discretionary power in the Governor to mitigate their sentence according to their good behaviour, and allot them a greater or smaller proportion of land for their future maintenance. When a community is established, and lays down certain laws for the government of the whole body, it is impossible to make a fairer condition than that those who refuse to obey the laws should no longer belong to it. All know the terms on which they may continue, and if they choose to forfeit their right by an act of disobedience they inflict the penalty of expulsion on themselves.

It is not only necessary, however, to abolish the punishment of death, but it is necessary as much as possible to abolish the punishment of Imprisonment, as it has been found, notwithstanding the praiseworthy efforts of many excellent persons to counteract such an effect, that all who go into prison with bad morals invariably come out with worse. There is scarcely an instance of a convicted criminal, who has suffered imprisonment, having ever suc-

CHAPTER X.  
ceeded in after-life. It may be said of every one who has once been a felon, what is said of a soldier who has once been flogged, that he is ever afterwards good for nothing. Where imprisonment, therefore, is inflicted, the confinement should be but for a short duration, and while it lasted should be solitary; but as the punishment of imprisonment is alike objectionable with the punishment of death, they should both be commuted, where commutation is practicable, for transportation.

To prevent the duration of imprisonment before conviction a judge should be appointed in every county town, for the trial of offences as soon as they occur, that the innocent may be immediately discharged, and that the guilty may not be made worse by the vicious contagion of a jail. The confinement of a person under charge of a crime for six months before the day of trial, is an act of injustice unheard of even in the most despotic of the continental governments, and is a foul blot on our system of jurisprudence. Were any Member of Parliament to bring in a bill, at the present day, for the regulation of trials, and were he to propose that a person suspected of a crime should be liable to undergo imprisonment for so long a period before a verdict could be obtained, there can be no doubt that the bill would be rejected with abhorrence. But what would be rejected if proposed should be altered though it has been endured. That a grievance has been of long standing is no reason why it should stand longer, and that it has stood so long is so much more to our disgrace. It is impossible, therefore, that this tyrannical

process can be too soon abandoned, and a more humane CHAPTER  
and equitable plan for the administration of justice, too soon established. Should the system which is here recommended be adopted, though our Criminal law lies in a narrow compass and is much more easily mastered than the Civil, yet no barrister should be eligible to the office of Judge, who was not of sufficient standing to be a Serjeant at Law. Civil suits should remain over for the Assizes as at present.

Transportation has sometimes been objected to because it is thought to diminish population, and rob the army and navy of soldiers and sailors. But those who have subjected themselves by their crimes to a sentence of transportation, have, generally speaking, maintained themselves for a long space of time by depredation on the public, and the country is deprived of no part of its productive industry by their removal. Our army and navy are much better without such recruits than with them. And should any apprehensions respecting the decrease of population still continue to be entertained, it is in the power of any nobleman or any country gentleman who entertains them to add to our numbers at will, as by doubling the farms on his estate he may double the population over the district he possesses, and by trebling them, treble it. But as there is a much stronger tendency to the increase of population than its decrease, no fear and no hope can be fairly entertained that transportation, let it be carried to what extent it may, will diminish the sum total of population a single individual. By the removal of one guest

CHAPTER from the great board of the nation, an opening will be  
 X. made for the introduction of another, and instead of any  
 alteration in the numerical amount the only difference  
 will be the substitution of a good subject for a bad one.

Should the change which is here suggested be made in our criminal laws, and loss of life be commuted for loss of liberty, there can be no doubt that, for the first five or six years, the convicts for transportation will be greatly augmented, but after that period, they will gradually lessen, and if the principles which are laid down in this work, for bettering the condition of the poor, be acted upon will eventually come to be very few. Poverty is the great parent of crime, and if poverty is exploded, crime will for the most part be exploded also. In legislating to prevent the one, Government will best legislate to prevent the other.

Though expence ought not to be regarded in any plan that is calculated to lessen the sufferings of the lower classes of mankind, yet the expences of our jurisprudence under this reformation by relieving the public from the maintenance of prisoners will in a few years be little more than the salary of the judges, or about one tenth of the existing charge.

## CHAPTER XI.

*The great Landed Proprietors deprived of the Share in the Government which they ought to have.—The Crown bound by Law to concede the Exercise of the Executive Authority to Ministers.—Constitutional Administrations during the Reigns of George I. and II.—George the Third determined not to give up the Exercise of the Executive Power to Ministers.—Appointed weak Administrations that he might secure this Power to himself.—The Great Barons of England have been excluded for Sixty Years from the Direction of Affairs.—Unconstitutional Tendency of this Systematic Exclusion.—Evil of a Party of King's Friends.—The Officers of the Household to form part of the Ministry, or be disqualified from voting in Parliament.—Parliamentary Reform a Bubble.*

**T**HOUGH much may be done for the good of the country by adopting the measures which are suggested in this work for our relief and prosperity, yet all that is done will be incomplete unless the Government is administered on the Constitutional principles on which it formerly was, and unless the great body of our landed interest are reinstated in the share which they ought to possess in the

CHAPTER  
XI.

CHAPTER direction of affairs, and of which they have been so insi-  
XI. diously deprived during the last and the present reign.

The leading principle of our Constitution is, that the Crown is to be governed in its public conduct by the advice of the Privy Council, who are made responsible for the acts of the King, according to the advice they give. The single act that the sovereign is legally capable of doing on his own responsibility is the appointment of his privy council, or the appointment of Ministers, who are a select committee of the privy council. Immediately that the ministers are named, the executive power is held to be vested in their hands, and the sovereign is discharged from all personal responsibility, and personal exercise of the executive authority. The oath which a privy counsellor takes is, that he will advise the King to the best of his judgment, without partiality, through affection, love, meed, doubt, or dread. The sovereigns of England therefore, unlike the sovereigns of other countries, are restricted from ruling according to the free dictates of their own judgment, and must be wholly and solely regulated in their public conduct by the judgment of others, by the free and independent judgment of their privy council. This controul over the executive functions of the monarch was established in our constitution as well to release the person of the sovereign from all responsibility as to prevent the evil that would ensue by permitting the crown to rule according to its own will and pleasure, instead of according to the discretion of sage and competent Advisers. This is the law, according to which the power of the crown is to be adminis-

tered; and this law the Sovereign takes an Oath at his **CHAPTER**  
**XI**  
 Coronation to obey.

In the appointment therefore of the cabinet council, or of the members of the privy council, to whom the executive authority of the crown is for the time being to be delegated, it is necessary that such men only should be selected as will advise the crown freely and independently according to their oath of office; and it is obvious, that if the ministers who are appointed, conform in all instances to the views and wishes of the crown, without exercising their free and unbiassed judgment, according to the oath they take, the fundamental principle, that the crown shall be directed in the exercise of its power by the judgment of others, is violated, and the sovereign might as well take upon himself the personal discharge of his authority, and rule according to his own will and pleasure, which the constitution has restricted him from doing.

At the close of the reign of Queen Anne, the great Landed Proprietors, or the great Baronial Families, who then composed the Whig interest, supported the claims of the House of Brunswick against the claims of the Stuarts, for the purpose of maintaining the ascendancy of the Protestant Religion, and the inviolability of the Constitution. As the administrations of the reigns of George the First and Second, were for the most part composed of the leading characters among these families, and as a constant alarm was excited by cabals in favour of the Stuarts, no attempt was made by either of these sovereigns to break in

CHAPTER upon the constitutional functions of the Ministry in the  
<sup>XI</sup> exercise of the executive power, and the public measures  
of the crown were directed, as they ought to be, by the free  
and unbiassed judgment of the Cabinet Council. But as  
the throne was too firmly established on the accession of  
George the Third, to be shaken by the feeble remains of  
the Stuart family and Stuart party, there was no longer  
the same necessity, from motives of alarm, to continue  
these families in power; and as the young monarch had  
been brought up without any respect for the principle of  
our constitution—that he was to be guided by the advice  
of his Council—he determined at once to withdraw his con-  
fidence from these families, and rule according to the dic-  
tates of his own free will, by having a Ministry under the  
controul of the Crown, instead of having the Crown  
under the controul of the Ministry. At the time that he  
formed this resolution, the administration was conducted  
by Lord Chatham, who acted as independently in the dis-  
charge of his duty as a great Minister ought to do, and it  
was composed of the heads of the old Baronial Families,  
who had brought about the Revolution, and had esta-  
blished our Civil and Religious Freedom on a foundation,  
which they thought too solid to be subverted. The ad-  
ministration, therefore, was in every respect the strongest and  
and most constitutional that had ever been formed, and  
was not only supported by the unanimous voice of both  
Houses of Parliament, but possessed the full confidence  
of the people. But it was this very strength and this very  
constitutional construction of the Administration, that  
made it so objectionable to the young and aspiring mo-

narch, who was totally incapable, in such a state of things, **CHAPTER**  
of ruling according to his own will. And as he was too  
ambitious to give up the exercise of the executive power  
to others, he resolved to overleap the bounds which the  
Constitution had set to his authority, and, by substituting  
Lord Bute for Lord Chatham, take the reins of govern-  
ment into his own hands, and direct his council instead of  
being directed by it. The mean subterfuge for the dis-  
missal of Mr. Legge, to which Lord Chatham so un-  
worthily submitted; the venality with which Lord Bute  
was purchased into the Cabinet by the sale of Lord Hol-  
derness; the address and flattery with which the old Duke  
of Newcastle was wheedled over only to be disgraced;  
and the master stroke of hypocrisy with which the peerage  
and pension were granted to Lord Chatham, then Mr.  
Pitt, to ruin not to serve him, it is not my province here  
to detail. But as a bad and base transaction can never  
be brought about but by bad and base means, every species  
of corruption, together with every species of low cunning,  
deceit, and artifice was practised, till the object which the  
King had in view was obtained, of placing Lord Bute at  
the head of affairs.

It was certainly conceived at that time, that the King  
acted under the influence of favouritism, and raised Lord  
Bute to the office of minister, to further the views of the  
favourite instead of his own. But Lord Bute had too  
little energy of character to be capable of feeling the pas-  
sion of ambition. He had all the properties of a humble  
menial, who thinks his master the first man on earth, but

CHAPTER no one quality or sentiment of a Statesman. A statesman

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will never separate the honour of the Crown from the interests of the Country, but Lord Bute thought of nothing but gratifying his\* royal master's wishes, and serving his royal master's purposes, let the interests of his country suffer as they might. It was by the entreaties of the King that he took office, and it was against the entreaties of the King that he laid it down. The King, many years afterwards, when this subject was no longer matter of interest but matter of history, confessed to Mr. Rose, that he liked Lord Bute as a man, but had no opinion of him as a Minister;" and when Mr. Rose, who was early impressed with the tale of favouritism, shewed some surprise, the King added, "Upon my honour, what I say, is true." At a still later period, the King made the same confession to Lord Sidmouth. The character of Lord Bute has been hardly dealt with. As he took office to promote the views of the crown and not his own, the public obloquy ought rather to have fallen on the Principal than the Agent. He was certainly the instrument of much mischief to his country, but he was more imposed upon than imposing, and it is not now too much to say, that the King abused his weakness and fidelity, and sacrificed him to his own ends. In his latter years Lord Bute lived in total seclusion, and complained of the neglect and ingratitude of his Royal Master.

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\* Lord Bute, in his private letters, seldom speaks of the king without designating him by the title of his Royal Master.

I am not however about to make any attempt to lessen CHAPTER  
 the veneration, in which the memory of George the Third <sup>X.</sup>   
 is deservedly held for his many excellent and moral  
 qualities, because the truth of History and the object  
 I have in view by this inquiry compel me to expose  
 his ambition of governing by his own authority, instead of  
 administering the power of the Crown by the advice of  
 his Council. It neither follows with men nor with wo-  
 men that they are bad in all respects because they are bad  
 in their ruling passion. In private life George the Third  
 was without a blemish; and it is the more extraordinary  
 that he should have permitted the love of power to have  
 gained so complete an ascendancy, as no man perhaps  
 in any situation, and certainly no man in his situation,  
 ever attained to so high a degree of self-control. But  
 the noblest character that ever adorned the earth was fond  
 of repeating

“ *Si violandum est jus, regnandi gratiâ*  
 “ *Violandum est—aliis rebus pietatem colas.*”

No two lines can better express the character of the late King. Where there was nothing to alarm his ambition, or put to the hazard his governing according to his own will, he was an example to the world of all that is good.

Soon after the resignation of Lord Bute, Lord Chatham was again sent for to form an Administration, and, according to Lord Hardwicke, in the interview which took place he told the King, “ that he could not conduct the Administration without the great Families who had supported

CHAPTER the revolution government, and other great persons, of

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whose abilities and integrity the public had had experience, and who had weight and credit in the nation. I should only deceive your Majesty," he said, "if I should leave you in an opinion that I could go on, and your Majesty make a solid Administration on any other footing." No public man should go into the closet of our sovereigns to submit to their consideration the principle of an Administration, without a copy of this speech having been previously laid on the table by the Lord in waiting. It was impossible that any two men could meet with more opposite ideas on the best plan of forming a Ministry than the King and Lord Chatham: Lord Chatham thinking of nothing but the good of his country, and how that good was to be secured by the strongest administration that could be formed, and the King thinking of nothing but his own power, and how that power was to be secured by the weakest administration that could be formed. The mention, therefore, of the great families, and a solid administration by Lord Chatham, put an end to the conference at once, though from the address with which the King kept his object out of view, so little was then known or suspected of his design to release himself from the controul of his privy council, that neither Lord Chatham nor Lord Hardwicke were aware on what grounds the negociation was broke off. But notwithstanding that the principle, which Lord Chatham laid down as the only constitutional principle on which a Ministry could be constructed, was not then acted upon, nor has since been acted upon, yet is it a principle for ever to be kept sacred

in the archives of liberty, and ever to be honored as the **CHAPTER**  
memorable deposit of the great Lord Chatham.

XI.

From this period to the close of his reign George the Third rigidly adhered to the policy of appointing a weak administration that he might retain the exercise of the executive power in his own hands, instead of a strong one, to which he would have been compelled to concede it. He therefore endeavoured in all instances to nominate a Minister who was totally incapable of standing without his support; for if the administration were strong enough to maintain itself by its own political weight, he well knew that it would be too strong to act in subservience to his will, and would claim its right to the powers which the constitution gave it. The political world always afforded some seceder from his party, or some isolated statesman, of sufficient ability to execute the office, of sufficient poverty to be willing to undertake it, and sufficiently limited in connection to be capable of acceding to his terms. And it must be admitted, that with one or two exceptions, George the Third was singularly happy in the men he obtained. With their aid, and the influence of the Crown, notwithstanding the great abilities that were arrayed on the opposite side and the advantage of a juster cause, he completely succeeded in establishing his point, with but little intermission, through the whole of his reign. His Successor has unhappily followed his example, and since the death of George the Second, no constitutional administration, that is, no administration with a *bonâ fide* disposition on the part of the Crown to

CHAPTER concede to it the full and free exercise of the executive  
XI. authority has existed.

It is now therefore sixty years since the great Landed Proprietors, or the old Baronial Families of the realm, have had any share in directing the councils of their country, for as they were capable of standing by their own strength, had they been admitted into office, and would have been too independent to sacrifice the interests of the country and the principles of the constitution to the personal ambition of the Sovereign, they were but little calculated to answer the views on which the Crown was administered during the last reign, and is administered during the present. It is true indeed, that these families have two or three times been taken into office, that their exclusion might not appear systematic, but they were in reality admitted for no other purpose than to carry the system of exclusion into effect, as good faith was never kept with them, nor intended to be kept with them, an opportunity being always seized to dismiss them in as short a time as possible after their appointment.

By this systematic exclusion, therefore, of our great Landed Proprietors, who, from the large property they have at stake, are more entitled to participate in the direction of public affairs than any other set of men, our Constitution has been entirely changed. If no controul is to be exercised over the Crown by the free advice of the Privy Council, if it is always to have a dependent Administration, that cannot be supported without its influence,

and will therefore act according to its pleasure, it is the CHAPTER  
 same thing as if our Sovereigns exercised their power in XI.  
 their own person, and governed by their own authority,  
 the principle of the Constitution, that the executive  
 functions should be conceded to, Ministers being a mere  
 nullity.

I certainly do not mean to contend, that the Sovereign is bound on all occasions, or at any given time, to form his Administration out of the old baronial families in opposition to his conscience. He may chuse his Ministers at will out of any set of men, and if this or that set were unwilling to favor any policy which in his opinion the interests of the country required, he would be at full liberty to make choice of any others he could find conscientiously disposed to co-operate with him, and prosecute his object. But I certainly mean to contend, that the systematic exclusion of any set of men, whether they be of the lowest rank, or whether they be of the highest rank in the Kingdom, is decidedly unconstitutional, and when the exclusion does apply to men of the highest rank, who are qualified by their situation to be placed at the head of affairs, and not only when it does apply to men of the highest rank, but to the descendants of those families to whom we owe our rights and liberties, and to whom the Royal Family owe their seat on the Throne, it is impossible not to regard the exclusion as more revolting to our feelings. The exclusion too is rendered still more hateful by our knowing that it proceeds from nothing else but a bad ambition to confine all the power of Government to one man, who

CHAPTER is totally incapable of directing it, and who in attempting  
 XI to possess himself of it violates the oath which he took  
 at the altar to concede it to others.

If it be asserted, that there has been no violation of the principles of the Constitution, that all the Administrations of the last Reign possessed the full and free exercise of the executive power, and that the Administration of the present Reign possesses it, then why has not the exercise of this power been occasionally entrusted to the great families? When we see that these families have been most obstinately shut out for sixty years together, and that not one Administration has been willingly formed, that could have maintained itself unsupported by the influence of the Crown, it is impossible not to infer, that weak Administrations have been appointed, and strong ones not appointed, for no other purpose, than to prevent the exercise of the executive power from being surrendered. If the weak ones have possessed this power, why have weak Administrations been preferred to strong ones? The conclusion is inevitable that they have not possessed it.

From the earliest period of our history to the present times the great Barons of England have been our stoutest safeguard against the inroads which the Crown has always attempted to make and will always attempt to make on the freedom of the people; they laid the foundation of our liberties in obtaining for us Magna Charta; they saved our laws by their celebrated declaration of “*Nolumus leges Angliæ mutare;*” they framed

the declaration of rights, and they brought about our **CHAPTER**  
glorious revolution. In the reigns of the Henrys and <sup>XI</sup> Edwards, they supported our claims in the field of battle. They have now changed the scene of action to the floor of Parliament; and though they have been borne down, defeated, and crushed in the last and present reign, yet with what firm and disinterested patriotism, they put themselves forward to defend us, notwithstanding that the press, as venal as it is licentious, has deprived them even of popular favour, the history of the reigns will sufficiently shew. But though they have been defeated, the contest is not ended, nor will it be ended, though they may be defeated for sixty years more. While a Russell, a Howard, and a Cavendish remain; and while a Grey, a Holland, and a Lansdown can lift up their voice in Parliament, the contest will be continued, and long as it may last, they will finally win it for us. The people of England will not for ever remain the dupes of an artful system, and be sold and tricked out of their Constitution by corruption and over-reaching, with whatever profusion the largesses may be bestowed, and with whatever skill the fine spun web of slavery may be wove. But it is more to the noble stand which the great Barons have made, and now make against this undermining attack than to any other cause that we owe the preservation of what still remains of our free Constitution. As ambition is insatiable, so the moralist will sigh over the grave of Bonaparte, the same bad ambition that prompted the Crown to gain what it has, would have prompted it to gain more, could more have been had, and but for the opposition of the

CHAPTER great landed proprietors in both Houses of Parliament,  
<sup>XI.</sup> the Guelphs would have been Tudors, and the *euthanasia* of the Constitution, predicted by Mr. Hume, and predicted perhaps because "his wishes were father to the thought," would already have taken place. But as there is no danger of the baronial families ever deserting the glorious cause they have upheld for so many centuries, whether that cause be assailed by violence, or assailed by influence, there is no danger of our Constitution ever again lapsing into despotism. Till, therefore, a constitutional Administration be formed, that is entrusted with the exercise of the executive power as fully and freely as the law requires that it should be; till a strong and powerful Administration be formed on the principle laid down by Lord Chatham, of including "the great families who had supported the revolution government, and other great persons, of whose abilities and integrity the public had had experience, and who had weight and credit in the nation," it is impossible that the country can be governed as it ought to be.

When George the Third was foiled in his attempt to govern the country, through a creature of his own, and was compelled to appoint a public character, who was known to the country for competency of talent, he established his celebrated party of King's friends, to keep the Minister in check, by stipulating on the appointment of every new Administration, for a certain number of places, to be left at his disposal. As these friends were put in place for the express purpose of supporting the Minister

or not, according as his conduct was consistent or otherwise with the views of the Crown, the Minister had no alternative but obedience or dismissal, and as the party was entirely at the King's command, the King in reality by their intervention secured to himself the whole power of Government. Nothing, therefore, could be more unconstitutional than this menial and go-between party, as it entirely defeated the principle of conceding the executive authority to Ministers; and there can be no doubt that the places should in all instances have been filled up by the friends of the Ministry, and the party have never been allowed to exist. Notwithstanding, however, the impossibility of an independent Administration with such means of tying its hands, his present Majesty has been permitted to act in the same manner, and keep a similar party in pay; but it is to the honour of the country that two statesmen at last arose, who would no longer countenance this violation of the rights and independence of Ministers, and Lord Grenville and Lord Grey have signally distinguished themselves by refusing to become Advisers to the Crown on this humiliating and debilitating system.

The best friends to the Sovereign are those who are the best friends to their Country, as they best promote the interest of the Crown who best promote the public welfare, and no Sovereign should have any friends distinct from this object. Having friends in employ for the sole purpose of enabling the Crown to do that clandestinely and illegally which it cannot do openly and lawfully—for the sole purpose of enabling the Sovereign to retain the personal

CHAPTER exercise of his power instead of entrusting it to Ministers—

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is in fact having them in power for the sole purpose of altering the principle on which the Crown was sworn to be administered, and subverting the Constitution; and as the only end of their appointment is to allow the Sovereign to gratify a mean and paltry ambition which ought never to be entertained, the Officers of the Household should either be nominated by Ministers and considered part of the Ministry, or should be disqualified from voting in Parliament.

As the King and the great Barons are engaged in the same common cause of raising their country to the highest state of prosperity to which it can be raised, a Sovereign who was great as well as good would take pride in collecting them about the Throne instead of excluding them from it, and would discharge the duties of his own high office with fidelity to set them a noble example of faithfully discharging theirs. By shutting the door against them a monarch may have the littleness to hug himself in his closet at their exclusion and glory in his victory; but triumph as he may, his joy must be dashed by the ill-timed thought that he triumphs over the best friends of their Country.

Though certainly no strong foundation has been laid for claims of gratitude from the manner in which the Crown has been administered during the last and present reign, yet it would but ill become us to requite this conduct on the part of our Sovereigns by any unjust restrictions

on the wealth and comfort of the other branches of the **CHAPTER**  
royal family. In making provision for them we ought  
to consider what is due to our own character as well as to  
theirs, and we seem to have reversed the policy we ought  
to pursue; we have been much more cautious of entrusting  
them with money than entrusting them with power; with power they can do nothing but harm, with money  
they can do nothing but good: it is impossible that they  
can be stinted too much in the one; but they ought to  
have a sufficiency of the other to enable them to act with  
the generosity which princes should always shew, and it is  
but fair to admit that generosity is the characteristic of one  
and all of the Family. But so far from giving them  
enough to be generous, we do not give them enough to be  
just. I make these observations not only because justice  
impels me to make them, from the embarrassments in  
which the Royal Family are involved, but in order that the  
preceding inquiry may not be misconstrued to arise from  
any feeling inconsistent with the respect and duty that are  
due to the Family on the Throne.

An opinion is entertained among many men of high  
respectability, and very generally among the inferior classes,  
that a Reform of Parliament would be a panacea for all  
our ills and grievances. Two plans of Reform have been  
mentioned—one is to divide the country into districts ac-  
cording to its population, having the returns regulated by  
the number of people; and the other is to divide it into  
districts of a given extent, having the returns regulated by  
the number of square acres. The only bodies out of

**CHAPTER** which members can be chosen are the agricultural and  
**XI.** manufacturing classes. If the country were divided into districts, according to the number of inhabitants, as the manufacturing population surpasses the agricultural, the number of merchants and manufacturers returned would exceed the number of country gentlemen. If the country were divided into districts according to the extent of land, as the landed interest is richer than the manufacturing the number of country gentlemen returned would exceed the number of merchants and manufacturers; whatever good therefore would result to the country in one case from having a preponderance of merchants and manufacturers, or in the other case from having a preponderance of country gentlemen, that good would arise from whichever mode of reform was preferred. But as the merchants and country gentlemen who would be returned under a reform would be no better than the merchants and country gentlemen who are returned now, and as there are no other persons who can be returned, it is impossible to calculate on the slightest practical good that would result from either mode of reform. The Constitution might be deemed by some to be more perfect in theory, but as there are no means by which any improvement can be made in the existing race of our country gentlemen and merchants, and as no means have been pointed out by which the future race is to be better, there is no reason to conclude that the members who would be returned to the reformed Parliament would be any better than the members who are returned under the existing state of things. As the upright and disinterested statesman who so warmly

espouses this cause, good though he be, would be no better CHAPTER  
XI. when returned to the reformed Parliament than he now is, ~~~~~ and could see no more how to improve our condition than he now sees, he could propose no more measures for our improvement than he now proposes, and as no other man would be better than he now is, and could see no more how to mend our situation than he now sees, no more measures would altogether be proposed for our good than are now proposed, and we should altogether be no better.

I am well aware that I have no chance of being able to convince this honest and zealous Reformer that he is in the pursuit of an illusive good that can never be realized; but all the dreams of all the ills and wrongs which the hero of Cervantes was to redress by the valour of his arm, were not more air-drawn than the dreams of the ills and wrongs which the ardent fancy of Sir Francis Burdett has led him to conclude are to be redressed by Parliamentary Reform. All the best and wealthiest and most intelligent men that the country produces are returned to Parliament at present, and though Sir Francis Burdett will say, and I will say with him, bad are the best, yet unless the Reformed Parliament did as much for us, and returned the best of the bad, we should be worse off than we now are. If, therefore, the same members, or nearly the same members, were not returned to the reformed Parliament that are returned now, we should not be so well off; and if the same members were returned we should be no better off. A Reform therefore may put us in a worse situation but cannot possibly put us in a better; for as no better men are to be

CHAPTER found, at least in this country, than those who are now re-  
XI. turned, all amelioration is impracticable.

It does not appear that the number of votes by which a member is returned makes any discernable difference in him. Sir Francis Burdett, now that he is returned for Westminster, is precisely the same independent patriot and able and eloquent speaker that he was when returned for his first borough, without any observable alteration for the better or worse; and there is no reason to suppose that there will be any apparent difference in any other man when returned for a place that is more populous instead of for a place that is less so. It may be presumed that Sir Francis Burdett, like all other men, will readily admit that he is not so good as he ought to be, yet as the electors of Westminster cannot find out how to get a better member to represent them, they afford no clue by which any other boroughs are to find out how to get better members to represent them. That the House of Commons most richly merits all the hard names which the fertile imagination of Sir Francis Burdett so mercilessly showers down on its resistless head is perfectly true, and it is greatly to be feared that every future House of Commons will deserve them as richly; but as the House, constituted as it is, contains all the best and ablest men in the country, vile and degenerate as these sons of men are, there is no possibility of getting a better House, without as of old raising up a new race of men from dragon's teeth. As there would be no greater change of members in a Reformed Parliament than there usually is in a new Parliament, a reformed one would be

productive of no more good than a new one, and what CHAPTER  
that good amounts to may be safely referred to Sir Francis XI.  
Burdett to say. Of all the bubbles by which public ex-  
pectation has been at different times excited in this country,  
the bubble that would burst at the close of the first session  
of the reformed Parliament would be the greatest.

On the evil of Triennial Parliaments the voice of Addison  
ought to be conclusive. Though the Septennial Act was  
a Whig measure, and Addison was a Whig, yet he was as  
warm a friend to truth and reason as to liberty, and it is im-  
possible to read his account of the state of the country  
when Triennial Parliaments prevailed, of the feuds and en-  
mities, the riot and confusion, that never ceased from one  
election to another, without rejoicing that the life of a  
Parliament is prolonged to seven years.

But as Parliamentary Reform is rather an useless than a  
dangerous measure, as there is nothing that the good can  
lose by it, and nothing that the bad can gain, I should not  
have introduced the subject were it not necessary to en-  
deavour to draw men's minds from a good that is ideal  
and unattainable, to a good that is real and practicable,  
to the administration of the government on sound and  
constitutional principles and this not only for the salva-  
tion of our rights and liberties, but for such alterations in  
our laws and policy as will best remove crime, slavery, and  
poverty from the world.

FINIS.

the 10th day of January 1792. To whom so ever it may concern  
I do hereby declare that I am of sound mind & full  
of 10 years of age & I do hereby make & publish my last  
will in writing and in presence of two witnesses and do desire  
that the same to be read in publick at my grave and delivered  
to my executors to be carried into execution.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF I have hereunto set my hand

the 10th day of January 1792. I do hereby declare that I am  
of sound mind & full of 10 years of age & I do hereby make &  
publish my last will in writing and in presence of two witnesses  
and do desire that the same to be read in publick at my grave and delivered

to my executors to be carried into execution.

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## APPENDIX.

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### TABLEAU, &c.

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*(Referred to in page 58)*



# TABLEAU COMPARATIF

## Des Revenus Presumés Départemens.

1<sup>o</sup>. d'après les Revenus trouvés dans les Cantons déjà cadastrés.

2<sup>o</sup>. d'après le Produit moyen de l'arpent dans les mêmes Cantons.

3<sup>o</sup>. d'après les recherches des Commissaires spéciaux envoyés dans les départemens en 1814.

| DÉPARTEMENS.              | REVENUS LE CADASTRE,                       |                                          | REVENUS<br>Suivant le Travail des<br>Commissaires spéciaux |
|---------------------------|--------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------|
|                           | D'Après le Revenu des<br>Cantons Cadastré. | D'Après le Produit<br>Moyen de l'Arpent. |                                                            |
| Ain .....                 | 11,978,163f                                | 10,062,243f                              | 17,500,000f                                                |
| Aisne .....               | 23,435,114                                 | 27,441,210                               | 31,000,000                                                 |
| Allier .....              | 9,240,259                                  | 8,238,537                                | 13,000,000                                                 |
| Alpes (Basses) .....      | 3,498,235                                  | 4,654,810                                | 5,200,000                                                  |
| Alpes (Hautes) .....      | 2,963,491                                  | 3,604,386                                | 4,000,000                                                  |
| Ardèche .....             | 10,793,768                                 | 11,767,878                               | 12,500,000                                                 |
| Ardennes .....            | 10,496,894                                 | 12,203,843                               | 14,000,000                                                 |
| Ariège .....              | 7,763,157                                  | 11,618,245                               | 9,400,000                                                  |
| Aube .....                | 14,166,666                                 | 13,685,665                               | 15,000,000                                                 |
| Aude .....                | 13,129,251                                 | 17,263,896                               | 17,000,000                                                 |
| Aveyron .....             | 11,090,414                                 | 12,469,600                               | 15,000,000                                                 |
| Bouches-du-Rhône .....    | 15,670,102                                 | 17,258,140                               | 18,800,000                                                 |
| Calvados .....            | 33,543,307                                 | 43,637,130                               | 36,800,000                                                 |
| Cantal .....              | 8,711,538                                  | 10,022,264                               | 10,300,000                                                 |
| Charente .....            | 17,350,418                                 | 17,323,756                               | 18,500,000                                                 |
| Charente-Inférieure ..... | 20,227,272                                 | 26,358,967                               | 25,400,000                                                 |
| Cher .....                | 9,814,814                                  | 9,330,579                                | 11,000,000                                                 |
| Corrèze .....             | 5,441,489                                  | 9,572,228                                | 8,800,000                                                  |
| Côte-d'Or .....           | 21,896,551                                 | 27,396,126                               | 25,000,000                                                 |
| Côtes-du-Nord .....       | 17,872,340                                 | 19,383,128                               | 19,500,000                                                 |
| Creuse .....              | 6,068,965                                  | 6,929,686                                | 7,000,000                                                  |
| Dordogne .....            | 13,966,887                                 | 14,431,754                               | 21,500,000                                                 |
| Doubs .....               | 14,075,925                                 | 14,464,385                               | 13,000,000                                                 |
| Drôme .....               | 10,413,223                                 | 20,749,342                               | 14,000,000                                                 |
| Eure .....                | 27,388,059                                 | 27,486,125                               | 29,400,000                                                 |
| Eure-et-Loir .....        | 14,303,797                                 | 15,912,653                               | 22,000,000                                                 |
| Finistère .....           | 14,343,434                                 | 13,666,599                               | 16,000,000                                                 |
| Gard .....                | 17,891,653                                 | 18,213,648                               | 18,400,000                                                 |
| Garonne (Haute) .....     | 13,525,244                                 | 18,035,172                               | 22,500,000                                                 |
| Gers .....                | 11,296,496                                 | 10,556,592                               | 16,800,000                                                 |
| Gironde .....             | 32,111,111                                 | 18,130,959                               | 40,000,000                                                 |
| Aérrault .....            | 15,094,674                                 | 11,660,672                               | 20,000,000                                                 |
| Ille-et-Vilaine .....     | 18,543,689                                 | 18,451,439                               | 21,000,000                                                 |
| Indre .....               | 7,411,347                                  | 8,433,965                                | 10,000,000                                                 |
| Indre-et-Loire .....      | 12,333,333                                 | 16,176,958                               | 15,400,000                                                 |
| Isère .....               | 17,500,000                                 | 32,334,980                               | 24,000,000                                                 |
| Jura .....                | 14,042,553                                 | 23,474,099                               | 16,000,000                                                 |
| Landes .....              | 4,842,767                                  | 15,285,148                               | 6,700,000                                                  |
| Loir-et-Cher .....        | 11,546,153                                 | 16,337,070                               | 12,000,000                                                 |

| DÉPARTEMENS.              | REVENUS LE CADASTRE,                       |                                          | REVENUS<br>Suivant le Travail des<br>Commissaires spéciaux |
|---------------------------|--------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------|
|                           | D'Après le Revenu des<br>Cantons Cadastré. | D'Après le Produit<br>Moyen de l'Arpent. |                                                            |
| Loire .....               | 1,174,497                                  | 11,269,314                               | 14,000,000                                                 |
| Loire (Haute) .....       | 11,086,956                                 | 15,780,805                               | 11,000,000                                                 |
| Loire Inférieure .....    | 6,122,448                                  | 15,959,719                               | 19,000,000                                                 |
| Loiret .....              | 13,468,208                                 | 8,743,686                                | 19,000,000                                                 |
| Lot .....                 | 9,663,424                                  | 7,936,566                                | 11,500,000                                                 |
| Lot-et-Garonne .....      | 16,904,260                                 | 17,689,750                               | 21,500,000                                                 |
| Lozère .....              | 5,058,823                                  | 5,578,784                                | 6,500,000                                                  |
| Maine-et-Loire .....      | 21,110,474                                 | 32,426,909                               | 24,000,000                                                 |
| Manche .....              | 29,760,000                                 | 37,650,134                               | 32,000,000                                                 |
| Marne .....               | 14,879,518                                 | 8,991,650                                | 19,300,000                                                 |
| Marne (Haute) .....       | 12,666,666                                 | 12,626,163                               | 13,100,000                                                 |
| Mayenne .....             | 13,456,790                                 | 19,414,219                               | 15,000,000                                                 |
| Meurthe .....             | 14,955,159                                 | 13,151,666                               | 17,700,000                                                 |
| Meuse .....               | 12,845,528                                 | 10,393,658                               | 15,500,000                                                 |
| Morbihan .....            | 14,646,464                                 | 16,631,780                               | 15,900,000                                                 |
| Moselle .....             | 14,138,117                                 | 21,776,490                               | 19,400,000                                                 |
| Nièvre .....              | 10,653,226                                 | 10,289,127                               | 13,500,000                                                 |
| Nord .....                | 37,431,192                                 | 32,645,353                               | 50,000,000                                                 |
| Oise .....                | 24,100,000                                 | 26,984,311                               | 27,000,000                                                 |
| Orne .....                | 20,681,520                                 | 20,758,961                               | 22,500,000                                                 |
| Pas-de-Calais .....       | 31,720,430                                 | 36,117,220                               | 35,500,000                                                 |
| Puy-de-Dôme .....         | 14,880,952                                 | 21,665,708                               | 22,500,000                                                 |
| Pyrénées (Basses) .....   | 10,800,756                                 | 14,729,727                               | 14,800,000                                                 |
| Pyrénées (Hautes) .....   | 6,785,714                                  | 3,821,050                                | 7,500,000                                                  |
| Pyrenees-Orientales ..... | 4,697,986                                  | 8,587,102                                | 7,700,000                                                  |
| Rhin (Bas) .....          | 15,692,307                                 | 16,142,843                               | 24,500,000                                                 |
| Rhin (Haut) .....         | 13,846,153                                 | 9,720,568                                | 18,000,000                                                 |
| Rhône .....               | 16,030,534                                 | 10,021,208                               | 21,500,000                                                 |
| Saône (Haute) .....       | 16,402,809                                 | 19,137,348                               | 17,000,000                                                 |
| Saône-et-Loire .....      | 22,925,303                                 | 23,784,470                               | 30,000,000                                                 |
| Sarthe .....              | 17,906,077                                 | 18,770,881                               | 21,000,000                                                 |
| Seine .....               | 49,921,466                                 | 65,001,764                               | 54,000,000                                                 |
| Seine-Inférieure .....    | 34,285,714                                 | 34,290,332                               | 47,000,000                                                 |
| Seine-et-Marne .....      | 21,032,679                                 | 25,388,621                               | 28,000,000                                                 |
| Seine-et-Oise .....       | 29,483,660                                 | 32,242,748                               | 33,600,000                                                 |
| Sèvres (Deux) .....       | 10,101,505                                 | 12,741,393                               | 16,300,000                                                 |
| Somme .....               | 29,732,758                                 | 28,947,398                               | 32,000,000                                                 |
| Tarn .....                | 11,898,734                                 | 12,343,969                               | 16,800,000                                                 |
| Tarn-et-Garonne .....     | 11,151,825                                 | 10,845,466                               | 16,800,000                                                 |
| Var .....                 | 15,384,615                                 | 21,823,144                               | 23,000,000                                                 |
| Vaucluse .....            | 7,421,155                                  | 10,972,120                               | 11,500,000                                                 |
| Vendée .....              | 15,000,000                                 | 10,868,119                               | 15,600,000                                                 |
| Vienne .....              | 10,074,626                                 | 8,630,740                                | 12,300,000                                                 |
| Vienne (Haute) .....      | 7,152,317                                  | 8,577,091                                | 8,500,000                                                  |
| Vosges .....              | 12,580,645                                 | 7,902,836                                | 12,800,000                                                 |
| Yonne .....               | 15,833,333                                 | 26,444,857                               | 17,500,000                                                 |
| <b>TOTAUX .....</b>       | <b>1,323,138,877</b>                       | <b>1,486,244,653</b>                     | <b>1,626,000,000</b>                                       |

